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Reading Guidance 
This PhD thesis is written in ‘paper’ format. There are 5 core research Chapters, 
each either published or under review in research journals. The 5 core research Chapters 
are sandwiched between an Introduction and Discussion that together form a 6th Chapter 
that has been accepted for publication in the legal journal, Criminal Law Review. The 6th 
Chapter was written as an invited special issue piece to summarize this program of 
research for a legal-practitioner audience.  
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Introduction 
At least half of all cases tried in British criminal courts concern alleged sexual 
offences (Jory & Jones, 2016; Truss, 2017), and a large proportion of cases involving 
children as complainers relate to domestic abuse or sexual offences (Evidence and 
Procedure Review Report (EPRR), Scottish Court Service, 2015). Regardless of age, the 
witnesses in such cases are vulnerable since the accused will often represent (if the 
allegations are true) a source of fear for the witness, and the recounted events may be 
particularly traumatic, threatening, or harmful (EPRR [Section 2.2], 2015). It is now 
widely accepted that gathering evidence from young and vulnerable witnesses requires 
special care, and that subjecting them to the traditional adversarial form of examination 
and cross-examination – often characterized by overly leading, complex, and confusing 
questioning (Henderson, 2015) - is no longer acceptable (EPRR [Section 2.1], 2015; 
Spencer & Lamb, 2012).  
Recently, the availability of special measures to support victims and witnesses 
giving evidence in court in Scotland (e.g., via a live TV link, section 271J; use of screens, 
section 271K; presence of a supporter, section 271L, Victims and Witnesses [Scotland] 
Act, 2014) has increased dramatically (Standards of Service for Victims and Witnesses, 
2017), after calls for a more systematic approach to gathering evidence from children was 
made by the Lord President (Carloway, 2013). Furthermore, the fundamental proposition 
explored in the EPRR (2015) is that substantial improvements can be made to the 
administration of justice with the widespread use of pre-recorded evidence in place of 
testimony in court. The premise is that properly conducted witness interviews before trial 
are far more likely than belated appearances at court to elicit comprehensive, credible, and 
reliable accounts, as well as to improve case management (EPRR [Section 1.24], 2015; 
Westera, Kebbell, & Milne, 2013). The EPRR (2015) led to the development of two 
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working groups; one seeking to improve and extend the use of Joint Investigative 
Interviews (JIIs; i.e., forensic interviews conducted by police officers and social workers) 
as evidence-in-chief and the second focused on expanding the use of existing procedures 
for taking evidence by commissioner1. A High Court of Justiciary Practice Note on Taking 
Evidence by a Commissioner was launched in March 2017, and is regarded as the next 
step in improving the way in which children and vulnerable witnesses are treated in 
Scotland (Dorrian, 2017). Similar procedures (that bring into force Section 28 of the 
Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, 1999) have already been successfully piloted in 
England and Wales (Baverstock, 2016) and are due for national roll-out.  
There is no doubt that such monumental changes proposed to the law, 
administrative infrastructure, and practical arrangements, represents a significant 
attitudinal shift in the criminal justice system. However, procedural changes alone are not 
enough to ensure that trials and verdicts are just and fair. Informed by decades of research 
investigating the best ways in which alleged victims of child abuse can be questioned by 
police and social service agencies to uncover both truth and deceit (see Granhag, Vrij, & 
Verschuere, 2014; Lamb, La Rooy, Malloy, & Katz, 2011), there has been recognition 
from practitioners (e.g., Dorrian, 2017; Henderson, 2015; Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2015) 
and researchers (e.g., Andrews, Lamb, & Lyon, 2015; Zajac & Hayne, 2003) that the form 
and substance of traditional adversarial methods of questioning do not elicit best (i.e., full 
and accurate) evidence, especially from vulnerable witnesses. Although still disputed by 
some advocates, research and best-evidence practices have made clear that, if examination 
																																																						
1Taking evidence by commissioner is currently considered only for the most vulnerable 
witnesses. In these instances, delays in testifying are deemed likely to increase distress and 
trauma, significantly hindering the witness’s ability to give evidence. Evidence can 
therefore be taken before a commissioner appointed by the court. The evidence is taken in 
full (direct-, cross-, and re-direct-examination) from the witness, proceedings are video 
recorded, and later received at the subsequent trial (see Vulnerable Witnesses [Scotland] 
Act, 2004). 
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and cross-examination are to be engines for discovering the truth, the nature of the 
questioning itself must be improved (Dorrian, 2017; Spencer & Lamb, 2012).  
The judiciary in England and Wales have made considerable strides in this 
direction. For example, the use of registered intermediaries, who are neutral specialists 
(often speech and language therapists) bought in to facilitate the communication between 
particularly vulnerable witnesses and forensic practitioners during testimony, is becoming 
more accepted and widespread (Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2009). “Toolkits” are also free 
resources provided by the Advocates Gateway, hosted by the Inns of Court College of 
Advocacy, for practitioners preparing to question vulnerable witnesses. Further, alongside 
the roll-out of pre-recorded evidence in place of testimony in court, England and Wales 
will implement Ground Rules Hearings (GRHs) at which judges can review and revise the 
questions to be asked of witnesses (Baverstock, 2016). Whilst the Scottish judiciary have 
not implemented these measures nor any mandatory training for practitioners, concerns 
have been raised that examination practices need to be more informed by our established 
knowledge of children’s developing capacities and limitations (Carloway, 2013; Dorrian, 
2017).  
Despite these changes to procedure and practice, and concern expressed by the 
judiciary (e.g., Carloway, 2013; Dorrian, 2017; Spencer & Lamb, 2012) about the risks 
associated with inappropriate procedures in relation to children’s testimony, no prior 
systematic quantitative research has been conducted investigating the nature of the direct- 
and cross-examinations of children in Scotland. Such research is necessary to provide a 
baseline against which the effectiveness of changes to procedure and practice can be 
measured, and to inform the necessity and extent of further changes. The present program 
of research was therefore designed to investigate four parameters of prosecutors and 
defense lawyers’ questions: question type [Chapter 1; Andrews, S. J. & Lamb, M. 
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E. (2016). How do lawyers examine and cross-examine children in Scotland? Applied 
Cognitive Psychology, 30(6), 953–971. doi: 10.1002/acp.3286], linguistic complexity 
[Chapter 2; Andrews, S. J. & Lamb, M. E. (2017). The structural linguistic complexity of 
lawyers’ questions and children’s responses in Scottish criminal courts. Child Abuse & 
Neglect, 65, 182-193. doi: 10.1016/j.chiabu.2017.01.022], question repetition [Chapter 3; 
Andrews, S. J. & Lamb, M. E. (2017, in press). Lawyers’ question repetition and 
children’s responses in Scottish criminal courts. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 
Advanced Online Publication. doi: 10.1177/0886260517725739], and question content 
[Chapter 4; Andrews, S. J. & Lamb, M. E. (under review). Lawyers’ question content and 
children’s responses in Scottish criminal courts. Psychology, Crime, & Law.], how these 
parameters affected children’s responses (including an in-depth analysis of the questions 
that affected children’s propensity to express uncertainty [Chapter 5; Andrews, S. J., 
Ahern, E. C., & Lamb, M. E. (2017). Children’s uncertain responses when testifying about 
alleged sexual abuse in Scottish courts. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 35, 204-224. doi: 
10.1002/bsl.2286]), and whether the children’s ages affected how they were questioned or 
how they responded.  
Permission for the research was sought and granted by the head of the Scottish 
judiciary: the Lord President and Lord Justice General at the time, Lord Gill. In order to 
attain the sample, the Court Service Team of the Scottish Court Service identified all cases 
conducted in six major criminal court-houses in Scotland between 2009 and 2014 in which 
alleged victims of child abuse aged 5 to 17 years old had testified. Forty-three trials 
involving a total of 74 children were identified. Recordings of the cases were located, and 
the portions of the trials in which the children testified were transcribed, coded, and 
analyzed. Cases involving children who needed the assistance of translators, retracted their 
sexual abuse allegations, or had many sections of inaudible or missing audio were 
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excluded from detailed coding and statistical analysis. The remaining 36 trials involved a 
total of 56 alleged victims of child sexual abuse. 
For each of the Chapters, I was the lead author and conducted all of the sample 
collection, primary data coding, statistical analysis, primary interpretations, write-ups, and 
revisions. My supervisor and co-authors advised throughout this process and commented 
on drafts of each of the Chapters after they were written-up.  
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Abstract 
In the first study to systematically assess lawyers’ questioning of children in Scotland, we 
examined 56 trial transcripts of 5- to 17-year-old children testifying as alleged victims of 
sexual abuse, focusing on differences between prosecutors and defense lawyers with 
respect to the types of questions asked and effects on witnesses’ responses. Prosecutors 
used more invitations, directives, and option-posing prompts than defense lawyers, who 
used more suggestive prompts than prosecutors. Children were more unresponsive and 
less informative when answering defense lawyers than prosecutors. All children 
contradicted themselves at least once, with defense lawyers eliciting more self-
contradictions than prosecutors. Suggestive questions were most likely to elicit self-
contradictions, with suggestive confrontational and introductory questions eliciting 
significantly more self-contradictions than suggestive suppositions. Children also 
acquiesced more in response to tagged suggestions than untagged suggestions. Overall, 
lawyers altered their behavior little in response to variations in children’s ages.  
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How do lawyers examine and cross-examine children in Scotland? 
In adversarial jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and 
New Zealand, cross-examination plays a critical role, since defendants have the right to 
challenge the evidence against them. However, recent experimental and field research, 
conducted primarily in the United States and New Zealand, has highlighted problems in 
the ways that prosecutors and defense lawyers question children in court, generating 
international interest, concern, and debate regarding the ways in which children’s evidence 
should be presented and challenged. Remarkably, however, there has been no prior 
systematic quantitative research on the cross-examination of children in the United 
Kingdom, because proceedings are not routinely transcribed and are kept confidential by 
the courts. In England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, common-law principles prevail, 
whereas in Scotland there is a pluralistic system based on shared common-law principles 
combined with some unique civil-law principles. In particular, Scottish law requires that 
all evidence (including identification evidence) must be corroborated, and as a result 
children are called upon to testify more often and regarding a much wider range of crimes, 
than in the rest of the United Kingdom. Furthermore, precognition is a unique feature of 
Scottish law which requires that all witnesses must state their evidence before trial, so that 
advocates know in advance what evidence witnesses are likely to give and can thus better 
prepare their cross-examinations than can barristers in the rest of the United Kingdom. 
Further, forensic interviews are conducted in accordance with Joint Investigative 
Interview guidelines (Scottish Government, 2011) as opposed to Achieving Best Evidence 
guidelines (Home Office, 2011). All of these factors underline the importance of research 
examining cross-examination practices in a variety of common law jurisdictions, where 
differences like those enumerated above may profoundly affect what happens in court. 
Accordingly, the current research builds upon an unprecedented collaboration with the 
QUESTIONING CHILDREN IN SCOTTISH COURTS 
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Scottish judiciary, which has publicly and privately expressed considerable concern 
recently about the risks associated with inappropriate procedures in relation to children’s 
testimony. The study was designed to assess comprehensively how Scottish prosecutors 
and defense lawyers question children. 
The cross-examination of witnesses is often deemed essential to protect the 
accused’s right to a fair trial (e.g., Article 6 (3d), of the European Convention on Human 
Rights; Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). Courts have a duty to allow witnesses 
to give their best evidence (Home Office, 2011, section 5.8) but in adversarial 
jurisdictions, lawyers aim to undermine the opponents’ witnesses, and they question child 
witnesses accordingly. In particular, lawyers may challenge witness credibility and 
persuade children to change details in their accounts, often by exploiting their 
developmental limitations. Such questioning techniques violate guidelines, based on an 
extensive body of experimental and field research, outlining the best ways to elicit truthful 
testimony (see Rush, Quas, & McAuliff, 2012; Spencer & Lamb, 2012) and raise serious 
questions about the extent to which courts ensure both that guilty suspects are convicted 
and that innocent suspects are not wrongly convicted.  
Question Types and Children’s Responses: Lessons from Psychological Research 
The question types used to elicit accounts of children’s experiences affect both the 
quantity and quality of the information obtained (see Lamb, La Rooy, Malloy, & Katz, 
2011; Lamb, Malloy, Hershkowitz, & La Rooy, 2015; Saywitz, Lyon, & Goodman, 2011 
for reviews). On the one hand, when questioned with open-ended free-recall prompts (e.g., 
“Tell me what happened.”), children provide accounts that may be brief but are more 
likely to be accurate. Additional open-ended prompts can be used to follow-up and thus 
elicit elaborations or further details (e.g., “You mentioned X. Tell me more about that.”). 
Even though younger children may produce shorter and less detailed accounts in response 
QUESTIONING CHILDREN IN SCOTTISH COURTS 
	
	 16 
to open-ended questions than older children and adults (e.g., Eisen, Goodman, Qin, Davis, 
& Crayton, 2007; Hershkowitz, Lamb, Orbach, Katz, & Horowitz, 2012; Lamb, Sternberg, 
Orbach, Esplin, Stewart, & Mitchell, 2003), their reports are no less accurate (e.g., Jack, 
Leov, & Zajac, 2014; Sutherland & Hayne, 2001) but the probability that responses will 
be erroneous increases considerably when children are questioned using closed-ended 
recognition prompts (e.g., “Did he touch you with his fingers?”), due to the false 
recognition of details and response biases (e.g., Jones & Pipe, 2002; Lamb, Orbach, 
Hershkowitz, Horowitz, & Abbott, 2007). Younger children are more likely than older 
children and adults to provide erroneous details in response to closed-ended questions 
(e.g., Waterman, Blades, & Spencer, 2001, 2004; see Melnyk, Crossman, & Scullin, 2007, 
for a review).  
Suggestive prompts are most problematic because children, especially young 
children, may change details in their accounts and thus respond inconsistently, either by 
incorporating suggested information or acquiescing to perceived interviewer coercion 
(e.g., Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Bruck, Ceci, & Principe, 2006; Eisen, Qin, Goodman, & Davis, 
2002; Lamb & Fauchier, 2001; London & Kulkofsky, 2010; Orbach & Lamb, 2001). 
Suggestive tag questions (e.g., “You’re lying, aren’t you?”) are especially detrimental 
(Lamb & Fauchier, 2001; Orbach & Lamb, 2001; Walker, Kenniston, & Inada, 2013). 
Recent research distinguishing between different types of suggestive prompts – 
confrontational, suppositional, and introductory - in forensic interviews (Orbach, Lamb, 
Hershkowitz, & Abbott, in press, see Table 1) found that children were twice as likely to 
acquiesce than resist interviewers’ suggestions. Contradictions were most likely to be 
elicited in response to suggestive introductory prompts, closely followed by suggestive 
confrontational prompts, although the latter elicited almost a third of all contradictory 
responses, despite accounting for only 5% of the total number of suggestive prompts. 
QUESTIONING CHILDREN IN SCOTTISH COURTS 
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Younger children were asked fewer suggestive questions than older children, but were 
more likely to acquiesce in response to suggestive confrontational prompts, and were as 
likely to acquiesce in response to suggestive suppositional and introductory prompts.  
To minimize the risk of eliciting erroneous information, therefore, best-practice 
guidelines for forensic interviewers encourage maximal reliance on free-recall prompts, 
advise against the use of closed-ended ‘yes/no’ questions, and strongly discourage 
suggestive utterances (American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children, 2012; 
Home Office, 2011, section 3.44; Lamb et al., 2015). However, defense lawyers are 
permitted to ask children misleading questions when testing their evidence in cross-
examinations, even though this increases the chances that children will answer incorrectly 
(Henderson, 2002) and thus does not give children the opportunity to “give their best 
evidence”. 
Types of Questions Asked by Lawyers in Court  
Several recent studies have examined lawyer-child interactions using court 
transcripts from New Zealand (Hanna, Davies, Crothers, & Henderson, 2012 [18 cases]; 
Zajac & Cannan, 2009 [15 cases]; Zajac, Gross, & Hayne, 2003 [21 cases]) and the United 
States (Andrews, Ahern, Stolzenberg, & Lyon, in press [120 cases]; Andrews, Lamb, & 
Lyon, 2015a, 2015b [120 cases]; Klemfuss, Quas, & Lyon, 2014 [42 cases]; Stolzenberg 
and Lyon, 2014 [72 cases]). In New Zealand and throughout the United Kingdom, 
children’s direct testimony is provided to the court by way of pre-recorded forensic 
interviews, sometimes supplemented by direct examination by prosecutors at the time of 
trial.  In the United States, by contrast, direct testimony is provided at the time of trial, 
without the use of pre-recorded testimony. In all of these jurisdictions, cross-examination 
takes place during the trial. 
Although researchers have generally found that prosecutors ask more open-ended 
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questions than defense lawyers, and that defense lawyers ask more suggestive questions 
than prosecutors (e.g., Zajac et al., 2003), both prosecutors and defense lawyers 
predominantly ask questions that could be answered “yes” or “no” (Hanna et al., 2012; 
Klemfuss et al., 2014; Stolzenberg & Lyon, 2014; Zajac & Cannan, 2009). In the most 
comprehensive study to date, Andrews et al. (2015a) examined a total of 48,716 question-
response pairs, and found that lawyers used more closed-ended than open-ended prompts. 
Specifically, prosecutors used more invitations, directives, and option-posing prompts than 
defense lawyers, who used more suggestive prompts than prosecutors. 
Because younger children are more suggestible and may produce less detailed 
answers than older children, it seems likely that lawyers may ask children of different ages 
different types of questions. However, the results of previous studies have again been 
somewhat inconsistent, likely because of methodological differences and the small 
numbers of cases included in most studies. Klemfuss et al. (2014) found that, with age, 
there was a significant decrease in the use of option-posing questions and an increase in 
the use of suggestive questions whereas Stolzenberg and Lyon (2014) found that lawyers 
were slightly more likely to ask younger children yes-no questions. However, both Zajac 
et al. (2003) and Andrews et al. (2015a) found no significant associations between 
children’s ages and the types of questions used by both prosecutors and defense lawyers.  
Children’s Responsiveness and Productivity in Court  
In forensic interviews, children who make allegations of abuse are responsive 
(acknowledge and attempt to engage with the question posed) to almost all the questions 
addressed to them (e.g., Lamb, Hershkowitz, Sternberg, Esplin, Hovav, Manor, & 
Yudilevitch, 1996; Sternberg, Lamb, Davies, & Westcott, 2001). Children’s productivity 
(in terms of the number of details reported) increases with age, especially in response to 
invitations (Lamb, Sternberg, & Esplin, 2000; Lamb et al., 2003), although very young 
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children are most productive in response to open-ended directive questions (Hershkowitz 
et al., 2012). Children are also responsive in the courtroom. Both Andrews et al. (2015a) 
and Klemfuss et al. (2014) found that child witnesses were more often responsive than 
unresponsive, although Andrews et al. (2015a, in press) also reported that children were 
more responsive to prosecutors than defense lawyers and that productivity increased with 
age, with children more productive in response to open-ended prompts than closed-ended 
prompts. Similarly, Klemfuss et al. (2014) found that, with increasing age, children 
elaborated more (i.e., provided more information than was requested) in response to 
prosecutors’ rather than defense lawyers’ questions. Older children elaborated more in 
response to open-ended directive and closed-ended option-posing questions than did 
younger children, but there were no such differences with respect to suggestive questions. 
Unfortunately, the actual age range was unspecified, although the children averaged 12 
years of age. 
Children’s Self-contradictions in Court 
In adversarial jurisdictions, jurors often place a strong emphasis on report 
consistency when assessing testimony (e.g., Bruer & Pozzulo, 2014; Myers, Redlich, 
Goodman, Prizmich, & Imwinkelried, 1999; Semmler & Brewer, 2002). Although 
inconsistencies are reported by judges to have a small effect on trial outcomes (Connolly, 
Price, & Gordon, 2009), self-contradictory responses may reduce children’s testimonial 
credibility (Home Office, 2011, section 2.214) and there is considerable interest in the 
extent to which testifying children might contradict themselves in court (e.g., Fisher, 
Brewer, & Mitchell, 2009). 
Many laboratory analogue studies have shown that children are more likely to 
change their correct responses when cross-examined suggestively (e.g., Jack & Zajac, 
2014; Fogliati & Bussey, 2014). For example, Fogliati and Bussey (2014) interviewed 120 
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5- and 7-year-old children twice about a staged transgression. All children first underwent 
a direct-examination and then either a second direct- or cross-examination immediately 
afterwards. Children interviewed in the direct/direct condition were equally accurate in the 
two interviews, whereas children in the direct/cross condition were significantly less 
accurate when cross-examined. Although some researchers have shown that these effects 
are stronger for younger than for older children (e.g., Bettenay, Ridley, Henry, & Crane, 
2014; Zajac & Hayne, 2006), Fogliati and Bussey (2014) reported no age differences in 
the number of errors elicited in cross-examinations, perhaps because the age difference 
between the groups was so small.  
Much less is known about age differences in children’s responses to direct- and 
cross-examination questions in real court cases. In New Zealand, Zajac et al. (2003) found 
that, regardless of age, children were more resistant and acquiescent in response to leading 
questions asked by defense lawyers rather than prosecutors. Children made no changes to 
their earlier statements in response to questions from prosecutors but 76% made changes 
under cross-examination, with 95% of these changes made in response to leading or 
credibility-challenging prompts. Moreover, Zajac and Cannan (2009) reported that both 
child and adult complainants were more likely to change their statements in response to 
questions from the defense than the prosecution. All of the adults and 93% of the children 
changed at least one response during cross-examination. Zajac and Cannan (2009) did not 
report how often prosecutors elicited self-contradictions and because the study was 
conducted in New Zealand where pre-recorded forensic interviews comprise the bulk of 
children’s direct testimonies the researchers could not compare in-court testimony with the 
contents of the forensic interviews. In the United States, Andrews et al. (2015a) identified 
self-contradictions in 95% of the cases studied. Defense lawyers elicited more self-
contradictions than prosecutors, but nearly all prosecutors (86%) elicited at least one self-
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contradiction. Suggestive questions elicited more self-contradictions than any other 
prompt type, regardless of age.  
Current Study  
There has been no previous research on cross examinations in the United 
Kingdom. The current study assessed the direct- and cross-examination of children in 
Scottish courts in a sample of transcripts involving 56 5- to 17-year-old children 
questioned in trials held between 2009 and 2014. Specifically, child age and lawyer role 
(prosecution/defense) were examined in relation to the types of questions asked. Child 
age, lawyer role, question types, and/or suggestive question subtypes were then further 
analyzed in relation to children’s responsiveness, the frequency of self-contradictions, 
children’s acquiescence and resistance to lawyers’ suggestive questions, and children’s 
productivity. To provide a comprehensive picture, and a foundation for further research, 
we further sought to explore the frequency with which substantive and non-substantive 
questions were asked, and whether this differed in relation to lawyer role and children’s 
age. Judges’ input was also described.  
In light of previous findings, first, we predicted that lawyers would ask more 
closed-ended than open-ended questions, and that defense lawyers would be more likely 
than prosecutors to use suggestive prompts. Second, we predicted that defense lawyers 
would be more likely than prosecutors to elicit self-contradictions (because they used 
more suggestive questions). Third, we predicted that suggestive prompts would be most 
likely to elicit self-contradictions, and that children would be more acquiescent in 
response to defense lawyers’ than prosecutors’ suggestive questions. Finally, we predicted 
that the effects of closed-ended and suggestive questions would be more detrimental (i.e., 
lower responsiveness, more self-contradictions, and lower productivity) for younger than 
for older children, but, in light of previous findings (Andrews et al., 2015a, in press), that 
QUESTIONING CHILDREN IN SCOTTISH COURTS 
	
	 22 
there would be no age differences in lawyers’ use of question types and suggestive 
question subtypes.  
Method 
Sample 
The Court Service Team of the Scottish Court Service identified all cases 
conducted in six major court-houses in Scotland between 2009 and 2014 in which alleged 
victims of child abuse had testified. Forty-three trials were identified. Recordings of the 
cases were located, and the portions of the trials in which the children testified were 
transcribed. Cases involving children who needed the assistance of translators or retracted 
their sexual abuse allegations or had many sections of inaudible or missing audio were 
excluded. Transcripts of 36 trials involving a total of 56 alleged victims of child sexual 
abuse were eligible for use in the current study. Nine cases (11 children) were from 
Aberdeen, 9 cases (19 children) from Edinburgh, 12 cases (16 children) from Glasgow, 1 
case (1 child) from Inverness, 3 cases (5 children) from Livingston, and 2 cases (4 
children) from Perth. The trials included in the present study involved at least 25 different 
prosecutors, 24 different defense lawyers, and 22 different judges. There were 9 
transcripts for which this information could not be determined.   
Children reported single (n = 18) or multiple (n = 38) sexually abusive experiences 
involving penetration (n = 38), touching under clothes (n = 10), touching over clothes (n = 
3), and indecent exposure (n = 5). The final sample included 40 girls and 16 boys of 
between 5 and 17 years of age (M = 13.99, SD = 2.69). Due to the negative skew, children 
were categorized on the basis of age at the time of trial into 3 groups: 12-year-olds and 
under (n = 15), 13- to 15-year-olds (n = 26), and 16- and 17-year-olds (n = 15). These 
categories were chosen because they accord with the Sexual Offences Act (2003): 16 
years is the age of sexual consent, but children under 13 years old can never legally give 
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sexual consent. No information was available concerning the children’s socioeconomic 
and ethnic backgrounds.  
All defendants were male. In 95% (n = 53) of the cases, children knew the alleged 
abusers. The suspects were biological parents (n = 8), step-fathers/mothers’ boyfriends (n 
= 3), other family members (n = 20), family friends (n = 5), friends/acquaintances (n = 
17), and strangers (n = 3). Defendants were either convicted (n = 42) or acquitted (n = 10). 
The remaining 4 defendants were convicted but not for all alleged sexual offences.   
In accordance with the Victims and Witnesses [Scotland] Act (2014), many of the 
children were accorded ‘special measures’ when they testified. All courts were closed to 
the public. Four children received no other special measures. Other children gave evidence 
in court with screen and a supporter present (n = 15), or just a supporter present (n = 5). 
The remaining children gave evidence via a live TV link either with a supporter present (n 
= 21) or without a supporter present (n = 3), or their evidence was taken on commission1 
(n = 8).  
Coding of Transcripts 
The transcripts contained direct- and often redirect-examinations, in which the 
prosecution questioned the children, and cross-examinations, in which the defense 
questioned the children. No transcripts contained recross-examinations. Both the 
substantive and non-substantive questions and responses and judges’ questions and input 
were coded.  
																																																						
1 Taking evidence by a commissioner is considered only for the most vulnerable 
witnesses. In these instances, delays in testifying may increase distress and trauma, 
significantly hindering the witness’s ability to give evidence. Evidence can therefore be 
taken before a commissioner appointed by the court. The evidence is taken in full (direct-, 
cross-, and re-direct-examination) from the witness, proceedings are video recorded, and 
later received at the subsequent trial (see Vulnerable Witnesses [Scotland] Act, 2004).  
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Non-substantive. Lawyers’ statements or questions that were not focused on the 
incident under investigation were coded as non-substantive. Inaudible prompts were also 
coded as non-substantive. Non-substantive prompts were classified into one of four 
categories: procedural, anchor, rapport, and inaudible (see Table 1 for definitions and 
examples).  
Substantive. Substantive utterances or responses were defined as those designed 
to elicit or provide information about what happened during the alleged incidents, what 
immediately preceded or followed the alleged incidents, within-incident interventions 
(e.g., unexpected interruptions exposing the abuse) and witness details (e.g., witness 
intervention), other features of the abuse (e.g., how long the incidents lasted, where they 
happened), disclosure, and prior substantive formal questioning (e.g., what the child said 
happened in the forensic interview).  
Question types. Lawyers’ substantive utterances were categorized into one of 
fifteen subtypes (see Table 1). To increase statistical power for some analyses, prompt 
type was also collapsed into the five categories commonly used to differentiate among 
interviewer utterances in forensic interviews (e.g., Lamb, Hershkowitz, Orbach, & Esplin, 
2008): facilitators, invitations, directive, option-posing, and suggestive prompts (see Table 
1).   
Suggestive question subtypes. Suggestive questions were further categorized into 
one of twelve subtypes (using a coding system designed by Orbach et al., in press). 
Definitions and examples of each type are provided in Table 1. To increase statistical 
power for some analyses, suggestive question subtype was also collapsed into 3 
categories: suggestive confrontation, suggestive supposition, and suggestive introduction. 
All suggested prompts were also coded for whether they were tagged or untagged (see 
Table 1).  
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Children’s responses. 
  Responsiveness. Children’s responsiveness was categorized exhaustively into one 
of two categories: responsive and unresponsive. Definitions and examples of each 
category are provided in Table 1.  
Self-contradictions. Self-contradictions were defined as responses that negated 
what the children had previously disclosed during the proceedings or provided conflicting 
information (see Table 1). 
Acquiescence and resistance to suggestive questions. Children’s responses to 
suggestive prompts were categorized as either acquiescent or resistant in relation to the 
suggestive confrontation, supposition, or input (see Table 1).   
Productivity. The number of new details conveyed by the child in each substantive 
response was tabulated using a procedure described by Lamb et al. (1996). Details were 
the smallest unit for analyzing information provided by children pertaining to the alleged 
incidents. Details involved the naming, identification, or description of individuals, 
objects, events, places, actions, emotions, thoughts, and sensations relevant to alleged 
incidents, as well as any of their features (e.g., appearances, locations, times, durations, 
temporal orders, sounds, smells, and textures). Repeated words or details between and 
within utterances were counted only once unless the repetition appeared intentional (e.g., 
for emphasis). Details were only counted when they added to the understanding of the 
target incident(s), therefore false starts (e.g., “I – they went...”; “Um, well...”), statements 
that expressed the child’s present mental or emotional state (e.g., “I am scared”), phrases 
that suggested the level of confidence of the interviewee during the interview (e.g. “I 
know”; “I think”; “Maybe”), and claims of lack of knowledge/ignorance (e.g., “I don't 
know”; “I don't remember”) were not counted as substantive details. 
Inter-rater Reliability  
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Another rater independently coded 20% of the transcripts that were randomly 
selected. The identification and classification of substantive and non-substantive prompts, 
non-substantive prompt classification, acquiescent versus resistant responses, and 
suggestive tag coding achieved 100% reliability. Inter-rater reliability in the classification 
of question subtypes was high, K = .89 (SE = .02), 95% CI [.85, .93], as was the 
agreement when coding suggestive question subtypes, K = .83 (SE = .04), 95% CI [.75, 
.91], children’s responsiveness, K = .96 (SE = .01), 95% CI [.94, .98], self-contradictions, 
K = .85 (SE = .05), 95% CI [.75, .95], and productivity, K = .83 (SE = .06), 95% CI [.71, 
.95]. Reliability assessments were performed throughout the duration of coding and all 
disagreements were resolved by discussion. 
Results 
Analytical Plan 
A series of preliminary discriminant function analyses were first conducted to 
determine whether gender, case verdicts, and the number of children testifying in each 
case should be considered further. Research questions were addressed using descriptive 
and repeated-measures analyses of variance (RM-ANOVAs), with children’s age entered 
as the between-subjects variable (12 years old and under, 13 to 15 years old, 16 and 17 
years old), and all other variables entered as within-subjects repeated-measures factors: 
lawyer role (prosecutor, defense), substantive question types (facilitators, invitations, 
directives, option-posing, suggestive prompts), suggestive question subtypes (suggestive 
confrontation, suggestive supposition, suggestive introduction), responsiveness 
(responsive), tag questions (tagged), self-contradictions (contradictions), children’s 
acquiescence/resistance (resistance), and children’s productivity. The within-subjects 
repeated measure scores (apart from children’s productivity) were converted into 
proportional values by dividing the cell count of interest (e.g., number of suggestive 
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questions asked by defense lawyers) by the appropriate grouping total (e.g., the total 
number of substantive questions asked by defense lawyers). Using proportional values 
controls for the number of questions asked by each lawyer and the number of responses 
per child, and also helps normalize data distributions. All variables entered into parametric 
tests were normally distributed. When Mauchly’s test of sphericity was violated, 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied. All parametric tests were conducted with 
child as the unit of analysis, and power analyses confirmed that all inferential tests 
reported had enough power (set at 0.8) to detect at least medium effect sizes. Simple 
effects analyses (with Bonferonni corrections) were used to follow-up significant three-
way interactions, and pairwise comparisons (with Bonferonni corrections) were used to 
follow-up significant two-way interactions. Exploratory analyses of non-substantive 
prompts (within-subjects repeated-measure: procedural prompts, anchors, rapport-
building) and judge’s questioning are also reported.  
Preliminary Analyses 
Discriminant function analyses revealed no significant effects for gender, case 
verdicts, and the number of children testifying in each case with respect to the 
proportional frequency of lawyers’ questions, question types, and children’s responses and 
thus these factors were not included in any of the analyses reported below.  
Questioning Frequency  
In total, an average of 509.25 (SD = 320.79, n = 28,518) questions were identified 
in each transcript. Of these, an average of 92.73 (SD = 95.36, n = 5,193) were non-
substantive prompts and 416.52 (SD = 250.86, n = 23,325) were substantive prompts. 
Prosecutors asked children an average of 307.77 (SD = 235.20, n = 17,235) questions; 
55.30 (SD = 73.71, n = 3,097) non-substantive prompts, and 252.46 (SD = 181.98, n = 
14,138) substantive prompts. Defense lawyers asked children an average of 201.48 (SD = 
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142.84, n = 11,283) questions; 37.43 (SD = 35.73, n = 2,096) non-substantive prompts, 
and 164.05 (SD = 116.05, n = 9,187) substantive prompts.  
 An RM-ANOVA conducted to identify associations between children’s age and 
the proportion of non-substantive and substantive questions asked by prosecutors and 
defense lawyers revealed a significant main effect for examination phase, F(1, 53) = 
506.04, p < .001, ηp2  = .91. There were significantly more substantive (M = .80, SD = .02) 
than non-substantive (M = .18, SD = .02) questions posed. Results also revealed a 
significant interaction between phase and children’s age, F(2, 53) = 6.97, p = .002, ηp2  = 
.21. Children 12 years old and under were asked significantly more non-substantive (M = 
.24, SD = .03) and fewer substantive questions (M = .73, SD = .03) than children aged 13 
to 14 years old (M = .13, SD = .02; M = .86, SD = .02) and 16 and 17 years old, (M = .16, 
SD = .03; M = .80, SD = .03), respectively. This two-way interaction was further qualified 
by a three-way interaction between lawyer role, examination phase, and children’s age, 
F(2, 53) = 3.72, p = .03, ηp2  = .12. Children aged 12 years and under were significantly 
more likely than 13- to 15-year-olds and 16- and 17-year-olds to be asked more non-
substantive and fewer substantive prompts by prosecutors. On the other hand, 16- and 17-
year-olds and children aged 12 years and under were significantly more likely than 13- to 
15-year-olds to be asked more non-substantive and fewer substantive prompts by defense 
lawyers (see Table 2). There were no other significant main or interaction effects.  
Substantive Questions 
Totals, average frequencies, and average proportions of substantive prompt type 
subcategories by lawyer role are presented in Table 3. Unclassified questions were 
excluded from the following analyses. An RM-ANOVA conducted to identify associations 
between children’s age and the proportion of substantive question types asked by 
prosecutors and defense lawyers revealed a significant main effect for question type, 
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F(2.20, 116.43) = 309.21, p < .001, ηp2  = .85. Children were prompted significantly less 
often using facilitators (M = .02, SD = .01) than directive (M = .17, SD = .01), option-
posing (M = .42, SD = .01), or suggestive (M = .32, SD = .01) prompts, and prompted 
significantly less with invitations (M = .02, SD = .002) than with directive, option-posing, 
and suggestive prompts. Further, children were prompted significantly less with directive 
than with option-posing and suggestive prompts, and were prompted significantly less 
with suggestive than option-posing prompts. There was also a question type by lawyer role 
interaction, F(2.19, 116.52) = 114.23, p < .001, ηp2  = .68. Prosecutors prompted children 
with significantly more invitations, directive, and option-posing prompts than did defense 
lawyers, whereas the latter prompted children with significantly more suggestive prompts 
than did prosecutors (see Table 3). The two-way interaction was further qualified by a 
three-way interaction between question type, lawyer role, and children’s age, F(4.39, 
116.52) = 5.55, p < .001, ηp2  = .17. Children aged 12 years and under were asked 
significantly fewer option-posing questions than 13- to 15- and 16- and 17-year-olds by 
prosecutors. When questioned by defense lawyers, children aged 12 years and under were 
prompted with significantly more facilitators, directives, and option-posing questions than 
13- to 15- and 16- and 17-year-olds. More suggestive prompts were offered to children 
aged 13 to 15 years than children aged 12 years and under and 16- and 17-year-olds by 
defense lawyers (see Table 4). There were no other significant effects.  
Suggestive Question Subtypes  
An age x suggestive question subtype x lawyer role RM-ANOVA revealed a main 
effect for suggestive question subtype, F(1.76, 87.90) = 151.81, p < .001, ηp2  = .75. 
Suggestive introductory questions (M = .64, SD = .02) were asked more than suggestive 
confrontational (M = .19, SD = .02) and suggestive suppositional (M = .18, SD = .01) 
questions (see Table 5). There was also an interaction between suggestive question 
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subtype and children’s age, F(3.52, 87.90) = 3.16, p = .02, ηp2  = .11. Children aged 12 
years and under were asked more suggestive confrontational (M = .25, SD = .03) and 
suggestive suppositional (M = .22, SD = .03) questions, and fewer suggestive introductory 
questions (M = .55, SD = .04), than 13- to 15-year-olds (M = .16, SD = .02; M = .18, SD = 
.02; M = .67, SD = .03) and 16- and 17-year-olds (M = .18, SD = .03; M = .16, SD = .03; 
M = .66, SD = .04), respectively. There was also an interaction between lawyer role and 
suggestive question subtype, F(1.80, 90.18) = 14.16, p < .001, ηp2  = .22. Defense lawyers 
asked more confrontational questions than prosecutors, whereas prosecutors made more 
suggestive suppositions than defense lawyers. Prosecutors and defense lawyers were 
equally likely to pose suggestive introductory questions (see Table 5). There were no other 
significant effects.  
A separate RM-ANOVA conducted to investigate associations between children’s 
age and the proportion of suggestive tag questions asked by prosecutors and defense 
lawyers revealed a significant main effect for lawyer role, F(1, 53) = 17.76, p < .001, ηp2  
= .25. Defense lawyers asked proportionally more tag questions (M = .18, SD = .03) than 
prosecutors (M = .05, SD = .02). Importantly, there was no significant interaction between 
children’s age and the proportion of suggestive tag questions asked by prosecutors and 
defense lawyers.  
Children’s Responses 
Children responded to 4,506 of the 5,193 non-substantive prompts with non-
substantive responses, 207 with substantive responses, 89 responses were inaudible, and 
391 were unclassified. They responded to 21,908 of the 23,325 substantive prompts with 
substantive responses, 1,079 with non-substantive responses, 260 responses were 
inaudible, and 78 were unclassified. The remaining analyses focus on substantive question 
and answer pairs only (n = 21,908). 
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Children’s Responsiveness 
Children were almost always responsive (M = .96, SD = .004). To ensure adequate 
statistical power, three separate tests were conducted to investigate children’s 
responsiveness. Facilitators were excluded from the following analyses. The first RM-
ANOVA was conducted to identify associations between children’s age and children’s 
responsiveness when prompted with different question types by prosecutors and defense 
lawyers. The test revealed a significant main effect for question type, F(2.11, 110.19) = 
16.24, p < .001, ηp2  = .24. Children were significantly more responsive to invitations (M = 
.99, SD = .01) than any other question type. Children were less responsive when 
answering directive questions (M = .93, SD = .01) than when answering option-posing 
questions (M = .96, SD = .004) or suggestive questions (M = .96, SD = .01). Furthermore, 
there was a significant two-way interaction with question type and children’s age, F(4.24, 
110.19) = 2.81, p = .03, ηp2  = .10. Children aged 12 years and under were less responsive 
to directives (M = .90, SD = 02) than children aged 13 to 15 years old (M = 95, SD = .01) 
and 16- and 17-year-olds (M = .95, SD = .02). There were no other significant main or 
interaction effects.  
Second, a RM-ANOVA was conducted to investigate differences in children’s 
responsiveness and suggestive question subtype. There was no significant main effect, 
F(1.32, 72.33) = 3.09, p = .07, ηp2  = .05. However, children were significantly less 
responsive to suggestive confrontational questions (M = .92, SD = .02) than suggestive 
introductory questions (M = .96, SD = .004) and suggestive suppositional questions, M = 
.95, SD = .01).  
 A paired-samples t-test showed that children were significantly less responsive to 
tagged questions (M = .86, SD = .31) than untagged questions (M = .95, SD = .04), t(55) = 
2.18, p = .03, d = .41, 95% CI [.01, .18]. 
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Self-contradictions 
In total, 973 contradictions were identified, constituting 4.4% of all children’s 
responses. All children contradicted themselves at least once. Table 6 provides descriptive 
statistics for children’s self-contradictions by question type and lawyer role. To ensure 
adequate statistical power, three separate tests were conducted to investigate children’s 
self-contradictions. An RM-ANOVA conducted to investigate associations between 
children’s age and children’s self-contradictions when prompted using different question 
types by prosecutors and defense lawyers revealed a significant main effect for question 
type, F(2.21, 117.37) = 57.02, p < .001, ηp2  = .52. Invitations (M = .004, SD = .002) 
elicited significantly fewer self-contradictions than option-posing questions (M = .02, SD 
= .003). Suggestive questions (M = .10, SD = .01) elicited significantly more self-
contradictions than any other question types (directives, M = .02, SD = .01; facilitators, M 
= .01, SD = .01). There was also a significant interaction between question type and 
children’s age, F(4.43, 117.37) = 2.53, p = .04, ηp2  = .09. More self-contradictions were 
elicited from children aged 12 years and under (M = 13, SD = .02) and 16- and 17-year-
olds (M = .10, SD = .02) than from 13- to 15-year-olds (M = .07, SD = .01) when they 
were suggestively prompted. A significant interaction between lawyer role and children’s 
age, F(2, 53) = 4.10, p = .02, ηp2  = .13 showed that prosecutors elicited significantly more 
self-contradictions from 16- and 17-year-olds (M = .04, SD = .01) than 13- to 15-year-olds 
(M = .02, SD = .01). There was no difference between children aged 12 years and under 
(M = .03, SD = .01) and those in the other age groups when questioned by prosecutors. 
However, defense lawyers were significantly more likely to elicit self-contradictions from 
children aged 12 years and under (M = .04, SD = .01) than from 13- to 15-year-olds (M = 
.03, SD = .004) and 16- and 17-year-olds (M = .02, SD = .01). There were no other 
significant main or interaction effects.  
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An RM-ANOVA conducted to investigate associations between the proportion of 
self-contradictions and suggestive question subtype revealed a significant main effect for 
suggestive question subtype, F(1.67, 92.05) = 6.42, p = .004, ηp2  = .11. Suggestive 
suppositional questions (M = .02, SD = .003) elicited significantly fewer self-
contradictions than suggestive confrontational (M = .04, SD = .01) and suggestive 
introductory (M = .04, SD = .004) questions. A paired-samples t-test showed no significant 
difference between the proportion of self-contradictions in response to suggestive tagged 
and untagged questions, t(55) = 1.77, p = .08. 
Children’s Acquiescence/Resistance to Suggestive Questions 
Of the 6,361 suggestive question-response pairs, children acquiesced to the 
suggestion 68.46% of the time (n = 4,355), and resisted the suggestion 28.86% of the time 
(n = 1,836). In 170 (2.57%) instances, the children’s responses were unclassified as their 
acquiescence or resistance was not clear. Unclassified responses were excluded from the 
following analyses. An RM-ANOVA conducted to investigate associations between 
children’s age and the proportion of suggestive question subtypes asked by prosecutors 
and defense lawyers that were resisted revealed a significant main effect for lawyer role, 
F(1, 53) = 18.61, p < .001, ηp2  = .26. Children resisted defense lawyers’ suggestive 
questions (M = .37, SD = .03) significantly more than prosecutors’ (M = .23, SD = .03). 
There was also a significant main effect for suggestive question subtype, F(1.54, 81.58) = 
46.42, p < .001, ηp2  = .47. Children resisted suggestive confrontational questions (M = .49, 
SD = .04) significantly more than suggestive suppositional (M = .26, SD = .03) and 
suggestive introductory (M = .14, SD = .01) questions. Children resisted suggestive 
suppositional questions significantly more than suggestive introductory questions. Lastly, 
there was a significant interaction between lawyer role and suggestive question subtype, 
F(1.37, 72.42) = 4.45, p = .03, ηp2  = .07. Children resisted significantly more in response 
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to confrontational questions when prompted by defense lawyers (M = .61, SD = .04) than 
when prompted by prosecutors (M = .36, SD = .06). Similarly, children resisted 
significantly more in response to suggestive suppositional questions when prompted by 
defense lawyers (M = .33, SD = .04) than when prompted by prosecutors (M = .19, SD = 
.03), and significantly more in response to suggestive introductory questions when 
prompted by defense lawyers (M = .16, SD = .02) than when prompted by prosecutors (M 
= .12, SD = .02). There were no other significant main or interaction effects. A paired-
samples t-test showed that children were significantly less resistant in response to tagged 
(M = .15, SD = .19) than untagged questions (M = .28, SD = .13), t(55) = 4.50, p < .001, d 
= .79, 95% CI [.07, .18]. 
Children’s Productivity 
 Descriptive statistics for children’s productivity by substantive question subtype 
and lawyer role are presented in Table 7. Unclassified questions were excluded from the 
following analyses. An RM-ANOVA conducted to investigate associations between the 
productivity of children of different ages when answering different question types asked 
by prosecutors and defense lawyers revealed a significant main effect for lawyer role, F(1, 
53) = 57.26, p < .001, ηp2  = .52. Children were more productive in response to prosecutors 
(M = 2.08, SD = .18) than defense lawyers (M = .86, SD = .07). There was also a 
significant two-way interaction between lawyer role and children’s age, F(2, 53) = 7.24, p 
= .002, ηp2  = .22. Children aged 12 years and under were less productive in response to 
prosecutors (M = 1.39, SD = .33) than were 13- to 15-year-olds (M = 2.74, SD = .25) and 
16- and 17-year-olds (M = 2.13, SD = .33). Further, there was a significant main effect for 
question type, F(1.86, 98.41) = 9.75, p < .001, ηp2  = .16. Children were significantly more 
productive in response to invitations (M = 2.19, SD = .33) than to option-posing prompts 
(M = 1.04, SD = .06), suggestive prompts (M = 1.05, SD = .05), and facilitators (M = 1.20, 
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SD = .19). Children were also significantly more productive in response to directives (M = 
1.88, SD = .13) than option-posing prompts, suggestive prompts, and facilitators. Lastly, 
there was a significant interaction between lawyer role and question type, F(1.67, 88.51) = 
19.41, p < .001, ηp2  = .27. Children were significantly more productive in response to all 
question types when prompted by prosecutors than when prompted by defense lawyers 
(see Table 7). There were no other significant main or interaction effects.  
An RM-ANOVA conducted to investigate mean productivity associations between 
children of different ages when answering different suggestive question subtypes asked by 
prosecutors and defense lawyers revealed a significant main effect for suggestive question 
subtype, F(1.86, 98.70) = 34.74, p < .001, ηp2  = .40. Suggestive confrontational questions 
(M = .52, SD = .08) were significantly less productive than suggestive suppositional (M = 
1.22, SD = .09) and suggestive introductory (M = 1.04, SD = .05) questions. Further, there 
was a significant interaction between lawyer role and suggestive question subtype, F(1.65, 
87.63) = 9.31, p = .001, ηp2  = .15. Children were more productive in response to 
prosecutors’ (M = 1.56, SD = .14) than defense lawyers’ suggestive suppositions (M = .88, 
SD = .12). Lastly, there was a significant interaction between lawyer role and children’s 
age, F(2, 53) = 8.56, p = .001, ηp2  = .24. Children aged 12 years and under were less 
productive in response to prosecutors and more productive in response to defense lawyers 
(M = .66, SD = .14; M = 1.04, SD = .12) than children aged 13 to 15 years old (M = 1.19, 
SD = .10; M = .75, SD = .09) and 16- and 17-year-olds (M = 1.20, SD = .14; M = .71, SD = 
.12), respectively. There were no other significant main or interaction effects. A paired-
samples t-test showed that children were significantly less productive in response to 
tagged questions (M = .83, SD = .55) than untagged questions (M = 1.04, SD = .32), t(55) 
= 2.65, p = .01, d = .47, 95% CI [.05, .37]. 
Non-substantive Questions 
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Totals, average frequencies, and average proportions of non-substantive prompt 
types by lawyer role are presented in Table 8. Due to small frequencies, inaudible prompts 
were excluded from the following analyses. An RM-ANOVA conducted to identify 
associations between children’s age and the proportion of non-substantive prompt types 
asked by prosecutors and defense lawyers revealed a significant main effect for non-
substantive prompt type, F(1.83, 93.46) = 38.26, p < .001, ηp2  = .43. Children were 
significantly more likely to be questioned using procedural prompts (M = .51, SD = .03) 
than any other non-substantive prompt type. Children were prompted with anchors (M = 
.30, SD = .03) significantly more than rapport-building prompts (M = .15, SD = .02). 
There was also a two-way interaction between non-substantive question type and age, 
F(3.67, 93.46) = 3.46, p = .13, ηp2  = .12. Children aged 12 years and under received 
significantly more rapport-building prompts (M = .28, SD = .04) than 13- to 15-year-olds 
(M = .11, SD = .03) and 16- and 17-year-olds (M = .07, SD = .04). Children aged 13 to 15 
years old received more procedural prompts (M = .57, SD = .04) than children aged 12 
years and under (M = .46, SD = .05), and 16- and 17-year-olds (M = .50, SD = .05). Lastly, 
16- and 17-year-olds received more anchors (M = .36, SD = .03), than children aged 12 
years and under (M = .25, SD = .05) and 13- to 15-year-olds (M = .30, SD = .04). There 
were no other significant main or interaction effects.  
Judge’s Questioning 
Judges asked children 1,682 questions. Of these, 1,469 (87.33%) were non-
substantive and 213 (12.66%) were substantive (see Table 9). Judges asked no suggestive 
tag questions. In response to substantive questions, children answered substantively 
91.55% (n =195) of the time. Of the substantive responses, children were responsive to 
questions 87.18% (n = 170) of the time, and unresponsive 12.82% (n = 25) of the time. In 
response to suggestive questions, children acquiesced 57.45% (n = 27) of the time and 
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resisted 42.55% (n = 20) of the time. In total, judges elicited 9 self-contradictions from 
children.  
Discussion 
This first examination of lawyer-child witness interactions in Scottish courts 
yielded a number of findings that can assist in the evaluation and implementation of 
currently proposed changes to practices adopted in courts throughout the United Kingdom 
and other common law jurisdictions. Additionally, documenting the Scottish experience is 
important since Scotland is distinct from other common law jurisdictions such as England 
and Wales and New Zealand because all evidence must be corroborated, ‘precognition’ 
requires pre-trial disclosure of all evidence, and forensic interviews are conducted in 
accordance with Joint Investigative Interview guidelines, which differ from those 
employed in other parts of the United Kingdom. 
As predicted, prosecutors were significantly more likely than defense lawyers to 
use invitations, directives, and option-posing prompts, whereas defense lawyers were 
significantly more likely than prosecutors to use suggestive prompts. Previous studies had 
shown that prosecutors used more open-ended prompts whereas defense lawyers used 
more suggestive prompts (Andrews et al., 2015a; Klemfuss et al., 2014; Stolzenberg & 
Lyon, 2014) but the present findings also made clear that the difficulties children face in 
court are not solely attributable to cross-examination by defense lawyers. Prosecutors, too, 
used more closed-ended than open-ended prompts, were most likely to use option-posing 
prompts, and virtually never asked invitations. Indeed, the same was true of judges, too, 
although the majority of the questions they asked were non-substantive. These results 
appear inconsistent with findings that prosecutors in New Zealand predominantly asked 
open-ended questions (Zajac et al., 2003), but are consistent with subsequent research in 
New Zealand showing that prosecutors predominantly used closed-ended questions 
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(Hanna et al., 2012; Zajac & Cannan, 2009). Moreover, they highlight the value of 
distinguishing between invitations, which elicit rich and detailed responses from children 
and are almost never asked in court, and directives, which elicit shorter responses (Lamb 
et al., 2008). In comparison to lawyers in the United States (Andrews et al., 2015a), 
prosecutors in Scotland used similar types of questions, but the Scottish defense lawyers 
used fewer directives (.08 vs. .13), fewer option-posing prompts (.37 vs. .46), and more 
suggestive questions (.49 vs. .42) than Californian defense lawyers.  
As further predicted, both prosecutors and defense lawyers elicited a substantial 
number of inconsistencies. Although self-contradictions were proportionally rare, all 
children contradicted themselves at least once. Self-contradictions constituted 2.7% of all 
children’s responses to prosecutors’ questions and 6.5% of all responses to defense 
lawyers’ questions. Interestingly, these findings are very similar to those found in 
Andrews et al.’s (2015) study of Californian cases (2.5% and 6.4%, respectively). Other 
researchers have similarly shown that most children provide some inconsistent responses 
when questioned in court and that more inconsistencies are elicited by defense lawyers 
than by prosecutors (Zajac & Cannan, 2009; Zajac et al., 2003), but self-contradictions in 
response to prosecutors’ questions were much more common in this study and in Andrews 
et al.’s (2015a) study. Zajac et al. (2003) reported no self-contradictions in response to 
prosecutors and a range of 1 to 16 self-contradictions (M = 3.56) in response to defense 
lawyers. Zajac and Cannan (2009) reported an average of 1.03 and 5.03 self-contradictions 
in the direct- and cross-examinations, respectively, with an absolute range of 0-20. They 
noted that defense lawyers elicited self-contradictions in 93% of the cases, but did not 
report the percentage of cases in which prosecutors did so. As previously noted by 
Andrews et al. (2015a), these discrepancies can be explained by differences in the length 
of the transcripts examined. Both direct- and cross-examinations in the present study and 
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in Andrews et al.’s (2015a) study were much longer on average than those analyzed by 
Zajac and Cannan (2009) and Zajac et al (2003). Direct-examinations in particular were 
longer, probably because the New Zealand prosecutors relied to a large extent on 
children’s pre-recorded statements. Since Zajac and her colleagues did not have access to 
those videotapes, they could not determine the extent to which children’s in-court 
testimony contradicted their videotaped testimony.  
Suggestive questioning places pressure on children to reconsider and change their 
previous responses; both experimental (e.g., Jack & Zajac, 2014; Fogliati & Bussey, 2014; 
Zajac & Hayne, 2003) and field (Zajac et al., 2003; this study) research has shown that 
children are most likely to change their answers when questioned using closed-ended 
suggestive prompts. In the present study, suggestive questions were more likely to elicit 
self-contradictions than closed-ended option-posing prompts, open-ended directives, and 
invitations, while option-posing questions were more likely to elicit self-contradictions 
than invitations. A novel examination of different types of suggestive questions showed 
that suggestive introductory questions were asked more often than suggestive 
suppositional and confrontational questions. Prosecutors posed more suggestive 
suppositional questions than defense lawyers, whereas, unsurprisingly, defense lawyers 
posed more suggestive confrontational questions than prosecutors, and children 
acquiesced more in response to defense lawyers’ suggestions than prosecutors’. As in 
Orbach et al.’s (in press) study of forensic interviews, both suggestive confrontational and 
suggestive introductory questions elicited significantly more self-contradictions from 
children than suggestive suppositions. Suggestive confrontational questions are relatively 
easy to spot, and thus can be monitored by the court and possibly restricted when 
necessary. However, suggestive suppositional and introductory questions, as illustrated in 
Table 1, are less easy to identify, and involve lawyers assuming and introducing 
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information not previously mentioned by the children. The present findings are thus 
concerning because children acquiesced to suggestive questions almost 70% of the time, 
particularly when they were formulated as suggestive introductory questions.  
 It is widely acknowledged that tagged questions are highly suggestive and 
persuasive (see Plotnikoff & Wolfson, 2007; Spencer & Lamb, 2012), and, given their 
complexity (Walker et al., 2013), there have been calls for judges to restrict the use of tag 
questions, particularly when directed to the youngest children (Judicial College [fairness 
in courts and tribunals], 2010; R v Barker, 2010). However, 6% of all prosecutors’ and 
25% of all defense lawyers’ suggestive questions in the present study were tagged. 
Children were less responsive and more acquiescent in response to tagged questions than 
untagged questions, and lawyers did not alter their use of tagged questions depending on 
the children’s ages. Such findings raise serious concerns about the extent to which 
suggestive questions, particularly tagged questions, are avoided or proscribed in court and 
highlight the value of differentiating between different types of suggestive questions and 
the need to engage practitioners in further training.   
Unlike previous studies, the present study included children of diverse ages (i.e., 5- 
to 17-year-olds). We expected there to be no age differences, in line with previous 
research indicating that lawyers do not appear to adjust their questioning style to 
accommodate younger children (e.g., Andrews et al., 2015a), and that this pattern would 
also be evident in relation to the broader age range examined in the current study. No 
other study has examined both substantive and non-substantive questions and we found 
that prosecutors asked more non-substantive and fewer substantive questions of the 
youngest children, whereas defense lawyers asked more non-substantive and fewer 
substantive questions of the oldest children. The non-substantive prompt types varied 
depending on the children’s ages and there was no interaction with lawyer role. In 
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particular, there were more attempts at rapport building with children aged 12 years and 
under than with older children, suggesting that both prosecutors and defense lawyers were 
more supportive of the youngest children. However, the overall rates of rapport-building 
were low for all children.  
 With respect to substantive questions, there was a three-way interaction between 
question type, lawyer role, and children’s age, suggesting that lawyers changed their 
behavior somewhat depending on the children’s ages. In particular, prosecutors were least 
likely to ask option-posing questions of the youngest children, whereas defense lawyers 
asked more directive questions and facilitators of the youngest children. Children in the 
middle age group were asked fewer suggestive casting doubt questions than children in the 
oldest age group. Defense lawyers directed more option-posing questions to the youngest 
children, and asked more suggestive questions of those in the middle age group whereas 
prosecutors did not alter their behavior similarly. Additionally, the youngest children were 
asked more suggestive confrontational and suppositional questions (but fewer suggestive 
introductory questions) by both prosecutors and defense lawyers, although there were no 
age differences in the lawyers’ use of suggestive tag questions. Overall, in line with 
previous research and our predictions, both prosecutors and defense lawyers were not 
sensitive to differences in the children’s ages.  
There were few age differences in children’s responsiveness, although, as in previous 
research (Andrews et al., 2015a), children were almost always responsive to lawyers’ 
questions and more responsive to prosecutors than defense lawyers. Interestingly, although 
children were generally more productive in response to prosecutors than defense lawyers, 
and children were more productive in response to open-ended than closed-ended prompts, 
the youngest children were least productive in response to prosecutors’ questions. 
Furthermore, the youngest children were least productive in response to prosecutors’ 
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suggestions and more productive in response to defense lawyers’ suggestions, perhaps 
because the younger children did not understand why they were being asked suggestive 
questions by the prosecutors. By contrast, Andrews et al. (in press) and Klemfuss et al. 
(2014) reported that Californian children were more productive with increasing age. 
Unlike previous studies, we found that prosecutors elicited more self-contradictions from 
the oldest children than from children in the middle age group, whereas defense lawyers 
elicited fewest contradictions from the youngest children, but there were no age 
differences in acquiescence to suggestion. In response to suggestive questions, more self-
contradictions were elicited from children aged 13 to 15 years than from the youngest and 
oldest children. These findings highlight children’s ability to resist some suggestions by 
both prosecutors and defense lawyers, but also make clear that suggestive questions can 
have diverse effects on children depending on their age and the context.  
Limitations and Further Research 
As in most field studies, we were unable to determine the veracity of the 
allegations or of the children’s specific responses. However, self-contradictions of 
necessity constitute false responding, since the contradictory answers cannot both be 
correct, and our finding that suggestive questions were most likely to elicit self-
contradictions is consistent with laboratory research demonstrating that suggestive 
questions are most likely to elicit erroneous answers. It was, however, impossible to know 
which questions were misleading and which answers were accurate. Indeed, contradiction-
eliciting questions during cross-examination may increase testimonial accuracy if the 
initial reports were untrue. 
Second, we did not measure the complexity of the questions, although complexity 
may interact with children’s age, lawyer role, and question type in affecting children’s 
responsiveness, productivity, and consistency (Hanna et al., 2012; Zajac et al., 2009; Zajac 
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& Hayne, 2003). However, Evans, Lee, and Lyon (2009) did not find any age or lawyer 
role differences in either wordiness or the syntactic complexity of the questions asked 
when they examined 46 4- to 15-year-olds’ testimony in cases from Los Angeles. 
Similarly, although Zajac et al. (2009) found that adults were asked more complex 
questions than children, Zajac and Hayne (2003) found no relationship between age and 
complexity in a study of 5- to 13-year-olds. Furthermore, Zajac et al. (2009) found that 
31% of the defense lawyers’ questions were complex on one dimension, but so were 25% 
of the prosecutors’ questions, a surprisingly small difference. Indeed, Hanna et al. (2012) 
found differences in the complexity of the questions asked by prosecutors and defense 
lawyers only in relation to one of the five types examined. Hence, it seems unlikely that 
differences in the complexity of the questions asked may have accounted for the findings 
reported here. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to analyze question complexity in 
relation to witness age and complexity more finely and extensively, using a multi-method 
approach.  
Third, it is clear that researchers should consider more than question type when 
studying cross-examinations. For example, peripheral details relating to the alleged 
victim’s thoughts and feelings may be more emotionally salient and susceptible to 
suggestion than central details relating to the sexually abusive actions. Furthermore, when 
interpreting self-contradictions, acquiescence to suggestion may be driven as much by the 
content of the question as by the type of question. Future research should examine specific 
problems with question content, and link those findings to laboratory research on question 
content and children’s accuracy.  
Lastly, it might be fruitful to examine whether and how question type and 
children’s responses in court are associated with children’s gender and the case verdicts, 
although preliminary analyses revealed no significant associations in the present study, 
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perhaps because there were many more girls than boys and many more cases that resulted 
in convictions than acquittals. A better-matched sample designed to investigate these 
research questions may yield different results.  
Implications  
In Scotland, as in most other western jurisdictions, defendants have the right to 
challenge the evidence against them. It is well established that closed-ended questions, 
particularly suggestive utterances, are more likely to elicit erroneous information (e.g., 
APSAC, 2012; Home Office, 2011, section 3.44; Lamb et al., 2015) but of course cross-
examination questions are designed not to elicit evidence but to test it (Zajac, O’Neill, & 
Hayne, 2012) and it remains unclear how to protect children from distress and 
developmentally inappropriate, misleading and confusing questions, whilst also protecting 
the defendants’ rights to challenge their accusers. Best-practice guidelines for the 
questioning of child witnesses in court must allow the veracity of children’s testimony to 
be evaluated in ways that do not exploit their developmental capacities and limitations.  
There are currently very limited guidelines about how lawyers should question 
children in court. The guidance that does exist is neither well embraced nor well informed 
(Spencer & Lamb, 2012). However, it is now widely accepted in Scotland that gathering 
evidence from young and vulnerable witnesses requires special care, and that subjecting 
them to traditional adversarial forms of examination and cross-examination is no longer 
acceptable (Evidence and Procedure Review Report [Section 2.1], Scottish Court Service, 
March, 2015; Spencer & Lamb, 2012). The extent to which protective measures (e.g., a 
live TV link, section 271J; a screen, section 271K; a supporter, section 271L, Victims and 
Witnesses [Scotland] Act, 2014) are used, however, varies considerably within and 
between jurisdictions. Calls for a more systematic approach to gathering evidence from 
children was made recently in a speech to the Criminal Law Conference at Murrayfield by 
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the [then] Lord Justice Clerk (Lord Carloway, May, 2013). In England and Wales, further 
changes are on the horizon, too. In particular, the fundamental proposition explored in the 
Evidence and Procedure Review Report (Scottish Court Service, March, 2015) is that 
substantial improvements can be made to the administration of justice with the widespread 
use of pre-recorded statements in place of testimony in court and the implementation of 
Ground Rules Hearings, at which judges stipulate what types of questions can be asked. 
These procedures (bringing into force Section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal 
Evidence Act, 1999) are currently being piloted in England and Wales under the premise 
that a properly conducted witness interview before trial may be far more informative and 
appropriate than a belated appearance in court during the trial (Evidence and Procedure 
Review Report [Section 1.24], Scottish Court Service, March, 2015; Westera, Kebbell, & 
Milne, 2013). Furthermore, evidence-based “Toolkits” (see Advocacy Training Council 
(ATC), 2011) have been introduced to provide continuing education and thus improve 
practice in England and Wales, in recognition of the fact that many lawyers and judges 
need guidance on how best to question children appropriately. These Toolkits were 
endorsed in the Lord Chief Justice’s Criminal Practice Directions (2013), but the use and 
effectiveness of these opinions and resources have not been systematically assessed. It is 
likely that systematic training of judges and lawyers, perhaps alongside the greater use of 
well-trained intermediaries, may be necessary to ensure that practice changes in the 
intended direction.  
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Table 1. 
 
Coding Definitions and Examples.  
Code Definition Example 
Non-substantive prompts Statements or questions that were not 
focused on the incident under investigation. 
 
      Procedural Comments, statements, or questions, 
concerning procedural aspects of the 
direct/cross examinations, including 
introductory information and instructions, 
taking the oath, communication rules, 
introduction of evidence, and labelling or 
defining body parts.  
“Do you understand the difference between the truth and a lie?” 
“Tell me in words, because the tape doesn’t record what you do 
with your head.” 
“In your forensic interview you said…(reading from the Crown 
Production). Do you see that?”  
“Do you know the difference between your front bottom and your 
back bottom?” 
      Anchor Utterances providing children with external 
(not incident related) stimulus (e.g., a 
holiday or a birthday, description of the 
location) in order to aid in the relative 
dating, timing, location, etc., of the 
investigated incident. Anchoring questions 
do not address details of the alleged incident 
directly. They are usually followed by an 
option-posing question, aiming to extract 
substantive information in the context of the 
anchoring stimulus. 
Lawyer: “Do you remember Christmas day?” [anchor] 
Child: “Yes.” 
Lawyer: “Did it happen before or after Christmas?”  [option-
posing] 
 
Lawyer: “On this map you can see the park and then a path 
leading down to the river?” [anchor] 
Yes: “Yes.” 
Lawyer: “Is that the path where it happened?” [option-posing] 
 
 
      Rapport  Utterances designed enhance the children’s 
trust and cooperation, and provide 
emotional support. Such questions may 
focus on the children’s family, friends, 
school, general knowledge, or experienced 
“Tell me about what you like doing in your spare time.” 
“Do you like school? What’s your favorite subject?” 
“What did you do last Christmas? Did you get anything nice?” 
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neutral events not based on memory of the 
incident. 
      Inaudible Utterances that could not be transcribed due 
to poor sound quality. Partially inaudible 
utterances were also coded as inaudible if 
too much of the prompt was missing for it 
to be accurately classified.  
Lawyer: “So he (inaudible)?” 
Child: “Yes.” 
Lawyer: “(inaudible)?” 
Substantive prompts Utterances designed to elicit information 
about what happened during the alleged 
incidents, what immediately preceded or 
followed the alleged incidents, within-
incident interventions (e.g., unexpected 
interruptions exposing the abuse) and 
witness details (e.g., witness intervention), 
other features of the abuse (e.g., how long 
the incidents lasted, where they happened), 
disclosure, and prior substantive formal 
questioning (e.g., what the child said 
happened in their forensic interview). 
 
   Question types   
      Invitation Open-ended, input-free utterances used to 
elicit free-recall responses from children. 
Such questions, statements, imperatives, or 
contextual cues do not restrict the child’s 
focus except in a general sense.  
 
      General invitation Utterances asking about a whole incident, or 
about one of multiple incidents disclosed.   
“Tell me everything that happened from the beginning to the 
end.” (following a disclosure) 
“Tell me everything about the first time/last time/time you best 
remember.” 
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      Follow-up invitation Utterances asking about the last content 
mentioned by the child, or about the content 
of events occurring after the last point in 
time mentioned by the child.  
“Tell me more about that.” 
“Then what happened?” 
      Refocusing invitation Utterances that refocus on previous content 
and request elaboration. 
“Think back to the last time (or any other disclosed content), and 
tell me everything about that.”  (following a disclosure that it 
happened more than one time) 
      Closing invitation A closing question. Closing invitations are 
regarded as a substantive only when they 
elicit substantive details. When a prompt is 
formulated as “What else happened?” and 
the child has not given an earlier indication 
that additional things happened, the 
question is coded as suggestive (see below) 
because of the lawyer’s implied assumption 
that something else did happen.  
“Is there anything else you want to tell me?” 
      Cued invitation Utterances that refocus the child’s attention 
on previously mentioned details and use 
them as contextual cues in open-ended 
invitations to elicit free-recall responses.  
Refocusing may relate to content cues (e.g., 
events, objects, people, actions) mentioned 
by the child.  
“You mentioned (content mentioned by the child), tell me about 
that.”  
“Tell me about/what happened with (content mentioned by the 
child).” 
      Segment of time invitation A type of cued invitation. The lawyer uses 
one or two actions/occurrences mentioned 
by the child as “anchors” (i.e., a time 
reference) for invitations to tell about what 
happened before, after, or during a segment 
of time based on those temporal references. 
 
“You said (occurrence/action mentioned by the child), and then 
what happened?” 
“What was the very first thing that happened before (an 
occurrence/action mentioned by the child)?” 
“Tell me everything that happened from (an occurrence/action 
mentioned by the child) until (another occurrence/action 
mentioned by the child).” 
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      Directive Open-ended questions that refocus the child 
on aspects or details of the allegation that 
they have previously mentioned, mostly 
using ‘WH’ utterances to request further 
information.  
 
      Directive clarification Utterances asking for clarification about 
what the child mentioned. This type of 
clarification only refers to the wording of 
the child, not to the facts or content of the 
child’s statement. 
“You said (child’s words). What do you mean?” 
 
      Directive open A request for information about an intrinsic 
feature of disclosed content, using a wh- 
question (who, what, when, where, how, 
why), allowing a multi-word response. 
“Where/when/how did it happen?” 
“Why did you do that? 
 
      Directive narrow A request for information about a specific 
attribute of disclosed content.  
“What color was his t-shirt?” (when the child mentioned earlier 
that he was wearing a t-shirt). 
“Where did he touch you?” (when the child mentioned earlier that 
a male touched her).  
      Option-posing Closed-ended questions that refocus the 
child’s attention on details of the allegation 
that they have not previously mentioned, 
although without implying an expected 
response.  
 
      Option-posing yes/no Utterances that prompt yes/no responses. 
 
“Did he touch your skin?” (when the child had mentioned earlier 
that he touched her). 
“Did it hurt?” 
“Were your clothes on when this happened?” 
“Was there any other time/perpetrator?”  
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      Option-posing forced choice Utterances that request the selection of 
undisclosed forced-choice options.  
“Did he touch you over your clothes or under your clothes?” 
 
      Option-posing open choice Utterances that request the selection of 
undisclosed open-choice options, including 
“which” questions without explicitly stating 
options.  
“Was his shirt red or brown or something else?” 
“Was that photo he showed you from a photo album or a 
magazine or…?” 
“Which hand?” 
      Suggestive Statements or questions formulated in a way 
that communicates the expected response.  
 
      Facilitator  Non-suggestive encouragement to continue 
with an ongoing response immediately 
following the child's response, or verbatim 
restatements or echoing of the last few 
words of the child's previous utterance.   
“Okay”, “Yes”, “Go ahead”, “And…” 
      Uncategorized Clearly substantive questions that were 
inaudible, partially inaudible, unfinished, or 
interrupted before they could be accurately 
coded.  
Lawyer: “I suggest he didn’t touch you. What do you say to 
that?” 
Child: “He did.” 
Lawyer: “But wh-” [uncategorized] 
Child: “He did.” 
  Suggestive question subtypes   
      Suggestive confrontation   
      Doubt (3rd time) Raising the possibility for the third time that 
reported information is not true.  
“Is what you’re telling me true?” (when asked for the 3rd time) 
“Did that really happen?” (when asked for the 3rd time) 
“Are you sure?” (when asked for the 3rd time) 
      Option-posing (3rd time) An option-posing or suggestive question 
asked for the third time on the same issue. 
Lawyer: “Did it happen once or more than once?” 
Child: “More than once.” 
Lawyer: “So, it did happen more than once?” 
Child: “Yes.” 
Lawyer: “This is a serious matter. I’ll ask you again. Did it 
happen once or more than once?” [option-posing 3rd time] 
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      Coercive confrontation internal  The lawyer refers to information disclosed 
by the child earlier in the direct-/cross-
examination and uses it to confront the child 
by questioning, doubting, or contradicting 
his or her current statement. 
 
Lawyer: “What happened to your trousers?” 
Child: “They stayed on.” 
Lawyer: “How did he touch your privates if your trousers were 
on?” [coercive confrontation internal] 
 
Lawyer: “Earlier you said (XXX), but now you are saying that 
(seemingly contradicting information).”  
      Coercive confrontation external The lawyer refers to knowledge of 
undisclosed information about the 
investigated incident and confronts the child 
by using it to contradict information s/he 
disclosed. 
“The police detective told me that you (undisclosed information) 
and you said (cites the child). What do you say to that?” 
“You said (XXX), but your brother, who testified earlier, said that 
(contradicting info).”  
      Suggestive supposition   
      Implicit assumption The lawyer asks a question built on an 
implicit assumption that an undisclosed 
peripheral action had happened. 
Child: “Then I went to meet X.” 
Lawyer: “You met X. What did she tell you?” (when the child did 
not mention that X told anything)  
 
Child: “He then walked away.” 
Lawyer: “Okay. Where did he go when he walked out the 
house?” (when the child did not mention him walking out of the 
house) 
      Suggestive implicit assumption The lawyer asks a question built on a 
potentially contaminating assumption that 
something central to the allegation had 
happened.  
 
“What else happened?” (when the child did not indicate that 
something else had happened) 
“What else did X do?” (when the child did not mention that X did 
anything else) 
“What did X do to you?” (when child did not mention that X did 
anything to her/him)  
      Suggestive explicit supposition The lawyer asks a question built on an 
explicit undisclosed assumption (premise) 
that something had happened. 
“Did it hurt when he touched you?” (when the child did not 
mention that s/he was touched). 
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“Was your mother there when he touched you?” (when the child 
did not mention that s/he was touched).  
      Contradictory supposition The lawyer questions the child, ignoring an 
earlier contradicting response that rules out 
the question.   
“Did it hurt when he touched you?” (When child said s/he was 
not touched) 
      Suggestive introduction   
      Suggestive input The lawyer introduces undisclosed 
information (e.g., the suspect’s name, the 
location of the incident). 
 
“Tell me what happened with/at (a person/place not mentioned by 
child).” 
“So, X touched you?” (when the child did not say that s/he was 
touched)  
      Suggestive summary/conclusion The lawyer summarizes or quotes the child 
incorrectly; modifies, incorrectly concludes 
(with or without using a statement which is 
appended or preceded by a ‘tag’), 
incorrectly interprets, verbalizes the child’s 
action response beyond what the response 
indicates, or chooses one of two 
contradictory responses. 
Child: “I went to the park…”  
Lawyer: “You said you went to skate park.” 
 
Child: “X kissed me.” 
Lawyer: “Y kissed you?”  
 
Child: “It happened on Monday or Tuesday.”  
Lawyer: “So it happened on Monday?” 
 
“You saw a gun, didn’t you?”, “Didn’t you see a gun?”  
      Non-exhaustive options The lawyer provides restrictive, non-
exhaustive options, in a forced-choice 
question. 
“Was he lying on you or were you lying on him?” (when child 
only mentioned that they were lying in bed) 
“Did he touch you in the bedroom or in the living room?” (when 
child only mentioned that the suspect touched him/her at home)  
      External source The lawyer refers to knowledge he has, 
from a specified or an unspecified external 
source, of undisclosed information about the 
investigated incident. 
“Your mom told me (undisclosed information).” 
“I heard from the policeman that (undisclosed information).”  
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  Tag questions Short questions that are tagged onto the end 
of statements implying an expected 
response.  
“You’re lying, aren’t you?” 
“He touched you, didn’t he?” 
“It happened three times, right?” 
Children’s responses   
      Responsive Verbal and action responses related to the 
lawyer’s previous utterance. Utterances 
were assigned this category even if they did 
not contain new informative details, or 
when their meaning was unclear.  
Lawyer: “Did he take your trousers off?” 
Child: “Yes.” [responsive] 
Lawyer: “What did he do with your trousers?” 
Child: “I don’t know.” [responsive] 
      Unresponsive Responses that do not relate to the question 
asked in the previous lawyer utterance, but 
provide incident-related information. These 
include instances when children 
misunderstood the lawyers’ questions.  
Lawyer: “What did he say?”  
Child: “I was – I said “STOP” and I tried to push him away from 
me, but he kept holding on to my waist.” [unresponsive] 
Lawyer: “Well that can’t be right, can it? Try again. Was he 
standing or sitting?”  
Child: “He licked my private, too”. [unresponsive] 
      Self-contradiction Responses that negated what the children 
had previously disclosed during the 
proceedings or provided self- conflicting 
information.  
Lawyer: “He licked you one time?”  
Child: “Yes.”  
(later in the proceedings)  
Lawyer: “How many times did he lick you?”  
Child: “I don’t know - like 5 times.”[self-contradiction] 
 
Lawyer: “Did he touch your privates when you were in the car?” 
Child: “No.”  
Lawyer: “But I thought he did touch you in the car. Did he touch 
your privates in the car?”  
Child: “No. I never - in the car he touched my privates.” [self-
contradiction] 
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      Acquiescence Children’s responses that acquiesce to the 
suggested confrontation, supposition, or 
input. 
 
  
Lawyer: “You’re lying, aren’t you?” 
Child: “Yes.” 
 
Lawyer: “Did it hurt when he touched you?” (when the child did 
not mention that s/he was touched). 
Child: “Yes.” 
      Resistance Children’s responses that resist the 
suggested confrontation, supposition, or 
input. 
 
Lawyer: “You’re lying, aren’t you?” 
Child: “No.” 
 
Lawyer: “Did it hurt when he touched you?” (when the child did 
not mention that s/he was touched). 
Child: “He didn’t touch me.” 
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Table 2. 
 
Mean Proportions of Questions by Lawyer Role, Examination Phase, and Children’s Age.  
 
  Age (in years) 
  13 and under 14 and 15 16 and 17 
Lawyer Phase M SD M SD M SD 
Pros NS .26 .03 .11 .02 .12 .03 
 S .67 .04 .89 .03 .88 .04 
Def NS .22 .04 .17 .03 .21 .04 
 S .78 .05 .83 .04 .73 .05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUESTIONING CHILDREN IN SCOTTISH COURTS 
	
	 65 
Table 3. 
 
Totals, Average Frequencies, and Average Proportions of Substantive Prompt Types by Lawyer Role
 Lawyer role 
 Pros Def 
Question type n M(raw) SD(raw) M(prop) SD(prop) n M(raw) SD(raw) M(prop) SD(prop) 
Uncategorized total    138     2.38      3.84 .010 .022   191   3.38   6.71 .017 .036 
Facilitator total     322     5.75     9.32 .022 .035   208   3.71   5.92 .023 .042 
General invitation      33     0.59     0.87 .002 .006       5   0.09   0.29 .000 .002 
Follow-up invitation    138     2.46     4.42 .008 .009     23   0.41   1.63 .003 .011 
Refocusing invitation        1     0.20     0.13 .000 .001       1   0.02   0.13 .000 .000 
Closing invitation        1     0.20     0.13 .000 .000       0   0.00   0.00 .000 .000 
Cued invitation    231     4.13     5.87 .015 .018     15   0.27   0.75 .001 .003 
Segment of time invitation      62     1.11     2.06 .005 .013       9   0.16   0.57 .001 .006 
Invitation total    466     8.32     9.26 .032 .028     53   0.95   2.51 .006 .015 
Directive clarification    141     2.52     3.69 .009 .012     16   0.29   0.73 .002 .005 
Directive open 1,433   25.59   20.78 .100 .048    309   5.52   7.58 .031 .029 
Directive narrow 2,188   39.07   26.30 .164 .072    427   7.63   8.00 .045 .041 
Directive total 3,762   67.18   45.82 .280 .094    752 13.43 14.66 .081 .057 
Option-posing yes/no 6,752 120.57 103.60 .443 .104 3,121 55.73 39.78 .341 .135 
Option-posing forced choice    426     7.61     8.09 .027 .023    107   1.91   2.82 .011 .015 
Option-posing open choice    181     3.23     3.27 .015 .017     37   0.66   1.24 .005 .008 
Option-posing total 7,359 131.41 109.95 .494 .090 3,265 58.30 41.82 .369 .127 
Suggestive total 2,091   37.34   27.23 .159 .087 4,718 84.25 74.25 .486 .187 
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Table 4. 
 
Age Differences in Mean Proportions of Question Types by Lawyer Role  
  
  Age (in years) 
  13 and under 14 and 15 16 and 17 
Lawyer Question type M SD M SD M SD 
Pros Facilitator .03 .01 .02 .01 .02 .01 
 Invitation .04 .01 .04 .01 .02 .01 
 Directive .26 .03 .29 .02 .26 .03 
 Option-posing .43 .03 .50 .02 .52 .03 
 Suggestive .17 .02 .15 .02 .17 .02 
Def Facilitator .05 .01 .01 .01 .02 .01 
 Invitation .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
 Directive .13 .01 .06 .01 .06 .01 
 Option-posing .42 .04 .35 .03 .31 .04 
 Suggestive .39 .05 .56 .03 .46 .05 
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Table 5. 
 
Totals, Average Frequencies, and Average Proportions of Suggestive Subtypes by Lawyer Role 
 Lawyer role 
 Pros Def 
Suggestive subtype n M(raw) SD(raw) M(prop) SD(prop) n M(raw) SD(raw) M(prop) SD(prop) 
Doubt (3rd time)    114   2.04   4.04 .065 .148    556   9.93 10.64 .134 .098 
Option-posing (3rd time)      76   1.36   3.42 .029 .076    134   2.39   5.39 .023 .047 
Coercive confrontation internal       43   0.77   1.41 .015 .027    481   8.59 12.33 .078 .074 
Coercive confrontation external      24   0.43   1.23 .008 .020    212   3.79   6.82 .031 .044 
Suggestive confrontation total    257   4.59   7.66 .119 .183 1,373 24.70 29.49 .275 .135 
Implicit assumption    302   5.39   4.50 .162 .131    132   2.36   2.93 .032 .044 
Suggestive implicit assumption      25   0.45   0.87 .014 .029      25   0.45   1.37 .008 .033 
Suggestive explicit supposition      42   0.75   1.65 .024 .048      18   0.32   0.99 .005 .012 
Contradictory supposition    119   2.13   3.20 .056 .080    293   5.23   6.43 .064 .090 
Suggestive supposition total    488   8.71   6.51 .260 .172    468   8.36   8.36 .113 .107 
Suggestive input    697 12.45 11.49 .347 .206 1,482 26.46 24.28 .309 .170 
Suggestive summary/conclusion    497   8.88   9.21 .207 .142 1,154 20.61 19.55 .238 .128 
Non-exhaustive options      48   0.86   1.38 .023 .033      22   0.39   0.71 .006 .013 
External source    108   1.93   4.09 .043 .060    252   4.46   8.78 .056 .101 
Suggestive introduction total 1,346 24.11 19.40 .631 .216 2,877 51.96 44.05 .631 .158 
Tag questions    120   2.14   5.54 .051 .120 1,191 21.27 30.70 .196 .120 
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Table 6. 
 
Totals, Average Frequencies, and Average Proportions of Self-contradictions by Question Type and Lawyer Role. 
 
 Lawyer role 
 Pros Def 
Question type n M(raw) SD(raw) M(prop) SD(prop) n M(raw) SD(raw) M(prop) SD(prop) 
Invitation     5 0.09 0.35 .118 .022     0 0.00 0.00 .000 .000 
Directive   47 0.84 1.52 .034 .036   18 0.32 0.83 .086 .044 
Option-posing 122 2.18 2.85 .026 .023   93 1.66 2.58 .045 .032 
Suggestive 198 3.54 4.92 .110 .086 477 8.52 9.15 .121 .079 
Facilitator     7 0.13 0.51 .225 .199     6 0.11 0.41 .116 .028 
QUESTIONING CHILDREN IN SCOTTISH COURTS 
	
	 69 
 
Table 7. 
 
Individual Differences in Productivity: Totals, Average Frequencies, and Average Proportions by Question Subtype and Lawyer Role. 
 
 
   Lawyer role 
 Pros Def 
Question type n M SD n M SD 
Uncategorized total      52 2.14 3.15     61 0.95 1.88 
Facilitator total     322 1.75 0.34   208 0.69 0.16 
General invitation      30 5.43 6.83       3 2.00 3.46 
Follow-up invitation    126 4.05 4.23     20 0.90 1.52 
Refocusing invitation        1 3.00 -       1 0.00 - 
Closing invitation        1 3.00 -       0 0.00 0.00 
Cued invitation    200 5.07 7.13     13 2.77 3.22 
Segment of time invitation      55 6.76 9.65       8 0.75 0.89 
Invitation total    413 4.64 0.67     45 0.21 0.12 
Directive clarification    128 2.99 3.18     14 0.86 2.66 
Directive open 1,327 2.84 3.64    281 2.20 3.14 
Directive narrow 2,090 1.63 2.11    393 1.41 2.08 
Directive total 3,545 2.25 0.13    688 1.64 0.17 
Option-posing yes/no 6,482 1.10 1.92 2,992 0.83 1.37 
Option-posing forced choice    417 1.40 1.70    106 1.12 1.43 
Option-posing open choice    179 1.61 2.11      37 1.41 1.72 
Option-posing total 7,078 1.27 0.10 3,135 0.81 0.05 
Suggestive total 1,985 1.75 0.34 4,376 0.88 0.06 
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Table 8. 
 
Totals, Average Frequencies, and Average Proportions of Non-substantive Prompt Types by Lawyer Role. 
 
 
 
 
  
 Lawyer role 
 Pros Def 
NS prompt type n M(raw) SD(raw) M(prop) SD(prop) n M(raw) SD(raw) M(prop) SD(prop) 
Inaudible      56   1.00   2.58 .026 .061   65   1.16   4.00 .036 .123 
Procedural 1,347 24.05 33.99 .536 .224 913 16.30 16.31 .525 .256 
Anchor 1,088 19.43 29.71 .283 .219 792 14.14 18.07 .311 .230 
Rapport building    606 10.82 32.14 .156 .175 326   5.82 15.07 .128 .202 
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Table 9. 
 
Frequency of Judge’s Questions by Non-substantive, Substantive, and Suggestive Question Subtypes. 
 
 
Question type n 
Inaudible        0 
Procedural 1,399 
Anchor      25 
Rapport building      45 
Uncategorized         0 
Facilitator         3 
Invitation         6 
Directive total      38 
Option-posing     119 
Suggestive       47 
Suggestive confrontation       6 
Suggestive supposition       8 
Suggestive introduction     33 
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Abstract 
In the first study to systematically assess the structural linguistic complexity of lawyers’ 
questions of children in Scotland, we examined 56 trial transcripts of 5- to 17-year-old 
children testifying as alleged victims of sexual abuse. Complexity was assessed using 8 
quantitative measures of each utterance’s components (number of questions, phrases, 
clauses, sentences, false starts, average word count, word length, and sentence length) and 
a composite measure was used in the analyses. Lawyers did not alter the complexity of 
questions when prompting children of different ages. Defense lawyers asked more 
structurally complex questions than prosecutors. Directive questions were the least 
structurally complex questions, followed by option-posing questions. Suggestive 
questions, followed by invitations, were the most structurally complex questions. Option-
posing and suggestive questions were more complex when asked by defense lawyers than 
prosecutors. Of suggestive questions, confrontation and tagged questions were more 
complex than any other question type. Increased structural complexity led to more 
unresponsiveness, more expressions of uncertainty, and more self-contradictions 
regardless of which lawyer asked, the question type, or the children’s ages. These findings 
highlight the additional risks associated with asking some types of questions in 
structurally complex ways and highlight the need for further innovations (e.g., the use of 
intermediaries) to facilitate the questioning of vulnerable witnesses in Scottish criminal 
courts.  
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The structural linguistic complexity of lawyers’ questions and children’s responses in 
Scottish criminal courts 
In adversarial jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, United States, and New 
Zealand, the cross-examination of witnesses is often deemed an essential factor in 
protecting the accused’s right to a fair trial (e.g., Article 6 (3d), of the European 
Convention on Human Rights; Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). Courts have a 
duty to allow witnesses to give their best evidence (Home Office, 2011, section 5.8) but in 
adversarial jurisdictions, lawyers aim to undermine the opponents’ witnesses, and they 
question child witnesses accordingly (Andrews, Lamb, & Lyon, 2015a; Szojka, Andrews, 
Lamb, Stolzenberg, & Lyon, 2017). One major concern is that many of the questions that 
lawyers ask are linguistically complex, and that children may not possess the linguistic 
capacity and psychological competence necessary to effectively comprehend and respond 
to courtroom questioning (Hanna, Davies, Henderson, Crothers, & Rotherham, 2010; 
Zajac, O’Neill, & Hayne, 2012). Indeed, children seldom request clarification of 
grammatically complex and/or nonsensical questions (Carter, Bottoms, & Levine, 1996; 
Zajac, Gross, & Hayne, 2003), perhaps because they have difficultly detecting whether or 
not they have understood the requests. Such questioning techniques violate guidelines, 
based on an extensive body of experimental and field research, outlining the best ways to 
elicit testimony (see Rush, Quas, & McAuliff, 2012; Spencer & Lamb, 2012) and raise 
serious questions about the extent to which courts ensure both that guilty suspects are 
convicted and that innocent suspects are not wrongly convicted.  
Remarkably, however, there has been no prior systematic research on the linguistic 
complexity of lawyers’ questions and how this affects children’s responses in the United 
Kingdom, because proceedings are not routinely transcribed and are kept confidential by 
the courts. The current research builds upon an unprecedented collaboration with the 
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Scottish judiciary (a pluralistic system within the UK based on shared common-law 
principles combined with some unique civil-law principles), which has publicly and 
privately expressed considerable concern recently about the risks associated with 
inappropriate procedures in relation to children’s testimony, and thus comprises the first 
study to assess how structurally complex Scottish prosecutors’ and defense lawyers’ 
questions are and how children respond.  
Operationalizing linguistic complexity is a complex issue in itself. By definition, 
the complexity of questions is enhanced whenever any lexical, syntactic, semantic, or 
pragmatic aspect of the question increases processing time (Walker, Kenniston, & Inada, 
2013). The majority of previous studies have focused on lexical and syntactical measures 
of complexity, showing that much of the questioning conducted by lawyers during legal 
trials exceeds the communicative capacities of children and even adults (Brennan & 
Brennan, 1988; Perry, McAuliff, Tam, Claycomb, Dostal, & Flanagan, 1995). For 
example, many children are unfamiliar with or misunderstand terms commonly used in the 
courtroom (e.g., Flin, Stevenson, & Davies, 1989; Saywitz, Jeanicke, & Camparao, 1990) 
and this limits their ability to answer accurately (Evans, Lee, & Lyon, 2009; Perry et al., 
1995). Other researchers have suggested that children are unable to comprehend many 
aspects of syntax that are commonly used in legal settings (e.g., Brennan & Brennan, 
1988; Carter et al., 1996; Saywitz & Snyder, 1993), and that increased structural and 
syntactical complexity reduces the accuracy of children’s reports (Cashmore & DeHaas, 
1992; Zajac & Cannan, 2009; Zajac et al., 2003). Since adding length and additional 
structural components to questions is likely to greatly increase processing time, the current 
paper concerns itself with the structural complexity of lawyers’ questions and the effects 
of complexity on children’s responses. Specifically, structural complexity was assessed 
using 8 quantitative measures of each utterance’s components (number of questions, 
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phrases, clauses, sentences, false starts, average word count, word length, and sentence 
length). 
Perhaps surprisingly, there is no consistent evidence regarding either the 
differential complexity of questions asked by prosecutors and defense lawyers or the 
effects of age on these lawyers’ behavior. On the one hand, researchers have reported that 
defense lawyers tend to be less supportive and ask more complex and developmentally 
inappropriate questions than prosecutors (Cashmore & DeHaas, 1992; Davies & Seymour, 
1998; Flin, Bull, Boon, & Knox, 1993; Goodman, Taub, Jones, England, Port, Rudy et al., 
1992; Perry et al., 1995). For example, in a study conducted in New Zealand, Davies and 
Seymour (1998) found that defense lawyers asked 5- to 17-year-old children more 
questions involving complex language than prosecutors. Specifically, in comparison with 
prosecutors, defense lawyers asked more negative rhetorical questions, more multifaceted 
questions, more questions that lacked grammatical or semantic connections, more tagged 
questions, and more questions framed in the passive voice. There were no differences in 
relation to the children’s ages, however, suggesting that lawyers did not alter their 
questioning when prompting children of different ages. Similarly, although Zajac and 
Cannan (2009) found that adults were asked more complex questions (coded using 
measures of both structural [i.e., classification and count of linguistic components] and 
syntactical [i.e., arrangement of linguistic components] complexity) than children, Zajac et 
al. (2003) found no relationship between age and complexity (both structural and 
syntactical) in a study of 5- to 13-year-olds. Evans et al. (2009) reported neither age nor 
attorney type differences in either wordiness or the syntactic complexity of the questions 
posed while examining 46 4- to 15-year-olds in cases from Los Angeles. Zajac and 
Cannan (2009) found that 31% of the defense attorneys’ questions were complex, but so 
too were 25% of the prosecutors’ questions, a surprisingly small difference. Indeed, 
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Hanna, Davies, Crothers, and Henderson (2012) found that there were differences in the 
complexity of the questions asked by prosecutors and defense attorneys only in relation to 
three of the five types of questions examined. Specifically, prosecutors used more passives 
than defense lawyers, whereas defense lawyers used more double negatives and questions 
containing two or more subordinate clauses. There were no differences in the lawyers’ use 
of complex vocabulary and difficult concepts.  
It is unclear whether the inconsistent findings regarding the complexity of 
prosecutors’ and defense lawyers’ questions reflect secular changes in practices, 
differences between jurisdictions, or methodological differences. In addition, with the 
exception of Evans et al.’s (2009), all existing studies have involved very small samples, 
so further research using larger samples and more comprehensive measures of complexity 
may add clarity to a rather confusing picture.  
It is also likely that the linguistic complexity of questions differs depending on the 
type of question involved. Some question types may be more likely than others to become 
convoluted (e.g., suggestive questions), as a result of which they could contain 
components that increase both complexity and the likelihood that children will be 
unresponsive, inconsistent, or become confused/uncertain. In particular, suggestive tag 
questions are thought to be especially complex (Gibbons & Turell, 2008; R v W and M 
[2010] EWCA Crim 1926 para 30), requiring the respondent to carry out at least seven 
cognitive operations to fully comprehend and respond to the question correctly (Walker et 
al., 2013). As Walker et al. (2013) suggested, “if the question is a long one, being able to 
hold in memory all the propositions in the questions and check each one for truth before 
responding to a tag like “isn’t that true?” is probably beyond the capability of any 
preteen.” Indeed, the use of tag questions may not show up in the speech of some children 
until the early teens (Reich, 1986). No systematic field study has yet addressed how 
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linguistic complexity varies depending on the question type and how the type and 
linguistic complexity of the question together influence the ways in which children 
respond. 
In forensic interviews, children are typically responsive to almost all the questions 
addressed to them (e.g., Lamb, Hershkowitz, Sternberg, Esplin, Hovav, Manor, & 
Yudilevitch, 1996; Sternberg, Lamb, Davies, & Westcott, 2001), but laboratory analogue 
studies show that their answers to open-ended free-recall invitations (e.g., “Tell me what 
happened.”), children are more likely to be accurate than their answers to closed-ended 
recognition prompts (e.g., “Did he touch you with his fingers?”) for a number of reasons 
(e.g., Jones & Pipe, 2002; Lamb, Orbach, Hershkowitz, Horowitz, & Abbott, 2007). 
Younger children produce shorter and less detailed accounts in response to open-ended 
questions than older children and adults (e.g., Eisen, Goodman, Qin, Davis, & Crayton, 
2007; Hershkowitz, Lamb, Orbach, Katz, & Horowitz, 2012; Lamb, Sternberg, Orbach, 
Esplin, Stewart, & Mitchell, 2003), but their reports are no less accurate (e.g., Jack, Leov, 
& Zajac, 2014; Sutherland & Hayne, 2001). On the other hand, younger children are more 
likely than older children and adults to provide erroneous details in response to closed-
ended questions (e.g., Waterman, Blades, & Spencer, 2004; see Melnyk, Crossman, & 
Scullin, 2007, for a review), perhaps in part because they are less willing to say “I don’t 
know” in response to closed as opposed to open questions (Earhart, La Rooy, Brubacher, 
& Lamb, 2014).  
Although defense lawyers are permitted to ask children misleading and suggestive 
questions in cross-examination, we know that such types of questions are less likely to 
elicit accurate information from children (Henderson, 2002). Suggestive prompts are most 
problematic because children, especially young children, may change details in their 
accounts and thus respond inconsistently, either by incorporating suggested information or 
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acquiescing to perceived interviewer coercion (e.g., Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Bruck, Ceci, & 
Principe, 2006; Eisen, Qin, Goodman, & Davis, 2002; Lamb & Fauchier, 2001; London & 
Kulkofsky, 2010; Orbach & Lamb, 2001). Suggestive tag questions (e.g., “You’re lying, 
aren’t you?”) are often considered especially detrimental (Lamb & Fauchier, 2001; Orbach 
& Lamb, 2001; Walker et al., 2013). Recent research distinguishing between different 
types of suggestive prompts – confrontational, suppositional, and introductory - in forensic 
interviews (Orbach, Lamb, Hershkowitz, & Abbott, in press, see Table 1) found that 
children were twice as likely to acquiesce than resist interviewers’ suggestions. 
Contradictions were most likely to be elicited in response to suggestive introductory 
prompts, closely followed by suggestive confrontational prompts, although the latter 
elicited almost a third of all contradictory responses, despite accounting for only 5% of the 
total number of suggestive prompts. Younger children were asked fewer suggestive 
questions than older children, but were more likely to acquiesce in response to suggestive 
confrontational prompts, and were as likely to acquiesce in response to suggestive 
suppositional and introductory prompts.  
Complementing the above-referenced studies of forensic interviews, researchers 
have also examined children’s responses to different types of questions in court using 
transcripts from New Zealand (Zajac & Cannan, 2009; Zajac et al., 2003), the United 
States (Andrews, Ahern, Stolzenberg, & Lyon, in press; Andrews et al., 2015a, 2015b; 
Klemfuss, Quas, & Lyon, 2014; Stolzenberg & Lyon, 2014), and Scotland (Chapter 1). As 
in forensic interviews, child witnesses in court were more often responsive than 
unresponsive (Andrews et al., 2015a; Klemfuss et al., 2014), although Chapter 1 and 
Andrews et al. (2015a, in press) reported that children were more responsive to 
prosecutors than defense lawyers. Furthermore, in Scottish courts, as in the forensic 
interviews studied by Earhart et al. (2014), children responded with more uncertainty in 
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response to directive questions, particularly those posed by defense lawyers (Chapter 5). 
In relation to report consistency, studies measuring children’s self-contradictions have 
found that defense lawyers elicited more inconsistencies than prosecutors (Chapter 1; 
Andrews et al., 2015a; Zajac et al., 2003; Zajac & Cannan, 2009), and that suggestive 
questions elicited more self-contradictions than any other prompt type, regardless of age 
(Andrews et al., 2015a; Zajac et al., 2003). As in Orbach et al.’s (in press) study of 
forensic interviews, Chapter 1 found that both suggestive confrontational and suggestive 
introductory questions in court elicited significantly more self-contradictions from 
children than suggestive suppositions. Suggestive confrontational questions are relatively 
easy to spot, and thus can be monitored by the court and possibly restricted when 
necessary. However, suggestive suppositional and introductory questions involve lawyers 
assuming and introducing information not previously mentioned by the children (see 
Table 1) and are less easy to identify. One goal of the present study was thus to determine 
whether the different types of questions varied with respect to their linguistic complexity. 
The current study was designed to explore how the linguistic complexity of 
questions (assessed at the utterance level on 8 dimensions: number of questions, phrases, 
clauses, sentences, false starts, average word count, word length, and sentence length) may 
affect children’s responses at different ages, and how linguistic complexity may vary 
depending on who is asking (prosecutors or defense lawyers) and how the question is 
framed (question type). There has been no previous research on the linguistic complexity 
of lawyers’ questions in the United Kingdom. The current study assessed the direct- and 
cross-examination of children in Scottish courts in a sample of transcripts involving 56 5- 
to 17-year-old children questioned in trials held between 2009 and 2014. We sought to 
create a more comprehensive measure of complexity than in previous studies by 
combining 8 items measuring lexical and syntactical complexity.  
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Based on the literature reviewed above, we predicted that lawyers would not alter 
the linguistic complexity of questions depending on the children’s ages, and that defense 
lawyers would ask more linguistically complex questions than prosecutors. In relation to 
question types, we predicted that suggestive prompts would be more complex than option-
posing prompts, and that both would be more complex than directive prompts and 
invitations, with suggestive tag questions being most linguistically complex. We further 
predicted that increased linguistic complexity would lead to more unresponsiveness, more 
expressions of uncertainty, and more self-contradictions, regardless of how old the 
children were.  
Methods 
Sample 
The Court Service Team of the Scottish Court Service identified all cases 
conducted in six major criminal court-houses in Scotland between 2009 and 2014 in which 
alleged victims of child abuse had testified. Forty-three trials were identified and 36 of 
these were then selected for detailed study. Recordings of the cases were located, and the 
portions of the trials in which the children testified were transcribed. Cases involving 
children who needed the assistance of translators or retracted their sexual abuse allegations 
or had many sections of inaudible or missing audio were excluded. The 36 trials involved 
a total of 56 alleged victims of child sexual abuse. Nine cases (11 children) were from 
Aberdeen, 9 cases (19 children) from Edinburgh, 12 cases (16 children) from Glasgow, 1 
case (1 child) from Inverness, 3 cases (5 children) from Livingston, and 2 cases (4 
children) from Perth. The trials included in the present study involved at least 25 different 
prosecutors, 24 different defense lawyers, and 22 different judges. There were 9 
transcripts for which this information could not be determined.   
Children reported single (n = 18) or multiple (n = 38) sexually abusive experiences 
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involving penetration (n = 38), touching under clothes (n = 10), touching over clothes (n = 
3), and indecent exposure (n = 5). The final sample included 40 girls and 16 boys of 
between 5 and 17 years of age (M = 13.99, SD = 2.69).  
Age could not be entered into parametric tests as a continuous variable, because a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicated strong deviations from normality, D(55) = .20, p < 
.001. Therefore, children were categorized into three age groups at the time of trial: 12-
year-olds and under (n = 15), 13- to 15-year-olds (n = 26), and 16- and 17-year-olds (n = 
15). These categories were chosen because they accord with the Sexual Offences 
(Scotland) Act (2009); 16 years is the age of sexual consent, but a person aged 16 or over 
can claim to be innocent of the charge of committing sexual offences with a child aged 
between 13 and 16 years if that person ‘reasonably believed’ that the child was over the 
age of 16. However, this reasonable belief provision does not apply if the offence involved 
a child under the age of 13. No information was available concerning the children’s 
socioeconomic and ethnic backgrounds.  
All defendants were male. In 95% (n = 53) of the cases, children knew the alleged 
abusers. The suspects were biological parents (n = 8), step-fathers/mothers’ boyfriends (n 
= 3), other family members (n = 20), family friends (n = 5), friends/acquaintances (n = 
17), and strangers (n = 3). Defendants were either convicted (n = 42) or acquitted (n = 10). 
The remaining 4 defendants were convicted but not for all alleged sexual offences.   
In accordance with the Victims and Witnesses [Scotland] Act (2014), many of the 
children were accorded ‘special measures’ when they testified. All courts were closed to 
the public. Four children received no other special measures. Other children gave evidence 
in court with screen and a supporter present (n = 15), or just a supporter present (n = 5). 
The remaining children gave evidence via a live TV link either with a supporter present (n 
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= 21) or without a supporter present (n = 3), or their evidence was taken on commission1 
(n = 8).  
Coding of transcripts  
  The transcripts contained direct- and often redirect-examinations, in which the 
prosecution questioned the children, and cross-examinations, in which the defense 
questioned the children. No transcripts contained recross-examinations. Lawyers’ 
substantive questions and children’s corresponding responses were coded. Substantive 
utterances were defined as those designed to elicit or provide information about what 
happened during the alleged incidents, what immediately preceded or followed the alleged 
incidents, within-incident interventions (e.g., unexpected interruptions exposing the abuse) 
and witness details (e.g., witness interventions), other features of the abuse (e.g., how long 
the incidents lasted, where they happened), disclosure, and prior substantive formal 
questioning (e.g., what the child said happened in the forensic interview). All inaudible 
and partially inaudible prompts were excluded for the purposes of this study.  
  Lawyers’ substantive questions were coded for 8 different aspects of structural 
linguistic complexity (definitions and examples of all codes listed below are provided in 
Table 1), the types of questions lawyers asked were coded (see Table 1), and children’s 
responses were coded (see Table 1).  
  Linguistic complexity. 
  For each lawyer utterance, a coder tabulated the number of questions, phrases, 
clauses, sentences, and false starts. Each utterance was also entered into an automated 
																																																						
1 Evidence is taken by a commissioner only when the witness is considered especially 
vulnerable. In these instances, delays in testifying may increase distress and trauma, 
significantly hindering the witness’s ability to give evidence. Evidence is therefore taken 
before a commissioner appointed by the court. The evidence is taken in full (direct-, cross-
, and re-direct-examination) from the witness, proceedings are video recorded, and later 
received at the subsequent trial (see Vulnerable Witnesses [Scotland] Act, 2004).  
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linguistics program – the ATOS analyzer for text (see 
http://www1.renaissance.com/Products/Accelerated-Reader/ATOS/ATOS-Analyzer-for-
Text/lang/english) -- which calculated three further variables to measure structural 
complexity: word count, average word length (number of letters), and average sentence 
length (number of words). In order to create an overall measure of structural linguistic 
complexity, z-scores were generated at the utterance level for the 8 measures of 
complexity. Z-scores were used to ensure that each item was weighted equally within the 
composite by controlling for the ranges of scores for each item. The internal consistency 
of the composite score was high, α = .81. The 8 z-score measures were then averaged to 
create the linguistic complexity composite used as the dependent variable in all tests 
reported below. The mean score for structural question complexity was .00 (SD = .65, 
range -1.97 to 8.16).  
It is important to note that analysing the averaged z-scores as a composite measure 
is useful for determining where differences occur. However, interpretation of the 
composite scores beyond identifying differences should be done only when contextualised 
alongside the raw complexity item scores to retain a sense of how complex questions 
actually were (e.g., negative z-scores [below the mean of .00] indicate lower complexity 
relative to the comparison(s) within the sample, yet these may still be regarded as very 
complex questions for children to monitor and answer when the raw item scores are 
considered). Table 2 provides descriptive statistics to aid such interpretation.  
Lawyers’ question types. 
Question types. Lawyers’ substantive utterances were categorized into one of the 
four categories commonly used to differentiate among interviewer utterances in forensic 
interviews (e.g., Lamb, Hershkowitz, Orbach, & Esplin, 2008): invitations, directive, 
option-posing, and suggestive prompts.   
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Suggestive question subtypes. Suggestive questions were further categorized into 
one of 3 categories (using a coding system designed by Orbach et al., in press): suggestive 
confrontation, suggestive supposition, and suggestive introduction. All suggestive prompts 
were also coded for whether they were tagged or untagged.  
Children’s responses. 
  Responsiveness. Children’s responsiveness was categorized exhaustively into one 
of two categories: responsive and unresponsive.  
  Uncertainty. Uncertainty was coded when children indicated that they did not 
know/remember/were unsure about the answer, when they digressed, requested 
clarification, or did not answer.  
Self-contradictions. Self-contradictions were defined as responses that negated 
what the children had previously disclosed during the proceedings or provided conflicting 
information. 
Inter-rater Reliability  
Another rater independently coded 20% of the transcripts that were randomly 
selected. Inter-rater reliability in the identification of linguistic codes, and the 
identification and classification of all question and response codes were consistently high, 
Kappas > .83. Reliability assessments were performed throughout the duration of coding 
and all disagreements were resolved by discussion.  
Results 
Analytical plan 
  The reliability and internal consistency of the composite measure of complexity 
were first assessed. A series of preliminary discriminant function analyses were then 
conducted to determine whether gender, case verdicts, the number of children testifying in 
each case, and the use of special measures were associated with complexity. Research 
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questions were addressed using repeated-measures analyses of variance (RM-ANOVAs), 
with the linguistic complexity composite measure entered as the dependent variable, 
children’s age entered as the between-subjects independent variable (12 years old and 
under, 13 to 15 years old, 16 and 17 years old), and all other variables entered as within-
subjects repeated-measures factors: lawyer role (prosecutor, defense), question types 
(invitations, directives, option-posing, suggestive prompts), suggestive question subtypes 
(confrontation, supposition, introduction), tag questions (tagged, untagged), 
responsiveness (responsive, unresponsive), uncertainty (uncertainty present, uncertainty 
not present), and self-contradictions (contradiction present, contradiction not present). 
When Mauchly’s test of sphericity was violated, Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were 
applied. All parametric tests were conducted with child as the unit of analysis, and power 
analyses confirmed that all inferential tests reported had enough power (set at 0.8) to 
detect at least medium-sized effects. When investigating statistical interactions involving 
measures of the children’s responses, question type and lawyer role were analyzed in 
separate RM-ANOVAs to ensure adequate statistical power. Pairwise comparisons (with 
Bonferonni corrections) were used to follow-up significant two-way interactions. The 
structural linguistic complexity composite measure was aggregated to the child level by 
averaging it across the repeated-measures (e.g., when investigating whether linguistic 
complexity differed with question type, lawyer role, and children’s age, the mean 
linguistic complexity score was cross-tabulated for each child by question type and lawyer 
role). 
Preliminary analyses 
Discriminant function analyses revealed no significant effects for gender, case 
verdicts, the number of children testifying in each case, and type of special measures 
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afforded with respect to the overall mean z-scores for linguistic complexity, thus these 
factors were not included in any of the analyses reported below.  
Factors associated with variations in the complexity of lawyers’ questions 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to investigate whether the linguistic 
complexity of lawyers’ questions differed depending on the age of the children being 
questioned. Importantly, there was no significant difference, F(2, 55) = .08, p = .92, ηp2  = 
.003. 
Question types. A question type X lawyer role X children’s age RM-ANOVA 
with Greenhouse-Geisser corrections applied (ε = .69 and .81) revealed a significant main 
effect for lawyer role, F(1, 53) = 4.04, p = .05, ηp2  = .07. Defense lawyers (M = .08, SD = 
.04) asked more complex questions than prosecutors (M = -.05, SD = .05). There was also 
a significant main effect for question type, F(2.09, 110.97) = 15.96, p < .001, ηp2  = .23: 
Directive questions (M = -.12, SD = .03) were less complex than option-posing (M = -.03, 
SD = .02), invitations (M = .03, SD = .03), and suggestive (M = .05, SD = .02) questions, 
and option-posing questions were less complex than suggestive questions. There was also 
a significant interaction between question type and lawyer role, F(2.42, 128.31) = 4.81, p 
= .006, ηp2  = .08. Pairwise comparisons revealed that, when prompting children with 
option-posing and suggestive prompts, defense lawyers’ questions were more 
linguistically complex (M = .03, SD = .03; M = .11, SD = .03) than prosecutors’ questions 
(M = -.09, SD = .03; M = -.01, SD = .03, respectively). There were no other significant 
differences.  
Suggestive question types. A suggestive question subtype X lawyer role X age 
RM-ANOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser corrections applied (ε = .83) revealed a main 
effect for lawyer role, F(1, 53) = 5.34, p = .03, ηp2  = .09. As noted above, defense 
lawyers’ suggestive questions (M = .11, SD = .03) were more linguistically complex than 
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prosecutors’ (M = -.01, SD = .03) and there was also a main effect for suggestive question 
subtype, F(1.66, 87.89) = 7.59, p = .002, ηp2  = .13. Pairwise comparisons showed that 
suggestive suppositions (M = -.05, SD = .04) were less complex than suggestive 
confrontation (M = .12, SD = .05) and suggestive introduction (M = .06, SD = .03) 
questions. There were no other significant differences.  
Tag questions. A tagged/untagged X lawyer role X age RM-ANOVA again 
revealed the main effect for lawyer role, F(1, 53) = 10.19, p = .002, ηp2  = .16 (see above 
for descriptive statistics) as well as a main effect for tagged/untagged suggestive 
questions, F(1, 53) = 19.86, p < .001, ηp2  = .27. Tagged suggestive questions (M = .14, SD 
= .03) were more linguistically complex than untagged suggestive questions (M = -.02, SD 
= .02). There were no other significant differences. 
How were children’s responses affected by question complexity?  
Responsiveness. A responsiveness x lawyer role X age RM-ANOVA again 
showed the main effect for lawyer role, F(1, 53) = 10.85, p = .002, ηp2  = .17 (see above 
for descriptive statistics) as well as a main effect for responsiveness, F(1, 53) = 4.11, p = 
.05, ηp2  = .07: Children’s unresponsive answers were elicited by more complex questions 
(M = .04, SD = .03) than responsive answers (M = -.01, SD = .02). There were no other 
significant differences. 
A responsiveness X question type X age RM-ANOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrections applied (ε = .86 and ε = .83) again showed the main effect for responsiveness, 
F(1, 53) = 11.09, p = .002, ηp2  = .17, and a main effect for question type, F(2.60, 138.02) 
= 11.23, p < .001, ηp2  = .18 (see above for descriptive statistics) but no significant 
interactions.  
Uncertainty. An uncertainty X lawyer role X age RM-ANOVA showed the main 
effect for lawyer role, F(1, 53) = 10.11, p = .002, ηp2  = .16 (see above for descriptive 
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statistics) and a main effect for uncertainty, F(1, 53) = 15.93, p < .001, ηp2  = .23. 
Children’s expressions of uncertainty were elicited by more complex questions (M = .08, 
SD = .03) than responses that did not express uncertainty (M = -.02, SD = .02). There were 
no other significant effects. 
An uncertainty X question type X age RM-ANOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrections applied (ε = .84 and ε = .64) again showed the main effect for uncertainty, F(1, 
53) = 18.33, p < .001, ηp2  = .26, and also a main effect for question type, F(2.55, 134.91) 
= 17.95, p < .001, ηp2  = .25 (see above for descriptive statistics), but no significant 
interactions.  
Self-contradictions. A contradictions X lawyer role X age RM-ANOVA revealed 
the significant main effect for lawyer role, F(1, 53) = 4.69, p = .04, ηp2  = .08 (see above 
for descriptive statistics) and no other significant effects, although there was a non-
significant trend, F(1, 53) = 3.16, p = .08, ηp2  = .06, indicating that children’s 
contradictory responses tended to occur more often in response to more linguistically 
complex questions (M = .09, SD = .06) than non-contradictory responses (M = -.01, SD = 
.02).  
A contradictions X question type X age RM-ANOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrections applied (ε = .76 and ε = .71) showed the main effect for question type, F(2.29, 
125.68) = 6.60, p = .001, ηp2  = .11, and the non-significant trend for contradictions, F(1, 
53) = 3.54, p = .06, ηp2  = .06 (see above for descriptive statistics). However, there were no 
interactions.  
Discussion 
Although, as predicted, defense lawyers tended to ask more complex questions of 
children in the courtroom than prosecutors did, this study revealed considerable 
variability. Many of the lawyers’ questions were quite simple in structure, whereas others 
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were more complex. Importantly, and as expected, both prosecutors and defense lawyers 
asked similarly complex questions of children regardless of their age. As expected, 
suggestive questions were the most complex. Variations in the complexity of questions 
had an impact on the quality of children’s responses. Children were less likely to respond, 
more likely to express uncertainty, and, as a trend, more likely to contradict themselves 
when questions were more complex.  
At first glance, the average structural complexity of the questions asked may seem 
relatively low (see Table 2). The average utterance contained one question, formed by 14 
relatively short words within one sentence, with few false starts. However, the average 
number of phrases per utterance was 4, and the average number of clauses per utterance 
was 2.5, suggesting that the average utterance contained multiple clauses. Such questions 
are notoriously difficult for children, particularly those aged 12 years and under, to 
monitor and answer accurately (see Walker, 1993; Walker et al., 2013). Furthermore, the 
high standard deviations and wide ranges are noteworthy. Some lawyer utterances 
contained 8 questions, some involved as many as 10 sentences, some included up to 184 
words, and some contained words that averaged as many as 15 letters in length! Such 
questions would likely be extremely difficult for adults to monitor and answer, let alone 
children responding in extremely stressful and upsetting circumstances and after long 
delays between the event(s) in question and the courtroom testimony.  
 These issues are further exacerbated by the lawyers’ manifest insensitivity to the 
children’s ages. In line with our prediction, lawyers did not alter the structural complexity 
of the questions they posed depending on the children’s ages, suggesting insensitivity to 
children’s developmental capacities and limitations. Put another way, both prosecutors and 
defense lawyers used similarly complex questions to address 5- to 12-year-olds and 16- to 
17-year-olds. Although further research utilizing larger samples is needed to assess the 
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robustness of this finding, studies conducted in New Zealand (Davies & Seymour, 1998; 
Zajac et al., 2003) and California (Evans et al., 2009) similarly showed lawyers’ 
inattention to children’s ages, implying that this problem is not unique to Scotland, but 
may be a common characteristic of adversarial legal systems. Taken together, these 
findings suggest that learning why and how to alter questioning practices in line with 
children’s ages should be a significant focus of training, not only for defense lawyers, but 
also for prosecutors and judges.  
 However, unlike Evans et al. (2009), and to a greater extent than Zajac and Cannan 
(2009) and Hanna et al. (2012), we found that, as predicted, defense lawyers asked more 
structurally complex questions than prosecutors. Similarly, Cashmore and DeHaas (1992), 
Davies and Seymour (1998), Flin et al. (1993), Goodman et al. (1992), and Perry et al. 
(1995) also found that defense lawyers asked more linguistically complex questions than 
prosecutors. The inconsistency between these findings and those reported by Evans et al. 
(2009) may be due to methodological differences, since Evans et al. focused mainly on the 
syntactic complexity of the questions asked. Further research is needed to elucidate 
whether different results are obtained when researchers focus on different aspects of 
complexity.  
In general, our findings supported our predictions with respect to question types. 
Open-ended directive questions were less linguistically complex than closed-ended 
option-posing questions, open-ended invitations, and suggestive questions. Suggestive 
utterances were the most linguistically complex questions, particularly when asked by 
defense lawyers. Additionally, suggestive confrontational questions and tagged questions 
were the most linguistically complex forms of suggestive questions. Not only do such 
questions pose risks to the veracity of children’s responses because of their suggestiveness 
(Orbach et al., in press; Spencer & Lamb, 2012; Walker et al., 2013), but such risks are 
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exacerbated due to the high degree of linguistic competence they demand (Walker et al., 
2013). The current findings thus support recent calls for courts to restrict the use of the 
suggestive questions (Lord Carloway, 2013; Lord Chief Justice’s Criminal Practice 
Directions, 2013; Spencer & Lamb, 2012), particularly suggestive confrontational and 
tagged questions, that dominate cross-examinations (Chapter 1; Andrews et al., 2015a).  
Invitations may have been more linguistically complex than directive and option-
posing questions because the majority of invitations were formulated as cued-invitations 
(e.g., “You mentioned [person/object/action]. Tell me more about that” as opposed to 
general invitations (e.g., “Tell me what happened”) (Chapter 1). By definition, cued-
invitations refocus the child’s attention on previously mentioned details and uses them as 
contextual cues, thus increasing the structural complexity of the question. 
Lastly, and as predicted, increased linguistic complexity led to more 
unresponsiveness, more expressions of uncertainty, and (non-significantly) more self-
contradictions. Our findings are consistent with those of studies showing that increased 
complexity reduces the accuracy of children’s reports (Cashmore & DeHaas, 1992; Zajac 
et al., 2003; Zajac & Cannan, 2009). Increases in such responding may have deleterious 
effects on the evaluation of children’s testimony (Bruer & Pozzulo, 2014; Goodman, 
Golding, & Haith, 1984; Myers, Redlich, Goodman, Prizmich, & Imwinkelried, 1999; 
Semmler & Brewer, 2002), and the consequences may be serious. In the present study, 
children’s responses were largely influenced only by the linguistic complexity of 
questions, regardless of who asked them and how the questions were formulated, 
suggesting that linguistic complexity is a powerful determinant of children’s responses. It 
is possible that interactions with lawyer role and question type would be present in a larger 
sample that had enough power to detect very small effects but such differences would be 
of less practical significance than the larger effects found in the present study.  
STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY AND CHILDREN’S RESPONSES 
	 93 
In line with previous research (Chapter 1; Andrews et al., 2015a) we found no age 
differences in the children’s responses, suggesting that young witnesses of all ages are 
remarkably responsive and consistent in the face of challenging courtroom questioning. 
By contrast, the experimental literature shows linear developmental trends in children’s 
ability to respond effectively to demanding questions (see Andrews et al., 2015a). 
However, since the accuracy of children’s responses cannot be assessed in field research, 
it is possible that children simply acquiesce to the large number of suggestions and option-
posing questions asked of them in court (Chapter 1; Andrews et al., 2015a). Indeed, 
because option-posing and suggestive questions are more likely to be linguistically 
complex, it is possible that many children are responsive to questions they do not fully 
understand, and thus our results underestimate the deleterious effects of question 
complexity on children’s responses. Further experimental research, in which the accuracy 
of children’s response can be monitored, is needed to investigate these issues.  
Furthermore, whilst long words and sentences are often more difficult to 
comprehend than shorter ones (Walker et al., 2013), longer words can be more familiar 
than shorter words (e.g., feign versus pretend) while longer sentences can be easier to 
understand than shorter ones because comprehensibility can be affected by factors such as 
word order, negation, voice (active vs. passive), and the familiarity of the words used 
(Perera, 1980; Scott & Koonce, 2013). Further research is needed on how often, why, and 
to what extent sentences with identical numbers of clauses, phrases, and words are 
differentially comprehensible.  
Although the cross-examination of witnesses is often deemed essential to protect 
the accused’s right to a fair trial (e.g., Article 6 (3d), of the European Convention on 
Human Rights; Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution), courts have a duty to allow 
witnesses to give their best evidence (Home Office, 2011, section 5.8). The findings 
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obtained in the present study, supported by research conducted over the past 30 years in a 
variety of jurisdictions, suggest that lawyers, particularly defense lawyers, in adversarial 
systems ask questions of children that sometimes exploit their developmental limitations. 
Such questioning techniques violate guidelines, based on an extensive body of 
experimental and field research, outlining the best ways to elicit truthful testimony (see 
Rush et al., 2012; Spencer & Lamb, 2012) and raise serious questions about the extent to 
which courts ensure both that guilty suspects are convicted and that innocent suspects are 
not wrongly convicted.  
Since it is now widely accepted in Scotland that gathering evidence from young 
and vulnerable witnesses requires special care, and that subjecting them to traditional 
adversarial forms of examination and cross-examination is no longer acceptable (Evidence 
and Procedure Review Report [Section 2.1], Scottish Court Service, March, 2015; Lord 
Carloway, May, 2013; Spencer & Lamb, 2012), the findings described above should be 
particularly worrisome. It is clear that major reforms are warranted. In particular, the 
fundamental proposition explored in the Evidence and Procedure Review Report (Scottish 
Court Service, March, 2015) is that substantial improvements can be made to the 
administration of justice. Such improvements might involve the widespread use of pre-
recorded statements in place of testimony in court and the implementation of Ground 
Rules Hearings, at which judges stipulate what types of questions can be asked. These 
procedures (bringing into force Section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Act, 1999) are currently being implemented in England and Wales under the premise that 
a properly conducted witness interview before trial may be far more informative and 
appropriate than a belated appearance in court during the trial (Evidence and Procedure 
Review Report [Section 1.24], Scottish Court Service, March, 2015; Westera, Kebbell, & 
Milne, 2013). Furthermore, evidence-based “Toolkits” (see Advocacy Training Council 
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(ATC), 2011) have been introduced in England and Wales to provide continuing education 
and thus improve practice, in recognition of the fact that many lawyers and judges need 
guidance on how best to question children appropriately. These Toolkits were endorsed in 
the Lord Chief Justice’s Criminal Practice Directions (2013). Furthermore, intermediaries 
(i.e., trained professionals who are present at trial to facilitate communication between 
vulnerable witnesses and lawyers) have had their roles greatly expanded in recent years 
across England and Wales, and are increasingly used by judges in Crown courts to assist 
the court by highlighting complex questions and mediating miscommunications 
(Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2015). This potentially valuable special measure is presently not 
available in Scotland. Although the use and effectiveness of special measures have not 
been systematically assessed, it is likely that systematic training of judges and lawyers, 
perhaps alongside the greater use of well-trained intermediaries, may be necessary to 
ensure that practice in Scotland changes in the intended direction. 
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Table 1. 
 
Coding Definitions and Examples.  
 
Code 
 
Definition 
 
Example 
 
 
Linguistic complexity items 
 
  
      Number of questions A count of the number of questions in each 
utterance, including imperatives and statements 
phrased as questions.  
 
“How did he do it? What did he do? Did he touch 
you?” = 3 MQs 
 
      Number of phrases A string of words which form a grammatical 
unit; smaller than a clause and need not contain 
a verb (Burton, 2012).  
 
“The big man?” = 1 phrase 
 
“[He] [ran out] [of the house]?” = 3 phrases 
 
      Number of clauses A count of the number of clauses in each 
utterance. A clause is a larger word group that 
includes a little more information. It consists of 
at least two phrases - one is a noun phrase 
known as the subject, and the other is a verb 
phrase. 
 
“The big man shouted?” = 1 clause 
 
“The big man shouted and ran out of the house?” = 2 
clauses 
      Number of sentences  A count of the number of sentences in each 
utterance. Sentences often contain a subject and 
predicate, and consist of a main clause and 
sometimes one or more subordinate clauses. 
 
“The big man shouted and ran out of the house?” = 1 
sentence 
      False starts A count of the number of false starts (i.e., 
stumbles) within an utterance. False starts can 
“He – she never said anything – she she never – hold 
on, she never said anything to you at the hotel about 
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occur within sentences as well as at the 
beginning. 
this, did she? The first time you heard about it was on 
Tuesday – Wednesday, right?” = 4 false starts 
 
      Word count A count of the number of complete words in 
each utterance. 
 
 
      Average word length The average length (in letters) of words within 
each utterance. 
 
 
      Average sentence length The average length (in words) of sentences 
within each utterance. 
 
 
Question types 
 
  
      Invitation Open-ended, input-free utterances used to elicit 
free-recall responses from children. Such 
questions, statements, imperatives, or contextual 
cues do not restrict the child’s focus except in a 
general sense. Invitations can also follow-up on 
information just mentioned, or cue for 
additional free-recall elaboration about details 
previously mentioned.  
 
“Tell me everything about the first time/last 
time/time you best remember.” 
 
“Tell me more about that.” 
 
“Tell me about/what happened with (content 
mentioned by the child).” 
 
“What was the very first thing that happened before 
(an occurrence/action mentioned by the child)?” 
 
      Directive Open-ended questions that refocus the child on 
aspects or details of the allegation that they have 
previously mentioned, mostly using WH- 
utterances to request further information. 
“Where/when/how did it happen?” 
 
“Why did you do that? 
 
“What color was his t-shirt?” (when the child 
mentioned earlier that he was wearing a t-shirt). 
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“Where did he touch you?” (when the child 
mentioned earlier that a male touched her). 
 
      Option-posing Closed-ended questions that refocus the child’s 
attention on details of the allegation that they 
have not previously mentioned, although 
without implying an expected response. They 
can be formulated as “yes/no” or “choice” 
questions. 
“Did he touch your skin?” (when the child had 
mentioned earlier that he touched her). 
 
 “Were your clothes on when this happened?” 
 
“Did he touch you over your clothes or under your 
clothes?” 
 
“Was that photo he showed you from a photo album 
or a magazine or…?” 
 
      Suggestive Statements or questions formulated in a way 
that communicates the expected response. They 
may introduce information not mentioned by the 
child but assumed by the lawyer or query the 
truthfulness of the child’s response.  
 
 
Suggestive question subtypes 
 
  
      Suggestive confrontation Suggestive questions that 1) raise the possibility 
for the third time that reported information is 
not true, 2) are option-posing or suggestive 
questions asked for the third time on the same 
issue, 3) are instances where the lawyer refers to 
information disclosed by the child earlier in the 
direct-/cross-examination and uses it to confront 
the child by questioning, doubting, or 
“Are you sure?” (when asked for the 3rd time) 
 
Lawyer: “Did it happen once or more than once?” 
Child: “More than once.” 
Lawyer: “So, it did happen more than once?” 
Child: “Yes.” 
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contradicting his or her current statement, or 4) 
are instances where the lawyer refers to 
knowledge of undisclosed information about the 
investigated incident and confronts the child by 
using it to contradict information s/he disclosed. 
Lawyer: “This is a serious matter. I’ll ask you again. 
Did it happen once or more than once?” [option-
posing 3rd time]   
 
Lawyer: “What happened to your trousers?” 
Child: “They stayed on.” 
Lawyer: “How did he touch your privates if your 
trousers were on?” [coercive confrontation internal]  
 
“You said (XXX), but your brother, who testified 
earlier, said that (contradicting info).” 
 
      Suggestive supposition Suggestive questions where 1) the lawyer asks a 
question built on an implicit assumption that an 
undisclosed peripheral action had happened, 2) 
the lawyer asks a question built on a potentially 
contaminating assumption that something 
central to the allegation had happened, 3) the 
lawyer asks a question built on an explicit 
undisclosed assumption (premise) that 
something had happened, or 4) the lawyer 
questions the child, ignoring an earlier 
contradicting response that rules out the 
question.   
 
Child: “Then I went to meet X.” 
Lawyer: “You met X. What did she tell you?” (when 
the child did not mention that X told anything)  
 
“What else did X do?” (when the child did not 
mention that X did anything else) 
 
“Was your mother there when he touched you?” 
(when the child did not mention that s/he was 
touched). 
 
“Did it hurt when he touched you?” (When child said 
s/he was not touched) 
 
      Suggestive introduction Suggestive questions where 1) the lawyer 
introduces undisclosed information (e.g., the 
suspect’s name, the location of the incident), 2) 
the lawyer summarizes or quotes the child 
incorrectly; modifies, incorrectly concludes 
(with or without using a statement which is 
“Tell me what happened with/at (a person/place not 
mentioned by child).” 
 
Child: “I went to the park…”  
Lawyer: “You said you went to skate park.” 
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appended or preceded by a ‘tag’), incorrectly 
interprets, verbalizes the child’s action response 
beyond what the response indicates, or chooses 
one of two contradictory responses, 3) the 
lawyer provides restrictive, non-exhaustive 
options, in a forced-choice question, or 4) the 
lawyer refers to knowledge he has, from a 
specified or an unspecified external source, of 
undisclosed information about the investigated 
incident.  
 
“Did he touch you in the bedroom or in the living 
room?” (when child only mentioned that the suspect 
touched him/her at home) 
 
“Your mom told me (undisclosed information).” 
“I heard from the policeman that (undisclosed 
information).”  
 
       Tag question Short questions that are tagged onto the end of 
statements implying an expected response.  
“You’re lying, aren’t you?” 
 
“He touched you, didn’t he?” 
 
“It happened three times, right?” 
 
Children’s responses 
 
  
       Responsive Verbal and action responses related to the 
lawyer’s previous utterance. Utterances were 
assigned this category even if they did not 
contain new informative details, or when their 
meaning was unclear.  
 
Lawyer: “Did he take your trousers off?” 
Child: “Yes.” [responsive] 
Lawyer: “What did he do with your trousers?” 
Child: “I don’t know.” [responsive] 
       Unresponsive Responses that 1) do not relate to the question 
asked in the previous lawyer utterance, but 
provide incident-related information. These 
include instances when children misunderstood 
the lawyers’ questions. As well as, 2) non-
substantive responses such as digressions and 
non-responses.  
Lawyer: “What did he say?”  
Child: “I was – I said “STOP” and I tried to push him 
away from me, but he kept holding on to my waist.” 
[unresponsive] 
 
Lawyer: “Well that can’t be right, can it? Try again. 
Was he standing or sitting?”  
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Child: “He licked my private, too”. [unresponsive] 
 
       Uncertainty  Uncertain responses included don’t know 
(including “not sure”), don’t remember, 
digressions (i.e., the child responded but was off 
task, resistant, or provided an irrelevant 
response to the target question), requests for 
clarification, and non-responses. 
Lawyer: “So it happened at around dinnertime?” 
Child: “I’m not certain”. 
 
“I didn’t understand. Can you repeat that?” 
 
Lawyer: “How did it happen?” 
Child: (no response).  
 
       Self-contradiction Responses that negated what the children had 
previously disclosed during the proceedings or 
provided self- conflicting information.  
Lawyer: “He licked you one time?”  
Child: “Yes.”  
(later in the proceedings)  
Lawyer: “How many times did he lick you?”  
Child: “I don’t know - like 5 times.”[self-
contradiction] 
 
Lawyer: “Did he touch your privates when you were 
in the car?” Child: “No.”  
Lawyer: “But I thought he did touch you in the car. 
Did he touch your privates in the car?”  
Child: “No. I never - in the car he touched my 
privates.” [self-contradiction] 
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Table 2. 
 
Descriptive statistics for measures of Linguistic Complexity  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Raw score Z-score by item score within the lowest quartile 
Item M SD range 0% 6.25% 12.5% 25% 
Number of questions 1.06   .30   0-8 -3.65 -1.93 -.28 3.21 
Number of phrases 4.26 3.16 1-57 -1.35   -.24   .87 3.08 
Number of clauses 2.46 1.79 0-28 -1.37   -.39   .58 2.52 
Number of sentences 1.20   .55 0-10 -2.19   -.82   .99 2.37 
Number of false starts   .11   .43   0-9   -.25  1.49 2.66 5.55 
Word count     14.50    11.58   1-184 -1.17    .26   .73 2.72 
Average word length 3.77   .81 2-15 -4.21 -1.88 2.12 8.93 
Average sentence length    10.89 7.47 2-87 -1.46   -.72   .01 1.49 
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Abstract 
This study examined the effects of repeated questions (n = 7,968) on 5- to 17-year-olds’ 
testimony in child sexual abuse cases in Scottish criminal courts. We examined transcripts 
of direct- and cross-examinations of 56 children, categorizing how lawyers asked repeated 
questions in court and how children responded. Defense lawyers repeated more questions 
(39.6% of all questions asked) than prosecutors (30.6%) and repeated questions using 
more suggestive prompts (52% of their repeated questions) than prosecutors (18%) did. In 
response, children typically repeated or elaborated on their answers and seldom 
contradicted themselves. Self-contradictions were most often elicited by repeated 
suggestive prompts posed by defense lawyers. Younger children were asked more 
repeated questions than older children, but child age was not associated with the types of 
questions repeated or how children responded to repetition. Questions repeated after 
delays elicited more self-contradictions than questions repeated immediately. Most 
repeated questions (69.2%) were repeated more than once, yet no ‘asked-and-answered’ 
objections were ever raised. Overall, findings suggest that lawyers frequently ask children 
‘risky’ repeated questions. Official judicial guidance and training needs to be put in place 
to help identify and restrict the inappropriate repetition of questions.   
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Lawyers’ question repetition and children’s responses in Scottish criminal courts 
Repeated questions provide interviewees with opportunities to change their 
initially correct or incorrect responses. Since triers of fact often place emphasis on report 
consistency when assessing the credibility of oral testimony (Bruer & Pozzulo, 2014; 
Myers, Redlich, Goodman, Prizmich, & Imwinkelried, 1999; Semmler & Brewer, 2002), 
the adverse effects that inappropriate question repetition may have on children’s testimony 
is concerning. To date, existing research on the effects of question repetition has focused 
exclusively on children aged 12-years-old and under, and only one systematic field study, 
conducted in California (Andrews, Lamb, & Lyon, 2015a), has investigated how lawyers’ 
repetition of questions affected children’s responses. The current study sought to replicate 
and extend previous research by exploring repeated questioning in 5- to 17-year-old’s 
direct- and cross-examinations in Scottish criminal courts. Specifically, we examined the 
effects of children’s age, lawyer role, and question type on children’s responses, the effect 
of immediate versus delayed repetition on children’s responses, the extent of multiple 
repetition, and the frequency with which opposing lawyers objected to repeated questions 
on the grounds that they had already been ‘asked-and-answered’. 
Repeated questions do not necessarily degrade the accuracy of children’s accounts 
(see Lyon, 2002). In experimental studies, children provide additional accurate 
information that was not reported earlier when asked repeated open-ended prompts 
(Memon & Vartoukian, 1996; Poole & White, 1991). Furthermore, in forensic settings 
questions may need to be repeated to make the requests clear, to clarify details previously 
mentioned by the children (e.g., ambiguous or unclear responses), or to encourage children 
who are anxious or reluctant (Andrews & Lamb, 2014; La Rooy & Lamb, 2011). 
However, experimental studies indicate that children are more likely to contradict their 
answers when closed-ended questions are repeated than when open-ended questions are 
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repeated (e.g., Poole & White, 1991; Quas, Davis, Goodman, & Myers, 2007). Children 
may change details in their accounts and thus respond inconsistently (Lamb & Fauchier, 
2001; Zajac, Gross, & Hayne, 2003), perhaps believing that the questioners were 
unsatisfied with their initial answers or that their initial answers were incorrect (e.g., 
Howie, Kurukulasuriya, Nash, & Marsh, 2009; Howie, Nash, Kurukulasuriya, & Bowman, 
2012; Melinder, Scullin, Gravvold, & Iversen, 2007).	The responses of younger children 
are more likely to be compromised by suggestive techniques than those of older children 
(e.g., Eisen, Qin, Goodman, & Davis, 2002; Poole & Lindsay, 1998; White, Leichtman, & 
Ceci, 1997; for reviews see Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Bruck, Ceci, & Principe, 2006; London 
& Kulkofsky, 2010), and younger children are more vulnerable to the effects of repeated 
questioning than older children (e.g., Howie et al., 2012; Krähenbühl, Blades, & Eiser, 
2009; Warren, Hulse-Trotter, & Tubbs, 1991). 
Existing resources for British practitioners have acknowledged that repeated 
questions are sometimes necessary, but to avoid children, particularly younger children. 
feeling pressured to change their answers when questions are repeated by authority 
figures, questioners should explain to the children why questions are being repeated (The 
Advocates Gateway Toolkits; Toolkit 2, section 4.5 and Toolkit 6, section 5.6 and 6.7). 
Research has further advised that when questions need to be repeated, they should be 
prompted using only open-ended questions (Andrews & Lamb, 2014; Andrews et al., 
2015a). Despite being an adversarial jurisdiction in which lawyers aim to challenge the 
credibility of the opponents’ witnesses, Scottish courts have a duty to allow witnesses to 
give their best evidence (Home Office, 2011, section 5.8). However, no official guidance 
on the use of repeated questions exists in Scotland. This lack of regulation is particularly 
worrying when findings from the only existing field study on the use and effects of 
repeated questions in Californian courts (i.e., Andrews et al., 2015a) is considered 
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alongside recent field research on lawyers’ questioning of children in Scottish courts.  
As in previous experimental and field research on forensic interviews (i.e., Andrews 
& Lamb, 2014; La Rooy & Lamb, 2011; for a full review see Andrews et al., 2015a), 
Andrews et al. (2015a) examined the number of repeated questions and the effects of age 
and question type on children’s responses in a sample of 120 trial transcripts of 5- to 12-
year-old alleged victims of child sexual abuse. They further assessed the effects of 
repetition immediacy, the extent and effects of repeated repetition, and the use of the 
asked-and-answered objection. They found that defense lawyers repeated more questions 
(33.6% of total questions asked) than prosecutors (17.8%) and repeated questions using 
more suggestive prompts (38% of their repeated questions) than prosecutors (15%) did. In 
response, children typically repeated or elaborated on their answers, particularly when 
questions were repeated immediately after the initial response than after a delay, and 
seldom contradicted themselves. Importantly, and consistent with previous field and 
experimental research (e.g., Andrews & Lamb, 2014; Quas et al., 2007), self-
contradictions were most often elicited by repeated suggestive and option-posing prompts 
posed by either type of lawyer, but there was no effect on the rate of self-contradictions 
with repetition immediacy. Child age did not affect the numbers of questions repeated, the 
types of prompts used by lawyers to repeat questions, or how children responded to 
repetition. Most (61.5%) repeated questions were repeated more than once and, as 
repetition frequency increased, so did the number of self-contradictions. ‘Asked-and-
answered’ objections were rarely raised (n = 45) and were more likely to be overruled than 
sustained by judges. The authors surmised that lawyers frequently asked children ‘risky’ 
repeated questions, and that both lawyers and the judiciary needed more training to 
identify and restrict the unnecessary repetition of questions.   
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Recent field research in Scotland, analyzing the same sample as in the current study, 
found that both prosecutors and defense lawyers used more closed-ended questions than 
open-ended questions (Chapter 1). In particular, suggestive questions were frequently 
posed by prosecutors (16% of all questions) and especially by defense lawyers (49% of all 
questions). All children contradicted themselves at least once, with defense lawyers 
eliciting more self-contradictions than prosecutors. Suggestive questions were most likely 
to elicit self-contradictions.	Furthermore, unlike previous research (e.g., Andrews et al., 
2015b), Chapter 1 found interactions between the types of prompts posed by prosecutors 
and defense lawyers, children’s age, and children’s responses. However, these effects did 
not follow predicted patterns. For example, defense lawyers offered more suggestive 
prompts to children aged 13 to 15 years than children aged 12 years and under and 16- and 
17-year-olds, but were significantly more likely to elicit self-contradictions from children 
aged 12 years and under than from 13- to 15-year-olds and 16- and 17-year-olds. 
Furthermore, more self-contradictions were elicited from children aged 12 years and under 
and 16- and 17-year-olds than from 13- to 15-year-olds when they were suggestively 
prompted. Because field research on repeated questions has focused exclusively on 
children aged 12 years and under, research examining differential responses to repeated 
questions may help elucidate Chapter 1’s results and thus inform official guidance on the 
appropriate repetition of questions in court.   
As noted above, no assessment of question repetition has been conducted using 
Scottish courtroom transcripts (and only one systematic study of courtroom question 
repetition has been conducted elsewhere), and existing research has focused on children 
under 12 years of age. The present study thus utilised a sample of Scottish criminal court 
transcripts involving 56 5- to 17-year-old children questioned in trials held between 2009 
and 2014. Like Andrews et al. (2015a), we first investigated the effects of children’s age, 
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lawyer role, and repeated question type on children’s responses. Based on previous 
research, we predicted that defense lawyers would repeat more questions and ask more 
closed-ended and suggestive questions than prosecutors, children would respond with 
more self-contradictions when questioned by defense lawyers than when questioned by 
prosecutors, and there would be no age differences. Second, we coded the effects of 
immediate versus delayed repetition on children’s responses and predicted that questions 
repeated immediately would result in more elaborations and repetitions than questions 
repeated after a delay, but due to previous null findings we made no specific predictions 
regarding self-contradictions. Third, we explored the extent of multiple repetition and 
predicted that this would be extensive, as found by Andrews et al. (2015a). Lastly, we 
explored the frequency of ‘asked-and-answered’ objections, and predicted, again in line 
with the findings of Andrews et al. (2015a), that objections would be rare.  
Method	
Sample 
The Court Service Team of the Scottish Court Service identified all cases 
conducted in six major criminal court-houses in Scotland between 2009 and 2014 in which 
alleged victims of child abuse had testified. Forty-three trials were identified and 36 of 
these were then selected for detailed study. Recordings of the cases were located, and the 
portions of the trials in which the children testified were transcribed. Cases involving 
children who needed the assistance of translators or retracted their sexual abuse allegations 
or had many sections of inaudible or missing audio were excluded. The 36 trials involved 
a total of 56 alleged victims of child sexual abuse. Nine cases (11 children) were from 
Aberdeen, 9 cases (19 children) from Edinburgh, 12 cases (16 children) from Glasgow, 1 
case (1 child) from Inverness, 3 cases (5 children) from Livingston, and 2 cases (4 
children) from Perth. The trials included in the present study involved at least 25 different 
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prosecutors, 24 different defense lawyers, and 22 different judges. There were 9 
transcripts for which this information could not be determined.   
Children reported single (n = 18) or multiple (n = 38) sexually abusive experiences 
involving penetration (n = 38), touching under clothes (n = 10), touching over clothes (n = 
3), and indecent exposure (n = 5). The final sample included 40 girls and 16 boys of 
between 5 and 17 years of age (M = 13.99, SD = 2.69).  
Age could not be entered into parametric tests as a continuous variable, because a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicated strong deviations from normality, D(55) = .20, p < 
.001. Therefore, children were categorized into three age groups at the time of trial: 12-
year-olds and under (n = 15), 13- to 15-year-olds (n = 26), and 16- and 17-year-olds (n = 
15). These categories were chosen because they accord with the Sexual Offences 
(Scotland) Act (2009); 16 years is the age of sexual consent, but a person aged 16 or over 
can claim to be innocent of the charge of committing sexual offences with a child aged 
between 13 and 16 years if that person ‘reasonably believed’ that the child was over the 
age of 16. However, this reasonable belief provision does not apply if the offence involved 
a child under the age of 13. No information was available concerning the children’s 
socioeconomic and ethnic backgrounds.  
All defendants were male. In 95% (n = 53) of the cases, children knew the alleged 
abusers. The suspects were biological parents (n = 8), step-fathers/mothers’ boyfriends (n 
= 3), other family members (n = 20), family friends (n = 5), friends/acquaintances (n = 
17), and strangers (n = 3). Defendants were either convicted (n = 42) or acquitted (n = 10). 
The remaining 4 defendants were convicted but not for all alleged sexual offences.   
In accordance with the Victims and Witnesses [Scotland] Act (2014), many of the 
children were accorded ‘special measures’ when they testified. All courts were closed to 
the public. Four children received no other special measures. Other children gave evidence 
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in court with screen and a supporter present (n = 15), or just a supporter present (n = 5). 
The remaining children gave evidence via a live TV link either with a supporter present (n 
= 21) or without a supporter present (n = 3), or their evidence was taken on commission1 
(n = 8).  
Coding of Transcripts 
Identifying repeated questions.   
The transcripts contained direct- and often redirect-examinations, in which the 
prosecution questioned the children, as well as cross-examinations by defense lawyers. 
Only substantive repeated questions were coded. Substantive utterances were defined as 
those designed to elicit information about what happened during the alleged incidents, 
what immediately preceded the alleged incidents, within-incident interventions (e.g., 
unexpected interruptions exposing the abuse), and other features of the abuse (e.g., how 
long the incidents lasted, where they happened). Children’s substantive responses 
contained incident-related information (including “don’t know” responses). Non-
substantive repeated prompts that aimed to inform child witnesses about the purpose of the 
court proceedings, provide details about the examination procedure, and build rapport 
were not included. By definition, children’s non-substantive responses did not contain 
incident-related information and were also not included.  
Repeated questions were defined as questions that, when asked again, provided 
children with opportunities to change their previous (substantive) responses. Repeated 
questions could be repeated verbatim or could be reworded. Questions were not classified 
																																																						
1 Evidence is taken by a commissioner only when the witness is considered especially 
vulnerable. In these instances, delays in testifying may increase distress and trauma, 
significantly hindering the witness’s ability to give evidence. Evidence is therefore taken 
before a commissioner appointed by the court. The evidence is taken in full (direct-, cross-
, and re-direct-examination) from the witness, proceedings are video recorded, and later 
received at the subsequent trial (see Vulnerable Witnesses [Scotland] Act, 2004).  
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as repeated when the lawyers were clearly seeking information different from that sought 
in their initial prompt (e.g., Lawyer: “How did he [the accused] touch you?” Child: “He 
didn’t touch me that time, my friend did.” Lawyer: “How did he [the friend] touch you?”), 
were probing for more specific information about a topic (e.g., Lawyer: “Did he touch 
you?” Child: “Yes.” Lawyer: “How did he touch you?”; Lawyer: “How did he hurt J.?” 
Child: “I don’t know.” Lawyer: “Did you see him hurt J.?” Child “No.” Lawyer: “How do 
you think he hurt J.?”), or repeated a question because the child interpreted the initial 
question too literally (e.g., Lawyer: “Can you tell me how it came out of his jeans?” Child: 
“Yes.” Lawyer: “How did it come out of his jeans?”). Questions were also not coded as 
repeated when the child did not answer the initial prompt, because such instances do not 
provide children with the opportunity to change their first response. Questions could be 
repeated immediately after the initial responses or repeated later in the proceedings. 
Lawyers’ questions. After repeated questions had been identified, the types of 
lawyer utterances used to refocus the children were categorized. Lawyers’ questions were 
categorized into one of the four main categories (invitations, directive prompts, option-
posing prompts, and suggestive prompts) that are commonly used to differentiate among 
interviewer utterances in forensic interviews (e.g., Lamb, Hershkowitz, Orbach, & Esplin, 
2008). Definitions and examples of each type are provided in Table 1.  
Children’s responses. Andrews and Lamb’s (2014) coding scheme was used to 
identify how children responded to repeated questions (elaboration, repetition, 
contradiction, digression, no answer, and question). Definitions and examples are provided 
in Table 2. When a question was repeated more than once, children’s responses were 
coded in relation to their preceding, rather than initial, answers. 
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 Multiple repetition and asked-and-answered objections. The number of times 
each individual question had been repeated was also recorded. Asked-and-answered 
objections were coded when either prosecutors or defense lawyers raised the objection.  
Inter-rater Reliability 
Another rater independently coded 20% of the transcripts that were randomly 
selected. Reliability in the identification of repeated questions, and the classification of all 
question and response codes were consistently high, Kappas > .83. We conducted 
reliability assessments throughout the duration of coding and all disagreements were 
resolved by discussion.	
Results	
Preliminary Results  
We conducted a series of discriminant function analyses to determine whether there 
were any associations between children’s gender and case verdicts and the proportional 
frequency of repeated questions, question types, and children’s responses. The tests 
revealed no significant associations. Therefore, gender and case verdict were not included 
in any of the analyses below.  
All variables entered into parametric analyses were normally distributed and alpha 
levels were adjusted by default in all tests to control for multiple comparisons. All 
parametric tests, unless otherwise stated, were conducted with child as the unit of analysis.  
Frequency of Repetition 
On average, 416.52 (SD = 250.86) substantive lawyer prompts were identified in 
each transcript, with 252.46 (SD = 181.98) in direct-examinations and 164.05 (SD = 
116.05) in cross-examinations. Repeated questions totaled 7,968, with an average of 77.29 
(SD = 63.79, range = 0 – 250) or 30.61% of all prosecutor utterances repeated in direct-
examinations, and 65.00 (SD = 57.58, range = 0 – 270) or 39.62% all defense lawyer 
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utterances repeated in cross-examinations. The difference in proportional question 
repetition between prosecutors and defense lawyers was significant, t(55) = 4.14, p < .001, 
d = .73. Lawyers repeated questions in all transcripts. Prosecutors repeated their own 
questions 53.7% (n = 4,278) of the time and repeated defense lawyers’ questions 0.6% (n 
= 50) of the time. Defense lawyers repeated their own questions 39.9% (n = 3,178) of the 
time and repeated prosecutors’ questions 5.8% (n = 462) of the time. 
Children’s Age   
For the following analysis, to create normally distributed data, we calculated 
proportional scores by dividing the total number of repeated questions each child was 
asked by the total number of substantive questions they were asked. A simple linear 
regression revealed that children’s age (in years) was significantly associated with the 
proportional frequency with which questions were repeated, F(1, 55) = 4.83, β = -.29, p = 
.03, R2 = .08. Younger children were asked proportionally more repeated questions than 
older children.  
A RM-ANOVA was conducted to assess whether different types of questions were 
more or less likely to be repeated (within-subjects: proportions of repeated invitations, 
directives, option-posing, and suggestive prompts) depending on the age of the children 
(between-subjects: 12-year-olds and under, 13- to 15-year-olds, 16- to 17-year-olds). We 
calculated proportional scores by dividing the totals for each question type each child was 
asked by the total number of repeated questions each child was asked. Mauchly’s test of 
sphericity was violated so Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied. The analyses 
revealed significant main effects for the different types of questions, F(1.85, 92.41) = 
56.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .53. Pairwise comparisons revealed that option-posing (M = .39, SD 
= .02) and suggestive (M = .39, SD = .02) questions were more likely to be repeated than 
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invitations (M = .19, SD = .03) and directive (M = .17, SD = .01) questions. There was no 
significant interaction between children’s age and question type.  
We conducted a RM-ANOVA to assess whether different types of responses were 
more or less likely to be elicited by repeated questions (within-subjects: proportions of 
elaborations, repetitions, and self-contradictions) depending on the age of the children 
(between-subjects: 12-year-olds and under, 13- to 15-year-olds, 16- to 17-year-olds). 
Proportional scores were calculated by dividing the totals for each response type provided 
by each child by the total number of repeated questions each child was asked. Further, we 
removed three response types from the analyses (questions (n = 96), non responses (n = 
250), digressions (n = 74), and non-substantive responses (n = 334)) for which numbers 
were small, reducing the total number of repeated questions analyzed to 7,214. Mauchly’s 
test of sphericity was violated so Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied. The 
analyses revealed significant main effects for the different types of responses, F(1.57, 
82.94) = 331.01, p < .001, ηp2 = .86. Pairwise comparisons revealed that children repeated 
themselves (M = .60, SD = .01) significantly more often than they elaborated (M = .31, SD 
= .01) and self-contradicted (M = .10, SD = .01). There was a significant difference 
between the proportion of elaborations and self-contradictions elicited. There was no 
significant interaction between children’s age and response type.  
 Due to the null findings, age was not included in subsequent analyses.  
Effects of Lawyer Role and Question Type on Responses 
For the following analysis, to create normally distributed data, we calculated 
proportional scores by dividing the totals for each question type x response type for each 
child by the total number of repeated questions asked by each lawyer type for that child. 
Further, we removed one question type (invitations (n = 150)) and four response types 
(questions (n = 96), non responses (n = 250), digressions (n = 74), and non-substantive 
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responses (n = 334)) from the analyses, for which numbers were small when cross-
tabulated. These steps reduced the total number of repeated questions analyzed to 7,139. 
We conducted a RM-ANOVA to assess whether different types of questions were 
more or less likely to be repeated (within-subjects: proportions of repeated directives, 
option-posing, and suggestive prompts), what types of responses they elicited from the 
children (within-subjects: proportions of elaborations, repetitions, and contradictions), and 
whether this differed depending on the lawyers’ role (within-subjects: prosecution and 
defense). Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied. The analyses revealed significant 
main effects for the different types of questions, F(1.78, 95.56) = 178.92, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.77 and the different types of responses F(1.58, 87.09) = 332.23, p < .001, ηp2 = .86 (see 
above for pairwise comparisons).   
There was a two-way interaction between the types of questions prosecutors or 
defense lawyers asked repeatedly, F(1.50, 82.28) = 101.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .65. 
Proportionally, more of the prosecutors’ repeated questions were directives and option-
posing prompts whereas proportionally more of the defense lawyers’ repeated questions 
were suggestive prompts (see Table 3). 
There was also a two-way interaction between the types of responses prosecutors or 
defense lawyers elicited, F(1.54, 84.58) = 14.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .21. Prosecutors were 
significantly more likely to elicit elaborations than defense lawyers, whereas defense 
lawyers were significantly more likely to elicit repetitions and self-contradictions than 
prosecutors (see Table 4). 
Finally, there was a two-way interaction between the types of questions asked and 
the types of responses elicited, F(2.97, 163.24) = 165.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .75. There were 
significant differences in the question types that elicited elaborations, repetitions, and self-
contradictions. Examination of the means suggested that option-posing questions were 
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more likely to elicit elaborations and repetitions than repeated directive and suggestive 
questions. Repeated suggestive questions were more likely to elicit self-contradictions 
than directive and option-posing questions (see Table 5). 
The two-way interactions were qualified by a three-way interaction among lawyers’ 
role, question type, and response type, F(2.37, 130.57) = 25.97, p < .001, ηp2 = .32. The 
three-way interaction is presented in Figure 1. Overall, these results imply that suggestive 
questions were more problematic when posed by defense lawyers than by prosecutors, 
whereas non-suggestive question types resulted in more beneficial responses (in terms of 
consistency) when posed by prosecutors than by defense lawyers.  
The Effect of Immediate Versus Delayed Repetition on Children’s Responses 
A one-sample t-test revealed that repeated questions were asked immediately after 
preceding prompts (n = 2,739, 34%) significantly less often than after delays (n = 5,229, 
66%), t(7,967) = 310.36, p < .001, d = 3.92. 
A RM-ANOVA was conducted to determine whether immediacy (within-subjects: 
immediate or delayed repetition) affected the likelihood of eliciting different responses 
from children (within-subjects: elaborations, repetitions, and self-contradictions). We 
removed the small number of questions (n = 96), non responses (n = 250), digressions (n = 
74), and non-substantive responses (n = 334) from the analyses. This reduced the total 
number of repeated questions analyzed to 7,214. Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were 
applied. The RM-ANOVA revealed a main effect for response type, F(1.38, 75.60) = 
388.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .88. Repetitions (M = .59, SD = .01) were more frequent than 
elaborations (M = .33, SD = .01), and elaborations were more frequent than self-
contradictions (M = .08, SD = .01). There was also an interaction between immediacy and 
response type, F(1.36, 74.66) = 8.79, p = .002, ηp2 = .14. Children were more likely to 
elaborate when questions were repeated immediately than when questions were delayed, 
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whereas children were more likely to repeat and contradict themselves when questions 
were repeated after a delay than when repeated immediately (see Table 6).  
Effects of Multiple Repetition 
Of all repeated questions (n = 7,968), 30.8% (n = 2,451) were repeated only once 
and 69.2% (n = 5,517) were repeated more than once. A total of 4,078 specific repeated 
questions were themselves repeated. Table 7 shows the frequency of repetition in relation 
to the specific repeated questions. On average, questions were repeated 2.54 (SD = 2.97) 
times.  
Asked-and-answered Objections 
 No asked-and-answered objections were raised in any of the transcripts.   
Discussion	
This was the first study to investigate the effects of children’s age, lawyer role, and 
question type on children’s responses to repeated questions in Scottish direct- and cross-
examinations. Repetition immediacy, multiple repetition, and asked and answered 
objections were also examined. This was also the first study to explore the differential 
effects of question repetition in a sample with a wide age range (5- to 17-year-olds).   
We found that all children were prompted with repeated questions in Scottish courts, 
and that the rates of repetition were considerably higher than those found in forensic 
interviews (4.3% of interviewer prompts; Andrews & Lamb, 2014), and higher than those 
found in Californian courts: 17.8% of all questions asked by Californian prosecutors and 
33.6% of all questions asked by Californian defense lawyers (Andrews et al., 2015a) 
versus 30.6% of all questions asked by Scottish prosecutors and 39.6% of all questions 
asked by Scottish defense lawyers. Further research is needed to elucidate the reasons for 
these differences between jurisdictions. Nevertheless, as in forensic interviews and 
previous courtroom research, repeated questions most often elicited repetition and 
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elaboration, which may have enhanced the informativeness of the children’s testimony 
(Andrews & Lamb, 2014; Andrews et al., 2015a; La Rooy & Lamb, 2011). Repeated 
questions also elicited self-contradictions on occasion and these rates were slightly lower 
than those found by Andrews et al. (2015a). Nevertheless, as noted by Andrews et al. 
(2015a), although we were unable to assess the accuracy of children’s responses and the 
rate of self-contradiction was low, the risks of confusion and inaccuracy they foster may 
be substantial and the consequences may be serious. Furthermore, although self-
contradictions were infrequent overall, Andrews et al. (2015a) showed that	the rate 
increased dramatically as repetition frequency increased. This is of particular concern 
because nearly 70% of the repeated questions in the present study were repeated more than 
once.  
Unlike Andrews et al. (2015a) but in line with the findings of Andrews and Lamb’s 
(2014) study of forensic interviews, we found that age was associated with the frequency 
of question repetition in the courtroom; younger children were asked more repeated 
questions than older children. This discrepancy is likely attributable to the underpowered 
sample of repeated questions (n = 333) analyzed by Andrews and Lamb (2014) alongside 
the wider age range studied in the present study (5 to 17 years) than by Andrews et al. 
(2015a; 5 to 12 years). Further replication in studies involving children of diverse ages is 
clearly needed. However, we found that, consistent with Andrews et al.’s (2015a) findings 
and our predictions, the effects of question repetition were no more detrimental for 
younger children than for older children. This finding is inconsistent with experimental 
findings (e.g., Howie et al., 2012; Krähenbühl et al., 2009; Warren et al., 1991). 
Nevertheless, as Andrews and Lamb (2014) noted, some research suggests that, even 
though younger children may produce shorter and less detailed accounts of abuse than 
older children (Hershkowitz, Lamb, Orbach, Katz, & Horowitz, 2012; Lamb, Sternberg, 
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Orbach, Esplin, Stewart, & Mitchell, 2003), and thus perhaps prompt lawyers to repeat 
more questions, their reports may be no less accurate than older children’s (Oates & 
Shrimpton, 1991).  
Furthermore, as found by Andrews et al. (2015a) and in line with our predictions, we 
found that defense lawyers repeated more questions than prosecutors, and were more 
likely to elicit self-contradictions from children than prosecutors. Most notably, suggestive 
questions had greater effects on children’s consistency when posed by defense lawyers 
than by prosecutors, whereas non-suggestive questions resulted in more repetitions and 
elaborations when posed by prosecutors than by defense lawyers. These findings suggest 
that question repetition is a technique that is frequently utilized to undermine witness 
consistency during cross-examination, although children of all ages are resistant to the 
implicit coercion. As noted above, however, the risks may be substantial, particularly 
when questions are repeated multiple times.   
Again in line with our predictions and Andrews et al.’s (2015a) findings, we found 
that questions repeated immediately after preceding prompts elicited more elaborations 
and repetitions from children than when questions were repeated after delays. However, 
contrary to he null findings of Andrews et al. (2015a), we found that self-contradictions 
were more likely when there were delays between initial prompts and repeated prompts 
than when questions were repeated immediately. Unlike Andrews et al. (2015a), the 
current study was able to control for the number of questions each child was asked and 
immediacy analyses were therefore conducted at the level of the children rather than at the 
level of the questions. Thus, based on the present findings, we suggest with confidence 
that repeated questions pose less risk to children’s consistency when repeated immediately 
after initial prompts than when delayed. 
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Multiple question repetition has been studied very little but deserves further 
attention because as repetition frequency increases, so does the number of self-
contradictions (Andrews et al. (2015a). In line with our predictions, most repeated 
questions (69.2%) were repeated more than once (cf. Andrews et al., 2015a, 61.5%). 
Because each repeated question was repeated an average of 2.5 times in the present study, 
most repeated questions were closed-ended or suggestive, and 50 separate instances 
questions were repeated 10 or more times, it is concerning that no Scottish lawyers or 
judges ever raised an asked-and-answered objection. Such failures to object may have 
been motivated by lawyers’ expectations of the judges’ responses, since Andrews et al. 
(2015a) found that when Californian lawyers objected, their objections tended to be 
overruled. Nevertheless, there is no obvious reason why judges recurrently failed to 
intervene. Lawyers and judges should be made aware of the potential harm associated with 
unnecessary question repetition and of how these effects may be reduced (e.g., by 
explaining to children why the questions are being repeated, and repeating the question 
using less closed-ended and suggestive prompts). Training should encourage lawyers to 
utilize the asked-and-answered objection and judges to sustain objections when warranted 
so that children’s developmental capabilities are respected.  
In sum, this study provides further evidence that the questions asked of young 
witnesses in court are often repeated. Whatever the motivation of the lawyers involved, it 
is noteworthy that this practice most often leads children to restate what they said earlier, 
although the repetition, especially of closed-ended and suggestive questions, occasionally 
led children of all ages to change their responses. We do not know whether the last 
answers were more or less accurate than those provided initially, although some laboratory 
studies suggest that the repetition of such ‘risky’ types of questions may lead children to 
change accurate answers into inaccurate ones. Of course, questions may sometimes need 
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to be repeated and their repetition may lead children to change previously incorrect 
answers, but the sheer amount of question repetition found in the present study is 
alarming. The findings suggest that not enough is being done to restrict the unnecessary 
repetition of questions when lawyers question children in court. Official guidance is 
needed to ensure that questions are only repeated when necessary and immediately after 
the initial prompts, reasons for repetition are explicitly explained to children, and that 
repeated suggestive questions are avoided. 
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Table 1 
 
Types of Lawyer Utterances 
 
 
Code 
 
 
Definition 
 
Examples 
 
 
Invitation 
 
Open-ended, input-free utterances used 
to elicit free-recall responses from 
children. Such questions, statements, 
imperatives, or contextual cues do not 
restrict the child’s focus except in a 
general sense. Invitations can also 
follow-up on information just 
mentioned, or cue for additional free-
recall elaboration about details 
previously mentioned. 
 
“Tell me everything that happened from 
the beginning to the end.” 
 
 “Then what happened?” 
 
 “Earlier you mentioned 
[person/object/action]. Tell me more 
about that.” 
 
 “Tell me everything that happened 
before/after you went to the park.” 
[when ‘I went to the park’ was 
previously mentioned by the child] 
 
Directive Open-ended questions that refocus the 
child on aspects or details of the 
allegation that they have previously 
mentioned, mostly using ‘WH’ 
utterances to request further 
information. 
 
“Where were you when that happened?” 
 
 “Who did that to you?” [when ‘that’ 
was previously mentioned by the child] 
 
Option-posing Closed-ended questions that refocus the 
child’s attention on details of the 
allegation that they have not previously 
mentioned, although without implying 
an expected response. They can be 
formulated as “yes/no” or “choice” 
questions.  
 
“Did you see his penis?” 
 
 “Was he wearing underwear?” 
 
 “Did she do that one time or more than 
one time?” 
 
 “Was this Thursday or Saturday 
evening?” 
 
 
Suggestive Closed-ended statements or questions 
formulated in a way that communicates 
the expected response. They may 
introduce information not mentioned by 
the child but assumed by the lawyer or 
query the truthfulness of the child’s 
response. 
“He forced you to do that, didn’t he?” 
 
 “Your dad told me that B. touched your 
private part. Did B. touch your private 
part?” 
 
 Child: “He touched me.” Lawyer: “Did 
he touch your pee-pee over or under 
your clothes?” [when the child had not 
previously mentioned genital touching] 
 
 “Did that really happen?” 
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Table 2 
 
Children’s Responses to Repeated Questions 
 
 
 
  
Code 
 
Definition 
 
Examples 
 
Elaboration 
 
The child expanded on a 
previous response by 
providing additional 
forensically relevant 
information. 
 
 
Lawyer: “Where did she touch you?” Child: “She 
touched me on the outside of my clothes.” Lawyer: 
“Okay, but what part of your body did she touch?” 
Child: “She touched me on my behind on the outside.” 
 
Repetition The child responded by 
reporting the same 
information. 
Lawyer: “What day did M. pick up S. from the store?” 
Child: “Tuesday.” Later in the proceedings, Lawyer: 
“What day did S. get picked up from the store by M.?” 
Child: “I already told you it was Tuesday.” 
 
Contradiction The child negated what s/he 
had previously reported or 
provided conflicting 
information. 
Lawyer: “Did he touch you one time or more than one 
time?” Child: “He touched me seven times.” Lawyer: 
“But I thought he only touched you one time. Did he 
only touch you one time?” Child: “He touched me one 
time.” 
 
 Lawyer: “Did dad touch your privates at P.’s house?” 
Child: “Yes.” Later in the proceedings, Lawyer: “So did 
dad touch your private when you were at P.’s house?” 
Child: “No. I didn’t say that. He didn’t touch me.” 
 
Digression The child responded but was 
off task, resistant or provided 
an irrelevant response. 
Lawyer: “How did your private feel after the man left?” 
Child: “The man left really fast in his car because some 
big kids heard me shout but I don’t want to talk about 
my private.” Lawyer: “I know it’s really hard and you’re 
doing a great job but I really need to know if your 
private felt the same or different after the man left.” 
Child: “Let’s play I spy.” 
 
No answer The child was not responsive. Lawyer: “Did this happen over or under your clothes?” 
Child: “Under.”  Lawyer: “Are you sure it happened 
under your clothes?” Child: [no response].  
 
Question The child responded by 
asking the lawyer a question 
and the lawyer changed the 
subsequent line of 
questioning. 
 
Lawyer: “Did they see him do that?” Child: “My mom, 
B. and T.”  Lawyer: “Did they see him do that?” Child: 
“Do you mean if they saw with their eyes?” Lawyer: 
“Where were you when he tried to pull your pants 
down?” 
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Table 3 
 
Lawyer Role by Question Type Interaction 
 
 
Note. Proportions were calculated by cross-tabulating frequencies of question type x 
lawyer role for each child and then dividing those frequencies by the total number of 
repeated questions posed by prosecutors and defense lawyers for each child.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Question   
 
 
  Directive 
 
Option-posing 
 
 
Suggestive 
 
Lawyer  
 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
      M 
 
   SD 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
Prosecution 
 
 
.18 
 
.02 
 
.64 
 
.02 
 
.18 
 
.01 
 
Defense 
 
 
.05 
 
.01 
 
.42 
 
.02 
 
.52 
 
.03 
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Table 4 
 
Lawyer Role by Response Type Interaction 
 
 
Note. Proportions were calculated by cross-tabulating frequencies of response type x 
lawyer role for each child and then dividing those frequencies by the total number of 
repeated questions posed by prosecutors and defense lawyers for each child.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Response  
 
 
  Elaboration 
 
Repetition 
 
 
Self-contradiction 
 
Lawyer  
 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
      M 
 
   SD 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
Prosecution 
 
 
.36 
 
.02 
 
.57 
 
.02 
 
.06 
 
.01 
 
Defense 
 
 
.27 
 
.02 
 
.62 
 
.02 
 
.11 
 
.01 
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Table 5 
 
Question Type by Response Type Interaction 
 
  Response  
 
 
  Elaboration 
 
Repetition 
 
 
Self-contradiction 
 
Question  
 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
       M 
 
   SD 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
Directive 
 
 
.06 
 
.00 
 
.03 
 
.00 
 
.01 
 
.00 
 
Option-posing 
 
 
.14 
 
.01 
 
.38 
 
.01 
 
.02 
 
.00 
 
Suggestive 
 
 
.11 
 
.01 
 
.18 
 
.01 
 
.06 
 
.01 
 
Note. Proportions were calculated by cross-tabulating frequencies of question type x 
response type for each child and then dividing those frequencies by the total number of 
repeated questions posed to each child.  
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Table 6 
 
Immediacy by Response Type Interaction 
 
 
Note. Proportions were calculated by cross-tabulating frequencies of immediacy x 
response type for each child and then dividing those frequencies by the total number of 
repeated questions posed to each child immediately and after a delay.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  Response   
 
 
  Elaboration 
 
Repetition 
 
 
Self-contradiction 
 
Immediacy  
 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
      M 
 
   SD 
 
M 
 
SD 
 
Immediate 
 
 
.37 
 
.01 
 
.57 
 
.02 
 
.06 
 
.01 
 
Delayed 
 
 
.29 
 
.02 
 
.62 
 
.02 
 
.10 
 
.01 
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Table 7 
 
Frequency of Specific Repeated Question Repetition 
 
 
Number of 
repetitions 
 
 
 
   Frequency 
 
 
             1 
 
2,451 
             2 833 
             3   323 
             4   191 
             5   85 
             6     61 
             7     39 
             8     27 
             9     18 
           10     15 
           11       7 
           12       5 
           13       1 
           14       5 
           15       3 
           16       1 
           17       1 
           18       1 
           19       1 
           20       3 
           21       2 
           22       2 
           25       1 
           26       1 
          35 1 
    
      Total 
 
 
4,078 
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Figure 1  
 
A Three-way Interaction Among Lawyer Role, Question Type and Children’s Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. (Pros) = Prosecution, (Def) = Defense, D = Directive,  
OP = Option-posing, S = Suggestive.  
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Abstract 
 
We examined 56 trial transcripts of 5- to 17-year-old children testifying as alleged victims 
of sexual abuse, focusing on differences between prosecutors and defense lawyers with 
respect to the centrality of the information sought and topic of the questions asked, and the 
effects on witnesses’ responses. Over 40% of all questions focused on peripheral content 
and defense lawyers asked more questions prompting peripheral information than 
prosecutors. Overall, children were more productive and responsive to questions that 
prompted central information than questions that prompted peripheral information, and to 
questions seeking information about actions rather than any other topic, particularly when 
prompted by prosecutors. Lawyers did not alter the centrality of the information sought or 
topic of their questions when prompting children of different ages. These findings suggest 
that the centrality of the information sought and question topic are important parameters to 
consider when evaluating children’s responses to different types of questions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LAWYERS’ QUESTION CONTENT AND CHILDREN’S RESPONSES 
	 147 
Lawyers’ question content and children’s responses in Scottish criminal courts 
Research investigating the ways in which children are directly and cross-examined 
by lawyers in court has overwhelmingly focused on the types of questions asked and the 
effects thereof on children’s responses. Whilst more recent research has begun to assess 
the combined effects of question type, linguistic complexity, and question repetition on 
children’s responses, very few field studies have comprehensively considered how the 
content of questions, including whether the questions prompt central or peripheral 
information in relation to the allegations under investigation, affects children’s responses. 
Indeed, the contents of the questions prosecutors and defense lawyers ask are likely to 
differ due to their opposing motivations. The present quantitative field study was therefore 
designed to investigate the effects of both the centrality of the information sought and 
topical focus of prosecutors’ and defense lawyers’ questions on responses when 
examining children about alleged sexual offences in Scottish (i.e., adversarial-pluralistic) 
criminal courts.  
Centrality of Information Sought and Children’s Responses 
Previous research has typically conceptualized the centrality of information sought 
by questions as either being central to the ‘plot’ under investigation, thus probing the 
identification of main characters, the location and time of the incident(s), and abusive (or 
target) actions, or peripheral to the ‘plot’ under investigation, thus seeking descriptions of 
people, places, temporal parameters, emotions, and thoughts. Although diverse responses 
to questions about peripheral information do not change the plot of the incident(s) under 
investigation, questions prompting peripheral information may still elicit forensically 
important information.  
In both laboratory and analogue contexts, central details are more accessible in 
memory than peripheral details (Ibabe & Sporer, 2004), and thus children respond more 
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accurately to questions about central features than questions about peripheral details 
(Almerigogna, Ost, Akehurst, & Fluck, 2008; Candel, Merckelbach, Jelicic, Limpens, & 
Widdershoven, 2004; Peterson & Bell, 1996; Poole & White, 1991; Saywitz, Goodman, 
Nicholas, & Moan, 1991; Tucker, Mertin, & Luszez, 1990; Wright & Stroud, 1998). For 
example, Peterson and Whalen (2001) examined 2- to 13-year-olds’ memories of a 
medical emergency and found that new peripheral details were more likely than central 
details to be inaccurate after delays. Furthermore, whilst central detail recall was over 80% 
complete even after 5-year delays and with the youngest children, recall of peripheral 
information was never as complete. Researchers have thus suggested that central details 
are likely to be more resistant than peripheral details to misleading questions (Christianson 
& Loftus, 1991; Myers, Saywitz, & Goodman, 1996). In court, defense lawyers may ask 
more questions about peripheral information than prosecutors in an attempt to undermine 
witnesses’ testimony, and this may further explain why children are less productive 
(Chapter 1) and responsive (Chapter 1), and express more self-contradictions (Chapter 1) 
and uncertainty (Chapter 2; Chapter 5) in response to defense lawyers than prosecutors.  
When considering age differences in the accuracy and consistency of children’s 
responses to questions that prompt central and peripheral details, there is further consensus 
that young children have more difficulty answering questions that prompt peripheral 
information than older participants regardless of question type (Brady, Poole, Warren, & 
Jones, 1999; Roebers & Schneider, 2000). For example, in Roebers and Schneider’s 
(2000) study, 284 5- to 64-year-old participants viewed a short video about a theft and 
were questioned about it three and four weeks afterwards. Participants were most 
consistent in response to questions that sought central information, but children, especially 
pre-schoolers, had more difficulty answering questions that sought peripheral information 
than adults did. Although misleading questions adversely affected response consistency 
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for all age groups, participants responded inconsistently to both open-ended cued-recall 
questions and closed-ended recognition prompts when recalling peripheral information, 
suggesting that the centrality of information prompted affected the accuracy of children’s 
responses. Goodman, Rudy, Bottoms, and Aman (1990) suggested that age differences 
may diminish over time as older participants forget peripheral information that initially 
gave them an advantage, whereas central events were remembered well by all participants. 
This may be particularly important in the courtroom context, because many witnesses 
experience long delays between the alleged incidents(s) and testifying in court (e.g., 
Henderson & Lamb, 2017; see Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2009; Spencer & Lamb, 2012).  
Despite the relative importance of considering the centrality of the information that 
questions prompt when assessing the ways in which practitioners question children in 
forensic contexts and how children of all ages respond, no researchers have investigated 
the centrality of lawyers’ information requests in the courtroom.  
Question Topic and Children’s Responses 
 
Previous research examining forensic interviews has investigated various aspects of 
question topic, including temporal attributes (e.g., Orbach & Lamb, 2007) and disclosure 
processes (see Lindblad, 2007), as well as broader narrative-building techniques (e.g., 
Westcott & Kynan, 2004). In particular, some researchers have distinguished between wh- 
prompts focused on static contextual information (e.g., “What did he wear?”) and dynamic 
wh- prompts focused on actions or events (e.g., “How did you get hurt?) (Peterson & 
McCabe, 1992; Price & Roberts, 2011). Wh- prompts that focus on actions may be 
especially productive because children are likely to remember actions better than 
characteristics (Goodman, Hirschman, Hepps, & Rudy, 1991; Lamb, Sternberg, Orbach, 
Esplin, Stewart, & Mitchell, 2003; Peterson, Dowden, & Tobin, 1999). For example, 
Peterson and colleagues (1999) questioned 3- to 5-year-olds one week after playing with 
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an adult. Whereas children’s responses to wh- questions about actions were quite accurate 
(84% correct, 5% erroneous), their answers to questions about clothing (43% correct, 29% 
erroneous) and the room (14% correct, 24% erroneous) were quite inaccurate. 
Furthermore, actions are fundamental in sexual abuse cases since sexual abuse involves a 
series of actions performed by the perpetrator, as do grooming in preparation for the abuse 
and attempts at concealment. Because most sexual abuse prosecutions involve familiar 
perpetrators and repeated abuse (Stolzenberg & Lyon, 2014), it is unlikely that 
descriptions of people and places play a substantial role in determining whether abuse 
occurred (Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1987).  
Wh- prompts are therefore likely to vary widely in their specificity and accuracy, but 
differences among them have largely been ignored in research examining the productivity 
of different question-types. Only two studies have examined productivity differences 
among different types of wh- questions (Ahern, Andrews, Stolzenberg, & Lyon, 2015; 
Andrews, Ahern, Stolzenberg, & Lyon, 2015c). For example, Andrews, Lamb, and Lyon 
(2015a) examined 120 6- to 12-year-olds’ criminal court testimony in Californian child 
sexual abuse cases to compare the productivity of various substantive wh- questions asked 
by prosecutors and defense lawyers. Most notably, what/how-happen prompts were the 
most productive, and both what/how-dynamic prompts and wh- prompts about causality 
were more productive than other wh- prompts. Prosecutors asked proportionally more 
what/how-dynamic prompts, and defense lawyers more what/how-static prompts. There 
were no age differences. This finding is consistent with the suggestion that defense 
lawyers are more likely to focus on peripheral aspects of the abuse when cross-examining 
children (Ceci & Bruck, 1995).  
No researchers have comprehensively examined the topics of lawyers’ questions 
posed to children during direct- and cross-examinations. Such research is critical, as it 
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would allow direct comparisons to be drawn between the topics of prosecutors’ and 
defense lawyers’ questions and the ways in which children respond. While studies 
investigating lawyers’ differential use of and children’s responses to wh- prompts are 
informative, the majority of lawyers’ questions are not wh- prompts (see Chapter 1). 
Furthermore, because prosecutors and defense lawyers have different motivations and are 
likely to question witnesses accordingly, it follows that the topic of their questions may 
differ in important ways not illuminated by the past focus on types of wh- prompts. For 
example, to challenge the character of witnesses and defendants, respectively, defense 
lawyers might ask more static-questions (i.e., prompt for non-action contextual 
information) about the alleged victims than prosecutors, whereas prosecutors might ask 
more static-questions about the suspects than defense lawyers.  
Present Study 
Given the dearth of research in courtroom samples, the current study sought to 
comprehensively assess the centrality of the information sought and topic of lawyers’ 
questions asked of 56 5- to 17-year-old children questioned in Scottish criminal trials held 
between 2009 and 2014. Specifically, associations among child age, lawyer role 
(prosecution/defense), the centrality of the information sought, and question topic were 
analysed.  
Although this study was conducted to broadly and descriptively investigate 
information request centrality and question topic, specific hypotheses were addressed 
within the exploratory analyses, generated both from previous research and what is known 
of the courtroom context. With regard to the centrality of the information sought, it was 
predicted that children would find peripheral details more difficult to remember than 
central details, and would thus be less productive and responsive, and express more 
uncertainty and self-contradictions in response to questions that prompted peripheral than 
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central information. We further predicted that defense lawyers would focus children more 
on peripheral details than prosecutors, in an attempt to undermine witnesses’ perceived 
reliability, and thus children’s responses would be more detrimental (i.e., less productive 
and responsive, more self-contradictions and uncertainty) in response to defense lawyers 
than prosecutors. In line with previous research on this sample (e.g., Chapter 1), we 
predicted that both prosecutors and defense lawyers would not question children 
differently depending on their ages, and that age would not affect children’s responses 
either.  
With regard to question topic, we predicted that defense lawyers would ask more 
questions concerning the victims and less about actions than prosecutors, to challenge the 
character of witnesses rather than focus on the alleged abusive acts. On the other hand, we 
predicted that prosecutors would ask more questions about the suspect and more questions 
about actions than defense lawyers. Based on previous research (e.g., Chapter 1; Andrews 
et al., 2015a; Chapter 2; Chapter 5) it was further predicted that children would be more 
productive and responsive, and express less uncertainty and self-contradictions, when 
answering prosecutors’ questions than defense lawyers’ questions irrespective of question 
topic. We again predicted that there would be no age differences in the topic of questions 
and children’s responses.  
Methods 
Sample 
The Court Service Team of the Scottish Court Service identified all cases 
conducted in six major criminal court-houses in Scotland between 2009 and 2014 in which 
alleged victims of child abuse had testified. Forty-three trials were identified and 36 of 
these were then selected for detailed study. Recordings of the cases were located, and the 
portions of the trials in which the children testified were transcribed. Cases involving 
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children who needed the assistance of translators or retracted their sexual abuse allegations 
or had many sections of inaudible or missing audio were excluded. The 36 trials involved 
a total of 56 alleged victims of child sexual abuse. Nine cases (11 children) were from 
Aberdeen, 9 cases (19 children) from Edinburgh, 12 cases (16 children) from Glasgow, 1 
case (1 child) from Inverness, 3 cases (5 children) from Livingston, and 2 cases (4 
children) from Perth. The trials included in the present study involved at least 25 different 
prosecutors, 24 different defense lawyers, and 22 different judges. There were 9 
transcripts for which this information could not be determined.   
Children reported single (n = 18) or multiple (n = 38) sexually abusive experiences 
involving penetration (n = 38), touching under clothes (n = 10), touching over clothes (n = 
3), and indecent exposure (n = 5). The final sample included 40 girls and 16 boys of 
between 5 and 17 years of age (M = 13.99, SD = 2.69).  
Age could not be entered into parametric tests as a continuous variable, because a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicated strong deviations from normality, D(55) = .20, p < 
.001. Therefore, children were categorized into three age groups at the time of trial: 12-
year-olds and under (n = 15), 13- to 15-year-olds (n = 26), and 16- and 17-year-olds (n = 
15). These categories were chosen because they accord with the Sexual Offences 
(Scotland) Act (2009); 16 years is the age of sexual consent, but a person aged 16 or over 
can claim to be innocent of the charge of committing sexual offences with a child aged 
between 13 and 16 years if that person ‘reasonably believed’ that the child was over the 
age of 16. However, this reasonable belief provision does not apply if the offence involved 
a child under the age of 13. No information was available concerning the children’s 
socioeconomic and ethnic backgrounds.  
All defendants were male. In 95% (n = 53) of the cases, children knew the alleged 
abusers. The suspects were biological parents (n = 8), step-fathers/mothers’ boyfriends (n 
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= 3), other family members (n = 20), family friends (n = 5), friends/acquaintances (n = 
17), and strangers (n = 3). Defendants were either convicted (n = 42) or acquitted (n = 10). 
The remaining 4 defendants were convicted but not for all alleged sexual offences.   
In accordance with the Victims and Witnesses [Scotland] Act (2014), many of the 
children were accorded ‘special measures’ when they testified. All courts were closed to 
the public. Four children received no other special measures. Other children gave evidence 
in court with a screen and a supporter present (n = 15), or just a supporter present (n = 5). 
The remaining children gave evidence via a live TV link either with a supporter present (n 
= 21) or without a supporter present (n = 3), or their evidence was taken on commission1 
(n = 8).  
Coding of Transcripts 
The transcripts contained direct- and often redirect-examinations, in which the 
prosecution questioned the children, as well as cross-examinations by defense lawyers. 
Only substantive repeated questions were coded. Substantive utterances were defined as 
those designed to elicit information about what happened during the alleged incidents, 
what immediately preceded the alleged incidents, within-incident interventions (e.g., 
unexpected interruptions exposing the abuse), and other features of the abuse (e.g., how 
long the incidents lasted, where they happened). Children’s substantive responses 
contained incident-related information (including “don’t know” responses). Non-
substantive prompts that aimed to inform child witnesses about the purpose of the court 
proceedings, provide details about the examination procedure, and build rapport were not 
																																																						
1 Evidence is taken by a commissioner only when the witness is considered especially 
vulnerable. In these instances, delays in testifying may increase distress and trauma, 
significantly hindering the witness’s ability to give evidence. Evidence is therefore taken 
before a commissioner appointed by the court. The evidence is taken in full (direct-, cross-
, and re-direct-examination) from the witness, proceedings are video recorded, and later 
received at the subsequent trial (see Vulnerable Witnesses [Scotland] Act, 2004).  
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included. By definition, children’s non-substantive responses did not contain incident-
related information and were also not included.  
Lawyers’ questions.  
Centrality of information sought. The centrality of the information sought in each 
lawyer utterance was coded as prompting either central or peripheral details (see Table 1). 
When questions prompted both central and peripheral information, the question was coded 
as central. When more than one question was asked in a single utterance, centrality was 
coded in accordance with the last information request.  
Question topic. The topic of each lawyer utterance was coded into one of 17 topic 
categories (see Table 1). When questions prompted children about more than one topic 
category, the question was coded in accordance with the main or last information request. 
When more than one question was asked in a single utterance, topic was coded in 
accordance with the last information request. 
Children’s responses.  
Productivity. The number of new details conveyed by the child in each substantive 
response was tabulated using a procedure described by Lamb, Hershkowitz, Sternberg, 
Esplin, Hovav, Manor, and Yudilevitch (1996). Details were the smallest unit for 
analyzing information provided by children pertaining to the alleged incidents. Details 
involved the naming, identification, or description of individuals, objects, events, places, 
actions, emotions, thoughts, and sensations relevant to alleged incidents, as well as any of 
their features (e.g., appearances, locations, times, durations, temporal orders, sounds, 
smells, and textures). Repeated words or details between and within utterances were 
counted only once unless the repetition appeared intentional (e.g., for emphasis). Details 
were only counted when they added to the understanding of the target incident(s), 
therefore false starts (e.g., “I – they went...”; “Um, well...”), statements that expressed the 
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child’s present mental or emotional state (e.g., “I am scared”), phrases that suggested the 
level of confidence of the interviewee during the interview (e.g. “I know”; “I think”; 
“Maybe”), and claims of lack of knowledge/ignorance (e.g., “I don't know”; “I don't 
remember”) were not counted as substantive details. 
Responsiveness. Children’s responsiveness was categorized into one of two 
categories: responsive and unresponsive. Definitions and examples of each category are 
provided in Table 1. 
Self-contradictions. Self-contradictions were defined as responses that negated what 
the children had previously disclosed during the proceedings or provided conflicting 
information (see Table 1). 
Uncertainty. Expressions of substantive uncertainty were also coded (e.g., “Don’t 
know remember”; “Not sure”).  
Inter-rater Reliability  
Another rater independently coded 20% of the transcripts that were randomly 
selected. Reliability in the classification of all question and response codes were 
consistently high, Kappas > .83. We conducted reliability assessments throughout the 
duration of coding and all disagreements were resolved by discussion. 
Results 
Analytical Plan  
A series of preliminary discriminant function analyses were first conducted to 
determine whether gender, case verdicts, special measures afforded, and the number of 
children testifying in each case should be considered further. Research questions were 
addressed using descriptive and repeated-measures analyses of variance (RM-ANOVAs), 
with children’s age entered as the between-subjects variable (12 years old and under, 13 to 
15 years old, 16 and 17 years old), and all other variables entered as within-subjects 
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repeated-measures factors: lawyer role (prosecutor, defense), centrality of the information 
request (central, peripheral), question topic (suspect, victim, witness, suspect action, 
victim action, witness action, location, time, object, body part, suspect’s verbal statement, 
victim’s verbal statement, witness’s verbal statement, disclosure, prior formal questioning, 
thoughts/emotions, sensory perceptions), children’s productivity (number of details) 
responsiveness (responsive), self-contradictions (contradiction), and children’s uncertainty 
(uncertain). The within-subjects repeated measure scores (apart from children’s 
productivity) were converted into proportional values by dividing the cell count of interest 
(e.g., number of questions prompting central information asked by defense lawyers) by the 
appropriate grouping total (e.g., the total number of substantive questions asked by 
defense lawyers). Using proportional values controls for the number of questions asked by 
each lawyer and the number of responses per child, and also helps normalize data 
distributions. All variables entered into parametric tests were normally distributed and 
alpha levels were adjusted by default in all tests to control for multiple comparisons. 
When Mauchly’s test of sphericity was violated, Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were 
applied. All parametric tests were conducted with child as the unit of analysis, and power 
analyses confirmed that all inferential tests reported had enough power (set at 0.8) to 
detect at least medium effect sizes. RM-ANOVAs were unable to be conducted for 1) self-
contradictions x question topic and 2) uncertainty x question topic due to low cells counts 
and subsequent inadequate statistical power. Pairwise comparisons (with Bonferonni 
corrections) were used to follow-up significant interactions.  
Preliminary Analyses 
We conducted a series of discriminant function analyses to determine whether there 
were any associations between children’s gender, case verdicts, special measures afforded, 
and the number of children testifying in each case, and the proportional frequency of 
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information request centrality types, question topic types, and children’s responses. The 
tests revealed no significant associations. Therefore, gender, case verdict, special 
measures, and victim number were not included in any of the analyses below.  
The Centrality of Information Requests and Topics of Lawyers’ Questions 
A total of 22,200 substantive questions were analyzed; 13,514 (60.9%) were 
prosecutors’ questions and 8,686 (39.1%) were defense lawyers’ questions. Table 2 
provides the frequencies (ns) and relative proportions (%s) of questions cross-tabulated by 
information request centrality, question topic, and lawyer role. To ensure adequate 
statistical power, three separate tests were conducted to investigate the relative content of 
questions asked by lawyers. 
First, a Repeated-Measures Analysis of Variance (RM-ANOVA) conducted to 
investigate associations between information request centrality, question topic, and 
children’s age revealed a significant main effect for question topic, F(6.24, 330.88) = 
36.48, p < .001, η2p  = .41. As shown in Table 2, questions asking about location 
(comprising 12.2% of all questions asked), time (11.3%), witnesses (11.0%), and suspect 
actions (10.0%), were asked significantly more often than questions seeking other content. 
Questions seeking information about victim actions (8.5%), prior formal questioning 
(7.7%), objects (7.4%), and thoughts and emotions (6.0%) were the next most frequently 
asked questions. All other question topic categories were asked significantly less 
frequently, though it is notable that questions asking about victims (4.2%), suspects 
(3.7%), victim verbal statements (3.7%), disclosure processes (3.3%), and witness actions 
(3.0%), were asked non-significantly more often than questions seeking to elicit 
information about body parts (2.9%), suspect verbal statements (2.4%), witness verbal 
statements (1.6%), and sensory perceptions (1.3%). There was also a significant 
interaction between question topic and the centrality of the information request, F(6.02, 
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319.18) = 44.21, p < .001, η2p  = .46. Referring to Table 2, questions asking children about 
suspects, suspect actions, victim actions, time, body parts, suspect verbal statements, 
victim verbal statements, disclosure, and prior formal questioning were significantly more 
likely to be focused on central than peripheral details. On the other hand, questions asking 
children about witnesses, location, thought and emotions, and sensory perceptions, were 
more likely to be focused on peripheral than central details. Questions asking about 
victims, witness actions, objects, and witness verbal statements were as likely to probe 
central as peripheral details. There were no other significant main or interaction effects. 
A second RM-ANOVA conducted to investigate associations between information 
request centrality, lawyer role, and children’s age revealed a significant main effect for 
information request centrality, F(1, 53) = 26.17, p < .001, η2p  = .33. Questions seeking 
central (M = .60, SD = .02) content were asked significantly more than questions seeking 
peripheral (M = .40, SD = .02) information. There was also a significant interaction 
between information request centrality and lawyer role, F(1, 53) = 12.44, p < .001, η2p  = 
.19. Defense lawyers asked significantly more questions that prompted peripheral (M = 
.47, SD = .03) information and fewer that prompted central (M = .54, SD = .03) 
information than prosecutors (M = .36, SD = .02; M = .64, SD = .02, respectively). There 
were no other significant main or interaction effects. 
Lastly, a RM-ANOVA conducted to investigate associations between question 
topic, lawyer role, and children’s age revealed a significant main effect for question topic, 
F(5.35, 283.52) = 37.79, p < .001, η2p  = .42. Pairwise comparisons are described above. 
There was also a significant interaction between question topic and lawyer role, F(4.66, 
247.29) = 4.87, p < .001, η2p  = .08. Prosecutors were significantly more likely than 
defense lawyers to ask children about the suspect, victim, suspect actions, time, body 
parts, and suspect verbal statements. On the other hand, defense lawyers were significantly 
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more likely than prosecutors to ask children about victim actions, witness actions, witness 
verbal statements, and disclosure processes. There were no differences when lawyers 
asked children about witnesses, location, objects, victim verbal statements, prior formal 
questioning, thoughts and emotions, and sensory perceptions. There were no other 
significant main or interaction effects. 
How does the Centrality of Information Requests and Question Topic Affect 
Children’s Responses? 
Productivity 
Two separate tests were conducted to investigate differences in children’s 
productivity when answering questions prompting different content. First, a information 
request centrality x lawyer role x children’s age RM-ANOVA conducted to investigate 
children’s productivity revealed a significant main effect for lawyer role, F(1, 53) = 36.53, 
p < .001, η2p  = .41, with prosecutors eliciting significantly more productive responses 
from children (M = 1.48, SD = .10), than defense lawyers (M = .88, SD = .05). There was 
also a significant interaction between lawyer role and children’s age, F(2, 53) = 6.60, p = 
.003, η2p  = .20: Prosecutors elicited fewer productive answers from children aged 12-years 
old and under (M = 1.07, SD = .19) than from 13- to 15-year-olds (M = 1.74, SD = .14), 
and 16- to 17-year-olds (M = 1.63, SD = .19). There were no other significant differences 
(Defense: 12-years old and under, M = .99, SD = .10; 13- to 15-year olds, M = .86, SD = 
.08; 16- to 17-year olds, M = .80, SD = .10). There was a further main effect for the 
centrality of the information request, F(1, 53) = 4.18, p = .05, η2p  = .07, with questions 
prompting central (M = 1.22, SD = .07) details eliciting more productive responses than 
questions that prompted peripheral (M = 1.13, SD = .06) details. Lastly, there was an 
interaction between lawyer role and information request centrality, F(1, 53) = 18.67, p < 
.001, η2p  = .26. Prosecutors elicited significantly more productive answers from children 
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when prompting about central information (M = 1.62, SD = .12), than peripheral 
information (M = 1.33, SD = .09). There were no comparable differences for defense 
lawyers (central, M = .83, SD = .06; peripheral, M = .94, SD = .06). There were no other 
significant main or interaction effects. 
A second question topic x lawyer role x children’s age RM-ANOVA examining 
children’s productivity again revealed a significant main effect for lawyer role, F(1, 53) = 
29.60, p < .001, η2p  = .36, and a significant interaction between lawyer role and children’s 
age, F(2, 53) = 4.10, p = .02, η2p  = .13. See the previous test for descriptives. There was a 
further main effect for question topic, F(6.63, 351.26) = 5.19, p < .001, η2p  = .09. 
Questions seeking information about victims elicited significantly less information than 
questions about witnesses and victim actions. Questions asking children about body parts 
and prior formal questioning were both significantly less productive than questions about 
witnesses, victim actions, witness actions, location, time, objects, suspect verbal 
statements, victim verbal statements, and disclosure processes. Questions focused on body 
parts were further less productive than questions about suspects, suspect actions, and 
thought and emotions. There were no other significant differences. See Table 3. Lastly, 
there was a significant interaction between lawyer role and question topic, F(6.43, 340.68) 
= 6.05, p < .001, η2p  = .10. There were no differences between prosecutors and defense 
lawyers in children’s productivity when prompted about suspects, witness actions, time, 
witness verbal statements, and prior formal questioning. Children were significantly more 
productive in response to prosecutors’ questions about all other types of topic than those 
by defense lawyers. See Table 3. There were no other significant main or interaction 
effects. 
Responsiveness  
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Two separate tests were conducted to examine children’s responsiveness when 
answering questions focused on different content. First, a information request centrality x 
lawyer role x children’s age RM-ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for the 
centrality of the information request, F(1, 53) = 23.32, p < .001, η2p  = .31, with children 
more responsive to questions probing central (M = .54, SD = .02) than peripheral (M = .35, 
SD = .02) content. There was a further interaction between information request centrality 
and lawyer role, F(1, 53) = 12.14, p < .001, η2p  = .19: When asked about central content, 
children were more responsive to prosecutors (M = .59, SD = .02) than to defense lawyers 
(M = .48, SD = .03), whereas when asked about peripheral content, children were more 
responsive to defense lawyers (M = .38, SD = .03) than to prosecutors (M = .31, SD = .02). 
Finally, there was a significant interaction between lawyer role and children’s age, F(2, 
53) = 3.78, p = .03, η2p  = .13. Children aged 16- to 17-years old were more responsive to 
prosecutors (M = .46, SD = .02) than to defense lawyers (M = .39, SD = .02). There were 
no other significant differences (12-years old and under, M = .42, SD = .02, M = .45, SD = 
.02; 13- to 15-year-olds, M = .47, SD = .01, M = .46, SD = .02, respectively), and no other 
significant main or interaction effects.  
A second question topic x lawyer role x children’s age RM-ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect for question topic, F(4.54, 236.04) = 22.31, p < .001, η2p  = .30. 
Most notably, children were most responsive to questions about witnesses, suspect actions, 
location, and time than questions about any other topic. Children were least responsive to 
questions about witness verbal statements and sensory perceptions than questions about 
any other topic. Full descriptive statistics are provided in Table 4. There was also a 
significant interaction between lawyer role and question topic, F(3.62, 188.05) = 2.97, p = 
.03, η2p  = .05: Prosecutors elicited more responsive answers from children than defense 
lawyers when asking about the suspect, victim, suspect actions, time, body parts, and 
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suspect verbal statements. On the other hand, defense lawyers elicited more responsive 
answers than prosecutors when asking children about witness actions, witness verbal 
statements, disclosure processes, and thoughts and emotions. See Table 4. There were no 
other differences, and no other significant main or interaction effects.  
Self-contradictions 
A information request centrality x lawyer role x children’s age RM-ANOVA 
conducted to investigate the proportional frequency of children’s self-contradictions 
revealed a significant main effect for lawyer role, F(1, 53) = 23.24, p < .001, η2p  = .31, 
with children contradicting themselves more in response to defense lawyers (M = .03, SD 
= .00) than in response to prosecutors (M = .01, SD = .00). There was also a main effect 
for information request centrality, F(1, 53) = 30.70, p < .001, η2p  = .37, with children 
contradicting themselves more in response to questions that prompted central (M = .03, SD 
= .00) details than questions that prompted peripheral (M = .01, SD = .00) details. Finally, 
there was an interaction between lawyer role and information request centrality, F(2, 53) = 
5.94, p = .02, η2p  = .10. Children were significantly more likely to contradict themselves 
in response to defense lawyers’ central (M = .05, SD = .01) and peripheral (M = .02, SD = 
.00) information requests, than when responding to prosecutors’ central (M = .02, SD = 
.00) and peripheral (M = .01, SD = .00) information requests. There were no other 
significant main or interaction effects. 
Uncertainty 
A final information request centrality x lawyer role x children’s age RM-ANOVA 
examining the proportional frequency of children’s uncertainty revealed a significant main 
effect for information request centrality, F(1, 53) = 20.13, p < .001, η2p  = .28, with 
children expressing more uncertainty in response to questions that prompted central (M = 
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.08, SD = .01) details than questions that prompted peripheral (M = .04, SD = .00) details. 
There were no other significant main or interaction effects.  
Discussion 
This was the first study to examine both the centrality of the information sought 
and topics of lawyers’ questions in Scottish criminal courts and the ways children 
responded. The results help elucidate how prosecutors and defense lawyers differentially 
construct narratives for jurors and complement existing research examining how different 
features of questions (e.g., type, linguistic complexity, repetition) can influence children’s 
responses. The current findings should also assist in the evaluation and implementation of 
currently proposed changes to practices adopted in courts throughout the United Kingdom 
and other common law jurisdictions, such as the use of ground rules hearings, 
intermediaries, and taking evidence on commission.  
Of note, although lawyers’ questions were more likely to focus on central rather 
than peripheral details, 40% of all questions were focused on peripheral details. In line 
with our predictions, we found that defense lawyers (47%) asked more questions about 
peripheral details than prosecutors (36%) did, but because children respond more 
accurately to questions about central than about peripheral details (Almerigogna et al., 
2008; Candel et al., 2004; Peterson & Bell, 1996; Poole & White, 1991; Saywitz et al., 
1991; Tucker et al., 1990; Wright & Stroud, 1998), it is surprising that prosecutors asked 
so many of these riskier questions. Although questions focused on peripheral details can 
elicit forensically important information, such details (e.g., descriptions of people, 
locations, emotions and thoughts) are unlikely to be as important as central details in 
determining whether abuse occurred (Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1987). It might thus be 
important to determine in the future why lawyers, especially prosecutors, ask questions 
that prompt peripheral information.  
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With regard to question topic, several noteworthy findings should be discussed. 
First, it is interesting that lawyers devoted a large proportion of their questions to 
exploring with children the topics of location, time, and witnesses, especially as questions 
prompting information about location and witnesses were more likely to focus on 
peripheral than central details. It is also significant that topics such as body parts and 
sensory perceptions were discussed much less than other details, given that lawyers were 
exploring sexual abuse allegations. That said, it was clear that there were lawyer role 
differences in the topics of the questions asked, broadly in line with their motivations and 
our predictions. Prosecutors asked children more about the suspect, victim (perhaps to 
bolster character/credibility), suspect actions, time, body parts, and suspect verbal 
statements than defense lawyers, whereas defense lawyers were more likely than 
prosecutors to ask children about victim actions (perhaps to draw attention to the actions 
that victims did or did not take), witness actions, witness verbal statements, and disclosure 
processes. Question topic is a parameter that has been overlooked in previous research, yet 
it is clear that the topics of prosecutors’ and defense lawyers’ questions is very different. 
Further research should investigate the extent to which the topic of questions interacts 
with other question parameters to influence children’s responses.  
In the present study, children were more likely to respond and to do so more 
productively when asked about central rather than peripheral details and, in line with 
previous research (Ahern et al., 2015; Andrews et al., 2015c) questions about dynamic 
actions, such as victim actions, were more productive than questions about static content, 
such as body parts. These patterns are likely to further vary depending on question type, 
such that more open-ended questions elicit more productive responses from children than 
closed-ended questions (see Ahern et al., 2015; Andrews et al., 2015c). However, it is 
noteworthy that 5 categories of question topic (victim, body parts, witness verbal 
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statement, prior formal questioning, sensory perceptions) elicited relatively few 
substantive details. Low productivity in response to questions about victims, body parts, 
and sensory perceptions may reflect resistance or embarrassment on the part of the 
children, whereas low productivity in response to questions about witness prior statements 
and prior formal questioning may reflect particular difficulty recalling details about that 
topic, perhaps because those details are less salient than details about, for example, 
actions. Some of this speculation, which must be further investigated, is supported by the 
finding that children were least responsive to questions about witness verbal statements 
and sensory perceptions.  
Although prosecutors elicited more productive and responsive answers from 
children in response to questions about central rather than peripheral details, contrary to 
our predictions, there was no difference in children’s productivity when responding to 
defense lawyers’ central and peripheral information requests, and children were more 
responsive to defense lawyers’ questions about peripheral details. Of note, prosecutors 
elicited more responsive answers from children than defense lawyers when asking about 
the victim and body parts, perhaps reflecting better rapport. On the other hand, and 
contrary to predictions, defense lawyers elicited more responsive answers than prosecutors 
when asking children about witness actions, witness verbal statements, disclosure 
processes, and thoughts and emotions. This may be because witnesses strongly resisted the 
credibility challenges put to them during cross-examination (see Szojka, Andrews, Lamb, 
Stolzenberg, & Lyon, 2017).  
Children contradicted themselves more in response to defense lawyers’ than 
prosecutors’ questions, but, contrary to predictions, they did so in response to questions 
focused on both central and peripheral details, and there was no difference between 
lawyers in the rates at which children’s expressed uncertainty when answering questions 
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focused on central and peripheral details. The current study did not have enough statistical 
power to investigate differences in the rates of self-contradictions and uncertainty when 
responding to questions varying in topic, which needs further elucidation, along with the 
surprising finding, again contrary to our predictions, that children expressed more 
uncertainty in response to questions focused on central rather than peripheral details. 
However, whilst question centrality may play an important role in influencing children’s 
productivity, responsiveness, and expressions of uncertainty, children’s self-contradictions 
were less influenced by the substance of the questions, but more affected, as in previous 
research, by question type (Chapter 1), structural complexity (Chapter 2), and question 
repetition (Andrews, Lamb, & Lyon, 2015b; Chapter 3).  
Importantly, and consistent with our predictions, there were no differences 
associated with child age. In particular, this suggests that prosecutors and defense lawyers 
were as likely to ask questions about peripheral details, despite evidence that young 
children find peripheral questions much more difficult to answer accurately than older 
children (Brady et al., 1999; Roebers & Schneider, 2000). This finding suggests that 
prosecutors and defense lawyers focus both young and old children on aspects of their 
narrative that they are likely to struggle with: most notably, prompting temporal 
information (e.g., Droit-Volet & Izaute, 2005; Wandrey, Lyon, Quas, & Friedman, 2012; 
Zelanti & Droit-Volet, 2011). Researchers should further examine, using larger samples 
and/or experimental settings in which the accuracy of children’s responses can be 
monitored, the extent to which the content, type, and complexity of questions combine to 
diminish the accuracy of children’s responses.  
It is now widely accepted in Scotland that gathering evidence from young and 
vulnerable witnesses requires special care, and that subjecting them to traditional 
adversarial forms of examination and cross-examination is no longer acceptable (Evidence 
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and Procedure Review Report [Section 2.1], Scottish Court Service, March, 2015; Spencer 
& Lamb, 2012). For example, a High Court of Justiciary Practice Note on taking evidence 
by a commissioner was issued in March 2017; it is hoped that this will held reduce the 
need for vulnerable witnesses to give evidence in person in court. With a similar aim, the 
judiciary in in England and Wales has sought to made more extensive use of pre-recorded 
statements in place of testimony in court and to implement Ground Rules Hearings, at 
which judges stipulate what types of questions can be asked. These procedures (bringing 
into force Section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, 1999) are currently 
being piloted in England and Wales. The use of registered intermediaries, who are neutral 
specialists bought in to facilitate the communication between particularly vulnerable 
witnesses and forensic practitioners during testimony, is also becoming more accepted and 
widespread across England and Wales (see Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2009; Spencer & 
Lamb, 2012).  
However, it is pivotal that special measures such as these are evaluated 
systematically. The current findings suggest that, when practitioners are reviewing 
questions that will be asked of children, careful consideration should be given to the 
centrality and topic of the information sought. In particular, questions focused on 
peripheral details and questions that ask about the victim, body parts, sensory perceptions, 
and prior formal questioning are likely to undermine witness productivity and 
responsiveness, particularly during cross-examination. Based on previous research and the 
current findings, prompts that focus on the central details of the allegation and the alleged 
abusive actions involved are likely to be least risky and most informative.  
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Table 1. 
 
Coding Definitions and Examples.  
Code Definition Example 
Centrality of prompt   
       Central Questions that are plot-relevant, such as the 
identification of main characters, the 
location and time of the incident, abusive 
actions. Changing any such central detail 
will change the plot of the incident 
described. 
 
“Who touched you?” 
“How did he take your clothes off?” 
“Were you positioned on the bed when he did this?” 
 
       Peripheral Questions that are related to the incident, 
yet are not plot-relevant. Changing such 
details will not change the plot of the 
incident described. Examples include 
descriptions of people, descriptions of 
places, descriptions of time, emotions, 
thoughts.   
 
“How were you feeling when he did that?” 
“Can you describe how your bedroom was laid out at the time?” 
“Alan did this. Okay. Does Alan have a beard?” 
 
Question topic    
      Suspect Questions requesting information about the 
suspect.   
“You mentioned a man pulled down your pants. Tell me all about 
that man.” 
“Who did that to you?” 
 
      Victim Questions requesting information about the 
victim.   
 
“How old were you at the time?” 
      Witness Questions requesting information about 
witnesses.   
“Tell me about the boy who was in the same room.” 
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      Suspect action Questions requesting information about 
suspect actions.   
 
“Tell me about the man holding your arms.”  
“Did he force you to do that?”  
      Victim Action Questions requesting information about 
victim actions.   
 
“Did you run out of the room?”  
      Witness Action Questions requesting information about 
witness actions.   
 
“Was your brother watching?”  
      Location Questions requesting information about 
locations.   
“Where did the man sit?” 
“Tell me about the shelter where K. took you.” 
“What do you remember about the room where he raped you?” 
 
      Time Questions requesting information about 
time.   
“What time of year was it?” 
“Did that happen one time or more than one time?” 
“Was that the last time it happened?” 
 
      Object Questions requesting information about 
objects.   
“Was it a pen or a pencil that he touched you with?” 
“Tell me about the Vaseline.” 
 
      Body Part Questions requesting information about 
suspect, victims, and/or witness body parts.   
“Describe his ‘wee-wee.’” 
“Where did he touch you?” 
“Where did he touch your brother?” 
 
      Suspect’s Verbal Statement Questions requesting information about the 
content of suspects’ verbal statements.   
 
“What did you talk about?”  
“What did he say when he touched you?”  
      Victim’s Verbal Statement Questions requesting information about the 
content of victims’ verbal statements.   
 
“What did you yell?” 
      Witness’s Verbal Statement Questions requesting information about the “What did your brother say to the man?” 
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content of witnesses’ verbal statements.   
 
      Disclosure Questions requesting information about the 
victims’ disclosure processes.   
“You told your mum what he did, yes?” 
“Did you tell your sister what happened as well?”  
“What did you say when you told?” 
 
      Prior Formal Questioning Questions requesting information about the 
victims’ prior formal questioning (i.e., 
during medical examinations or forensic 
interviews).   
 
“Did the police come and interview you?” 
“Do you remember saying that to the police?” 
      Thoughts/Emotions Questions requesting information about the 
suspects’, victims’, and/or witnesses’ 
thoughts or emotions. Questions asking 
about such content are always peripheral.  
 
“How did you feel when he did that?” 
“You were angry, weren’t you?” 
      Sensory Perceptions Questions requesting information about the 
suspects’, victims’, and/or witnesses’ 
sensory perceptions. Questions asking about 
such content are always peripheral. 
 
“What did you see?” 
“What did you smell?” 
“What did your brother see?” 
Children’s responses   
      Responsive Verbal and action responses related to the 
lawyer’s previous utterance. Utterances 
were assigned this category even if they did 
not contain new informative details, or 
when their meaning was unclear.  
 
Lawyer: “Did he take your trousers off?” 
Child: “Yes.” [responsive] 
Lawyer: “What did he do with your trousers?” 
Child: “I don’t know.” [responsive] 
      Unresponsive Responses that do not relate to the question 
asked in the previous lawyer utterance, but 
provide incident-related information. These 
include instances when children 
Lawyer: “What did he say?”  
Child: “I was – I said “STOP” and I tried to push him away from 
me, but he kept holding on to my waist.” [unresponsive] 
Lawyer: “Well that can’t be right, can it? Try again. Was he 
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misunderstood the lawyers’ questions.  standing or sitting?”  
Child: “He licked my private, too”. [unresponsive] 
 
      Self-contradiction Responses that negated what the children 
had previously disclosed during the 
proceedings or provided self- conflicting 
information.  
Lawyer: “He licked you one time?”  
Child: “Yes.”  
(later in the proceedings)  
Lawyer: “How many times did he lick you?”  
Child: “I don’t know - like 5 times.”[self-contradiction] 
 
Lawyer: “Did he touch your privates when you were in the car?” 
Child: “No.”  
Lawyer: “But I thought he did touch you in the car. Did he touch 
your privates in the car?”  
Child: “No. I never - in the car he touched my privates.” [self-
contradiction] 
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Table 2. 
 
Centrality of Prompt x Question Topic x Lawyer Role.  
 
 Prosecution Defense Total 
 Central Peripheral Central Peripheral Central Peripheral Total 
Question Topic n % n % n % n % n % n % n % 
Suspect 426 4.9 126 2.6 164 3.5 105 2.6 590 4.4 231 2.6 821 3.7 
Victim 380 4.4 282 5.8 118 2.5 146 3.6 498 3.7 428 4.8 926 4.2 
Witness 589 6.8 878 18.1 375 8.1 590 14.6 964 7.2 1,468 16.5 2,432 11.0 
Suspect action 1,464 16.9 58 1.2 575 12.4 119 2.9 2,039 15.3 177 2.0 2,216 10.0 
Victim Action 761 8.8 223 4.6 541 11.6 358 8.9 1,302 9.8 581 6.5 1,883 8.5 
Witness Action 160 1.8 73 1.5 219 4.7 209 5.2 379 2.8 282 3.2 661 3.0 
Location 908 10.5 899 18.5 378 8.1 522 12.9 1,286 9.7 1,421 16.0 2,707 12.2 
Time 1,151 13.3 532 11.0 474 10.2 349 8.6 1,625 12.2 881 9.9 2,506 11.3 
Object 702 8.1 443 9.1 168 3.6 322 8.0 870 6.5 765 8.6 1,635 7.4 
Body Part 543 6.3 21 0.4 57 1.2 15 0.4 600 4.5 36 0.4 636 2.9 
Suspect’s Verbal 
Statement 
412 4.8 16 0.3 84 1.8 30 0.7 496 3.7 46 0.5 542 2.4 
Victim’s Verbal 
Statement 
318 3.7 87 1.8 279 6.0 139 3.4 597 4.5 226 2.5 823 3.7 
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Witness’s Verbal 
Statement 
74 0.9 20 0.4 155 3.3 102 2.5 229 1.7 122 1.4 351 1.6 
Disclosure 323 3.7 10 0.2 368 7.9 38 0.9 691 5.2 48 0.5 739 3.3 
Prior Formal 
Questioning 
448 5.2 265 5.5 693 14.9 293 7.3 1,114 8.6 558 6.3 1,699 7.7 
Thoughts/Emotions 0 0 723 14.9 0 0 603 14.9 0 0 1,326 14.9 1,326 6.0 
Sensory 
Perceptions 
0 0 199 4.1 0 0 98 2.4 0 0 297 3.3 297 1.3 
Total 8,659 64.1 4,855 35.9 4,648 53.5 4,038 46.5 13,307 59.9 8,893 40.1 22,200 100.00 
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Table 3. 
 
Productivity x Question Topic x Lawyer Role.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Prosecution Defense Total 
Question Topic M SD M SD M SD 
Suspect 1.19 .10 .88 .20 1.04 .12 
Victim 1.06 .13 .63 .12 .84 .08 
Witness 1.46 .11 1.03 .08 1.25 .07 
Suspect action 2.34 .34 .52 .06 1.43 .18 
Victim Action 1.86 .18 .96 .10 1.41 .11 
Witness Action 1.19 .15 1.24 .20 1.22 .12 
Location 1.28 .08 .94 .09 1.11 .06 
Time 1.12 .09 1.02 .13 1.07 .09 
Object 1.64 .22 .71 .06 1.17 .11 
Body Part .90 .09 .21 .05 .55 .05 
Suspect’s Verbal Statement 2.02 .44 .33 .10 1.18 .23 
Victim’s Verbal Statement 1.61 .28 .99 .18 1.30 .14 
Witness’s Verbal Statement .69 .19 .84 .17 .77 .13 
Disclosure 1.55 .21 .83 .13 1.19 .13 
Prior Formal Questioning .72 .08 .65 .08 .69 .05 
Thoughts/Emotions 1.51 .19 .12 .18 1.31 .16 
Sensory Perceptions 1.04 .21 .60 .13 .82 .13 
Total 1.48 .19 .88 .05 1.18 .06 
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Table 4. 
 
Responsiveness x Question Topic x Lawyer Role.  
  
	 Prosecution Defense Total 
Question Topic M SD M SD M SD 
Suspect .04 .01 .03 .01 .04 .00 
Victim .05 .00 .03 .01 .04 .01 
Witness .11 .01 .11 .01 .11 .01 
Suspect action .10 .01 .08 .01 .09 .01 
Victim Action .06 .01 .11 .03 .08 .01 
Witness Action .01 .00 .04 .01 .03 .00 
Location .12 .01 .10 .01 .11 .01 
Time .12 .01 .09 .01 .10 .01 
Object .06 .01 .05 .01 .06 .01 
Body Part .04 .00 .01 .00 .02 .00 
Suspect’s Verbal Statement .03 .01 .01 .00 .02 .00 
Victim’s Verbal Statement .05 .03 .03 .01 .04 .01 
Witness’s Verbal Statement .01 .00 .02 .01 .02 .00 
Disclosure .02 .00 .04 .01 .03 .00 
Prior Formal Questioning .07 .02 .09 .02 .08 .01 
Thoughts/Emotions .04 .01 .05 .01 .05 .00 
Sensory Perceptions .01 .00 .01 .00 .01 .00 
Total .06 .00 .05 .00 .05 .00 
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Abstract 
This study examined the uncertain responses of 56 5- to 17-year-old alleged sexual abuse 
victims testifying in Scottish criminal court trials. Don’t know/remember ground rules 
were explained to 38% of the children and each child reported uncertainty in response to 
15% of the questions on average. Uncertain responding was associated with expressions of 
resistance and confusion, questioning context (proportionally more regarding substantive 
than non-substantive issues), question content (least to disclosure-focused questions), 
utterance type (more to directives, particularly those posed by defense lawyers; more to 
recall-based than recognition prompts), and age (children in mid-adolescence were less 
likely to respond uncertainly than those who were either older or younger). There were no 
associations between expressions of uncertainty and ground rule administration, or with 
whether or not the question focused on central rather than peripheral details about the 
alleged crimes. Findings highlight concerns surrounding preparatory procedures to help 
witnesses, especially adolescents, indicate uncertainty when testifying. 
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Children's Uncertain Responses When Testifying about Alleged Sexual Abuse in Scottish 
Courts 
In criminal court, the reliability and completeness of children’s accounts is critical, 
especially in cases addressing child sexual abuse because witness testimony is often the 
primary source of evidence, and children’s evidence can have a large impact on legal 
outcomes. It is important to examine the frequency and conditions under which children 
express uncertainty in court, since allowing children to express uncertainty increases the 
likelihood that the information elicited from them is truthful and accurate (Koriat, 
Goldsmith, Schneider, & Nakash-Dura, 2001; Roebers & Schneider, 2005). 
Furthermore, courtroom questioning can be unusual and difficult for children, who 
are accustomed to being tested by knowledgeable adults (Lyon, 2010), and often feel 
pressured to answer adults’ questions (Earhart, La Rooy, Brubacher, & Lamb, 2014). 
Lawyers may also question children using complicated prompts about events that occurred 
long ago (Andrews, Lamb, & Lyon, 2015; Hanna, Davies, Crothers, & Henderson, 2012; 
Spencer & Lamb, 2012), making it critical to prepare children for their unique roles as 
witnesses by instructing them not to guess and to express uncertainty when they do not 
know the answers to questions (i.e., the “don’t know” ground rule).  
Comparing children’s propensity to express uncertainty in response to prosecutors 
and defense lawyers may be particularly important because lawyers are motivated to 
undermine the opponents’ witnesses and question alleged victims of child sex abuse 
accordingly, by asking easier or more difficult questions, respectively (Andrews et al., 
2015). Remarkably, however, very little field research has been conducted on children’s 
uncertain responses, and there has been no prior research on children’s uncertain 
responses in criminal court proceedings.  
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What Aspects of Courtroom Questioning Might Increase the Likelihood that 
Children Will Express Uncertainty? 
The likelihood that child witnesses might experience uncertainty in court relative 
to other forensic contexts is greater because courtroom questioning is often insensitive and 
cognitively unsupportive. This may be because lawyers are trained to elicit specific 
responses from children, with defense lawyers -- in particular -- trained to discredit 
witnesses (which they do by asking difficult-to-answer questions). For example, a host of 
studies (see Lamb, Malloy, Hershkowitz, & La Rooy, 2015; Walker, Kenniston, & Inada, 
2013) have revealed that many questions put to witnesses are linguistically complicated, 
include advanced vocabulary, and/or may require witnesses to report on information 
outside the scope of their competency (e.g., recall event dates and frequencies). Moreover, 
lawyers often ask child witnesses about events that occurred long ago (often years ago) 
and may ask children to recollect aspects of the past event that may be especially difficult 
to recall (e.g., peripheral details about what clothing was worn on a certain day).  
Further, although forensic interviewers are routinely advised to tell children that 
they should say “I don’t know” and “I don’t understand” when appropriate (Lamb, 
Orbach, Hershkowitz, Esplin, & Horowitz, 2007), it is unclear whether similar advice is 
offered in court, where it might be especially important because of the intimidating setting 
and the complexity of the questions asked, often by lawyers who are not trained to 
question children. In court, children also promise to tell the truth, making it especially 
important that they are encouraged to admit uncertainty when appropriate.  
Because lawyers ask many suggestive and closed-ended option-posing questions in 
court (Andrews et al., 2015) which pull for specific answers, the pressure to respond may 
be further increased (Warren, Hulse-Trotter, & Tubbs, 1991). For example, the extent to 
which questions offer options from which children can select (e.g., “yes/no”) may make 
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guessing easier than expressing uncertainty. The closed-ended and leading nature of 
lawyers’ questions also makes it unlikely that children are routinely given the opportunity 
to explain why they are uncertain.  
In sum, a number of factors may affect the propensity for children to express 
uncertainty more often in court than in other forensic contexts, including lawyer role 
(prosecutors vs. defense lawyers), whether or not the questions focused on central details 
about the alleged crime, the content of the questions posed (e.g., questions about actions 
during the alleged event vs. questions about the exact time of the incident), and the leading 
and closed-ended questions that lawyers routinely use when questioning children.  
Experimental Research on Children’s Uncertain Responses 
The conditions under which children accurately express uncertainty in response to 
adults’ questions have been widely researched in experimental and analogue studies. Such 
studies have found that children often feel obligated to answer adults’ questions, and that 
children attempt to answer nonsensical or unanswerable questions, rather than express 
uncertainty, even when they lack the required information or the questions do not make 
sense (Hughes & Grieve, 1980; Pratt, 1990; Waterman, Blades, & Spencer, 2000, 2001).  
Waterman et al. (2000) found that 92-96% of the children who answered 
nonsensical questions knew that the questions were ‘silly’ and unanswerable, but guessed 
anyway. Furthermore, children attempted to answer rather than express uncertainty more 
often when the nonsensical or unanswerable questions were closed-ended yes/no 
recognition prompts than when they were more recall-based (Gee, Gregory, & Pipe, 1999; 
Waterman et al., 2000; Waterman, Blades, & Spencer, 2004). Waterman and colleagues 
(2004) found that 8-year-olds were more likely to provide correct responses than 6-year-
olds, and were thus more likely to express uncertainty when appropriate. Worryingly, 
when forced to guess in response to misleading questions, both adults and children tended 
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to aver the incorrect information in subsequent interviews (Gombos, Pezdek, & Haymond, 
2012; Stolzenberg & Pezdek, 2013).  
However, experimental studies have also shown that pre-interview instructions 
encouraging children to say “I don’t know” when they did not know, lead them to say “I 
don’t know” appropriately more often but the instruction did not affect responses to non-
misleading questions (Mulder & Vrij, 1996; Waterman & Blades, 2011). This was 
particularly true when children practiced using the “don’t know” ground rule prior to 
substantive questioning (Danby, Brubacher, Sharman, & Powell, 2015). Such findings 
have informed recommendations that forensic interviewers should explicitly encourage 
children to say ‘I don’t know/remember’ when appropriate (Lamb et al., 2007). 
Field Research on Children’s Uncertain Responses 
Unlike experimental settings, forensic contexts often involve children being 
questioned about personally significant and emotionally salient events. As a result, 
children may express uncertainty, not because they genuinely do not know or remember 
the answer, but more often because they are reluctant to respond to the question, either 
because they find the subject matter difficult to talk about, or because they want to omit 
details. This possibility has affected the way that uncertainty has been coded in previous 
field research. 
Most studies examining reluctance in child investigative interviews have measured 
children’s reluctance by calculating how often children (whose abuse had been verified 
independently) denied abuse, resisted answering questions, or omitted information (e.g., 
Ahern, Hershkowitz, Lamb, Blasbalg, & Winstanley, 2014; Hershkowitz, 2013; 
Hershkowitz, Lamb, Katz, & Malloy, 2015; Hershkowitz, Orbach, Lamb, Sternberg, & 
Horowitz, 2006; Hershkowitz, Orbach, Sternberg, Pipe, Lamb, & Horowitz, 2007). In all 
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such studies omissions were the most common type of reluctant utterances; these included 
various uncertain responses (e.g., don’t know/don’t remember, non-responses/silence).  
In a study looking at the effects of enhanced rapport-building in forensic 
interviews with 4- to 13-year-olds alleging sexual abuse, omissions constituted a 
substantial minority of responses, including 18% of all responses in the rapport-building 
and 12% in the substantive (abuse-related) contexts of the interviews (Hershkowitz et al., 
2015). Children who did not disclose abuse that had been independently corroborated 
expressed more reluctance (including omissions) than children who did disclose 
(Hershkowitz et al., 2006, 2007). Furthermore, enhanced interviewer supportiveness and 
rapport-building resulted in markedly lower levels of reluctance, particularly omissions 
(Ahern et al., 2014; Hershkowitz et al., 2015). These studies suggested that it may 
sometimes be reasonable to view uncertain responses as indices of reluctance on the part 
of children motivated not to disclose their experiences. 	
Unlike Hershkowitz and colleagues, who were concerned primarily with the 
dynamics of interviews with children who were reluctant to disclose abuse (Ahern et al., 
2014; Hershkowitz, 2013; Hershkowitz et al., 2006, 2007, 2015), other researchers have 
evaluated children’s “don’t know” responses differently in investigative interviews. 
Earhart et al. (2014) examined 76 forensic interviews with allegedly abused 4- to 13- year-
olds and found that, even though the “don’t know” ground rule was presented in 94% of 
the interviews, an average of only 7 “don’t know” responses were identified in each 
interview, constituting only 6% of children’s substantive responses – half the proportion 
reported by Hershkowitz et al. (2015). This discrepancy may be attributable to differences 
in interview procedure as well as the inclusion of non-responses along with don’t 
know/remember responses in the ‘omissions’ category (Hershkowitz et al., 2015).  
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As in experimental studies (Gee et al., 1999; Waterman et al., 2000, 2004), Earhart 
and colleagues found that directives were more likely than option-posing prompts to elicit 
don’t know responses. Earhart et al. (2014) found no association between age and the 
frequency of don’t know responses, how uncertainty was elicited (by the child, by the 
interviewer, or due to question type), and the effect of the ground rule on children’s 
propensity to express uncertainty. However, children aged 7 to 13 years were more likely 
than children aged 3 to 6 years to elaborate on their uncertain response and explain why 
they were uncertain. 
Lastly, Earhart et al. (2014) also attempted to ascertain whether some don’t know 
responses might reflect reluctance by measuring the number of details children provided 
during their interviews. They found no evidence that children who said “I don’t know” 
more often were any less informative overall. The inconsistent findings suggest that it may 
not be appropriate in field research, where baseline accuracy cannot be established, to 
view uncertain responses as necessary indicators of reluctance, and highlight the need for 
further investigation into the extent to which children respond with uncertainty, why they 
do so, and how such responses are elicited. As noted earlier, there has been no previous 
research on expressions of uncertainty in the courtroom.  
Present Study 
It is crucial to study children’s uncertain responses in the course of trials, during 
which they are questioned by prosecutors who are motivated to enhance the credibility of 
their testimony, and by defense lawyers who are motivated to undermine it. Because 
children’s courtroom testimony is kept confidential by British courts and is not routinely 
transcribed, the current research builds upon a carefully negotiated and unprecedented 
collaboration with the Scottish judiciary, which has recently expressed considerable 
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concern about the risks associated with the quality and testing of children’s testimony 
(e.g., Evidence and Procedure Review Report, Scottish Court Service, March, 2015).  
The present study was the first to investigate children’s uncertain responses in 
court by examining a sample of Scottish criminal trial transcripts involving 56 children 
aged between 5 and 17 years testifying about sexual abuse. Due to the absence of previous 
relevant research, the present study was largely descriptive in nature. We identified the 
presence or absence of the “don’t know” ground rule and assessed the effect it had on the 
frequency with which children expressed uncertainty in a variety of ways. We also 
investigated associations between uncertain responses and children’s age, which of the 
lawyers was involved, question type, question content, the centrality of the details sought, 
and reluctance (as indexed by children’s verbal productivity and overt expressions of 
emotion or confusion). We further differentiated among different types of uncertain 
responses and coded the reasons offered by children to explain their responses.  
We predicted that: 1) children would express more uncertainty when questioned 
using recall-based questions rather than recognition and suggestive prompts, 2) children 
would express more uncertainty when questioned by prosecutors than defense lawyers, 
due to differences in their motivations and questioning techniques, and 3) children would 
express more uncertainty in response to questions about peripheral information than 
central information, because peripheral details are harder for children to remember (e.g., 
Peterson & Whalen, 2001). We did not make any predictions regarding age because 
previous research has yielded inconsistent findings.  
Method 
Sample 
With the approval and support of the Lord President, the Court Service Team of 
the Scottish Court Service identified cases conducted in six major court houses in Scotland 
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between 2009 and 2014 in which alleged child victims of sexual abuse had testified. 
Recordings of the cases were then located, and the portions of the trials in which the 
children testified were transcribed. Transcripts of 36 trials involving a total of 56 alleged 
victims of child sexual abuse were included in the study. Nine cases (11 children) were 
from Aberdeen, 9 cases (19 children) from Edinburgh, 12 cases (16 children) from 
Glasgow, 1 case (1 child) from Inverness, 3 cases (5 children) from Livingston, and 2 
cases (4 children) from Perth.  
The trials included involved at least 25 different prosecutors, 24 defense attorneys, and 22 
judges. Identifying information was unavailable for nine transcripts.   
Children reported single (n = 18) or multiple (n = 38) sexually abusive experiences 
involving penetration (n = 38), touching under clothes (n = 10), touching over clothes (n = 
3) and indecent exposure (n = 5). The final sample included 40 girls and 16 boys who 
were 5 to 17 years of age (M = 13.99, SD = 2.69). Age could not be entered into 
parametric tests as a continuous variable because the distribution was not normal, D(55) = 
.20, p < .001. Therefore, children were categorized into three age groups at the time of 
trial: 12-year-olds and under (n = 15, M = 10.25, SD = 2.13), 13- to 15-year-olds (n = 26, 
M = 14.62, SD = .83), and 16- and 17-year-olds (n = 15, M = 16.57, SD = .52). These age 
categories were chosen because they accord with the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 
(2009); 16 years is the age of sexual consent, but a person aged 16 or over can claim to be 
innocent of committing a sexual offence with a child aged between 13 and 16 years if that 
person ‘reasonably believed’ that the child was over the age of 16. However, this 
reasonable belief provision does not apply if the offence involved a child under the age of 
13. The children’s socioeconomic and ethnic backgrounds were unknown.  
All defendants were male. In 95% (n = 53) of the cases, the children knew the 
alleged abusers. The suspects were biological parents (n = 8), step-fathers/mothers’ 
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boyfriends (n = 3), other family members (n = 20), family friends (n = 5), 
friends/acquaintances (n = 17) and strangers (n = 3). Defendants were either convicted (n 
= 42) or acquitted (n = 10). The remaining 4 defendants were convicted but not for all 
alleged sexual offences.   
In accordance with the Victims and Witnesses [Scotland] Act (2014), many of the 
children had special measures in place. All courts were closed to the public. Four children 
received no other special measures. Other children gave evidence in court with a screen 
and a support person present (n = 15), or just a support person present (n = 5). The 
remaining children gave evidence via a live TV link with a support person present (n = 21) 
or without a support person present (n = 3), or their evidence was taken on commission1 (n 
= 8).  
Coding of Transcripts 
The transcripts contained direct- and often redirect-examinations, in which the 
prosecution questioned the children, and cross-examinations, in which the defense 
questioned the children. No transcripts contained recross-examinations. Both the 
substantive and non-substantive questions and responses were coded.  
Context: Non-substantive. Lawyers’ statements or questions that were not 
focused on the incident under investigation were coded as non-substantive. These included 
1) procedural prompts, defined as comments, statements, or questions concerning 
procedural aspects of the direct/cross examinations, including introductory information 
and instructions, taking the oath, communication rules, introduction of evidence, and 
																																																						
1 Taking evidence by a commissioner is considered only for the most vulnerable 
witnesses. In these instances, delays in testifying may increase distress and trauma, 
significantly hindering the witness’s ability to give evidence. Evidence can therefore be 
taken before a commissioner appointed by the court. The evidence is taken in full (direct-, 
cross-, and re-direct-examination) from the witness, proceedings are video recorded, and 
later received at the subsequent trial (see Vulnerable Witnesses [Scotland] Act, 2004). 
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labelling or defining body parts, 2) anchoring prompts, defined as utterances providing 
children with external (not incident related) references (e.g., a holiday or a birthday, 
description of the location) in order to aid in the relative dating, timing, location, etc., of 
the investigated incident, and 3) rapport-building prompts, defined as utterances designed 
to enhance the children’s trust and cooperation, and provide emotional support (e.g., by 
asking about the children’s family, friends, school, general knowledge, or neutral 
experienced events).  
Context: Substantive. Substantive utterances were defined as those designed to 
elicit information about what happened during the alleged incidents, what immediately 
preceded or followed the alleged incidents, within-incident events (e.g., unexpected 
interruptions exposing the abuse), witness details (e.g., witness intervention), other 
features of the abuse (e.g., how long the incidents lasted, where they happened), 
disclosure, and prior substantive formal questioning (e.g., what the child reported in 
forensic interview/s).  
Ground rule. The “don’t know/remember” ground rule (e.g., “If you don’t know 
it’s okay to say I don’t know”) and any practice or reiteration of the ground rule were 
coded.  
Uncertainty response type. Uncertain responses were exhaustively categorized 
into one of five main types: don’t know (including “not sure”), don’t remember, 
digressions (i.e., the child responded but was off task, resistant, or provided an irrelevant 
response to the target question), requests for clarification (e.g., “I didn’t understand. Can 
you repeat that?”), and non-responses. Each uncertain response was further classified in 
relation to how it was elicited: spontaneous, lawyer elicited, and in-answer. Definitions 
and examples of the three elicitation types are provided in Table 1. 
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Reasoning. Reason offered by the children to explain why they were uncertain 
were categorized as: poor memory (e.g., “I can’t remember because it was so long ago”), 
being emotional/confused at the time of the incident (e.g., “I was really upset when it 
happened, so I just don’t know”), or being emotional/confused at the time of trial 
questioning (e.g., “This is really, really stressful for me, so I’m finding it hard to think 
back”).  
Question type. Lawyers’ substantive utterances were categorized into one of four 
question type classes commonly used to differentiate between interviewer utterances in 
forensic interviews (e.g., Lamb, Hershkowitz, Orbach, & Esplin, 2008): invitations, 
directives, option-posing, and suggestive prompts (see Table 1). 
Question centrality. Questions that elicited uncertain responses were categorized 
with respect to whether the focus was on central or peripheral aspects of the incident under 
examination (see Table 1).  
Question content. The content of the questions that elicited uncertain responses 
was classified into one of six categories: suspect, victim, witness, contextual, disclosure, 
and prior formal questioning (see Table 1).  
Productivity. The number of new details conveyed by the child in each 
substantive response was tabulated using a procedure described by Lamb, Hershkowitz, 
Sternberg, Esplin, Hovav, Manor, and Yudilevitch (1996). Details were defined as the 
smallest units of information pertaining to the alleged incidents provided by the children. 
Details involved the naming, identification, or description of individuals, objects, events, 
places, actions, emotions, thoughts, and sensations relevant to alleged incidents, as well as 
any of their features (e.g., appearances, locations, times, durations, temporal orders, 
sounds, smells, and textures). Repeated words or details between and within utterances 
were counted only once unless the repetition appeared intentional (e.g., for emphasis). 
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Details were only counted when they added to the understanding of the target incident(s), 
therefore false starts (e.g., “I – they went...”; “Um, well...”), statements that expressed the 
child’s present mental or emotional state (e.g., “I am scared”), phrases that suggested the 
level of confidence of the interviewee during the examination (e.g. “I know”; “I think”; 
“Maybe”), and claims of lack of knowledge/ignorance (e.g., “I don't know”; “I don't 
remember”) were not counted as substantive details. 
Overt emotion or confusion. Overt expressions of emotion or confusion that 
might also convey reluctance (e.g., “NO! I don’t want to go on”; “Why are you asking me 
this?”; [unintelligible shouting]), confusion (e.g., “I have no idea what you’re going on 
about.”; “Er…[no response]”), and distress (e.g., crying/shouting) were identified. Overt 
emotion or confusion was not necessarily coded at the question level because emotions 
and confusion could be evident during a number of turns. Each ‘episode’ was coded as one 
instance of overt emotion or confusion.    
Inter-rater Reliability  
Two raters independently coded 20% of the transcripts that were randomly 
selected. One-hundred percent reliability was achieved for the classification of 
non/substantive prompts, don’t know/remember ground rules, and children’s reasoning. 
Inter-rater reliability for the classification of uncertainty response type (both main and 
elicitation type) was high, K = .96 (SE = .01), 95% CI [.94, .98], as was the agreement 
when coding question types, K = .94 (SE = .02), 95% CI [.90, .98], question centrality, K = 
.89 (SE = .02), 95% CI [.85, .93], question content, K = .84 (SE = .03), 95% CI [.78, .90], 
productivity, K = .83 (SE = .06), 95% CI [.71, .95], and overt emotion or confusion, K = 
.74 (SE = .05), 95% CI [.64, .84]. Reliability was assessed throughout the coding process 
and all disagreements were resolved by discussion. 
Results 
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Preliminary Analyses 
Discriminant function analyses revealed no significant effects due to gender or 
case verdicts on the proportion of uncertain response of each type, question types, 
question centrality, and question content. Therefore, gender and case verdicts were not 
included in any of the analyses reported below. Further discriminant functions analyses 
revealed no significant effects due to the different types of uncertain responses on the 
proportion of question types, rates of question centrality, and question content. The 
different types of uncertain responses were subsequently collapsed for inferential analyses.  
Using proportional values controls for the number of questions asked by each 
lawyer and the number of responses per child and aids in the normalization of data 
distributions.  Proportions were calculated by dividing the cell count of interest (e.g., the 
frequency of uncertain responses when prompted by defense lawyers’ substantive 
questions) by the appropriate grouping total (e.g., the total number of substantive 
questions asked by defense lawyers). All variables entered into parametric tests were 
normally distributed and alpha levels were adjusted to control for multiple comparisons. 
All parametric tests were conducted with child as the unit of analysis and power analyses 
confirmed that all inferential tests reported had enough power (set at 0.8) to detect at least 
medium-sized effects. Every analysis reported involved proportional values unless 
otherwise stated, with significant interactions followed-up using pairwise comparisons 
with Bonferroni corrections.  
Ground Rule 
Of the 56 children, 21 (37.50%) were told the don’t know/remember ground rule 
during questioning. Twelve of the 21 were told by prosecutors, 6 by defense lawyers, and 
3 by judges. In only 5 of the 21 cases was the ground rule reiterated later during 
testimony: twice by prosecutors and three times by the defense. All reiterations occurred 
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after a break in proceedings. The don’t know/don’t remember ground rule was never 
practiced. Descriptively, children who were told the ground rule expressed more 
uncertainty in total (M = 94.05, SD = 86.32) and proportionally (M = .15, SD = .09) than 
children who were not told the ground rule (M = 65.97, SD = 67.51; M = .12, SD = .08, 
respectively). However, t-tests revealed that these differences were not significant, t(54) = 
1.36, p = .18 and t(54) = 1.37, p = .17, respectively.  
Uncertain Response Frequency 
On average, 509.25 (SD = 320.79) questions were identified in each transcript, 
including 416.52 (SD = 250.86) substantive prompts, and 92.73 (SD = 95.36) non-
substantive prompts. In total, 4,284 uncertain responses were identified. All children 
responded uncertainly, some very often (M = 76.50, SD = 75.60, range 9 – 375). Children 
responded with uncertainty 15.02% of the time: 14.60% of the time (M = 61.41, SD = 
55.11) in response to substantive questions, and 7.50% of the time in response to non-
substantive questions (M = 15.09, SD = 31.16). Due to their low frequency, uncertain 
responses to judges’ questions (n = 119) were not considered further.  
Uncertain Response Types 
Of all uncertain responses, “don’t know” (n = 1,386, 32.35%) and “don’t 
remember” (n = 1,409, 32.89%) responses were most common. Non-responses (n = 704, 
16.43%), digressions (n = 281, 6.56%), and requests for clarification (n = 504, 11.76%) 
were less common. Most uncertain responses were identified as spontaneous (n = 2,585, 
60.34%), although lawyer-elicited “don’t know/remember” responses were also common 
(n = 993, 23.18%). Children responded with in-answer uncertainty 16.48% of the time (n 
= 706).  
Reasoning 
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Only 21 (37.50%) children explained why they were uncertain, providing only 64 
instances of reasoning. Children reasoned that they were unsure due to poor memory 
(70.31%; 16 children), being emotional/confused at the time of the incident (17.18%; 3 
children), and being emotional/confused at the time of questioning (12.50%; 6 children). 
Inspection of the descriptive frequencies revealed comparable rates of reasoning on the 
part of children in each age group (12 years old and under n = 6, 13 to 15 years old n = 8, 
16 to 17 years old n = 7). However, children in the middle and oldest age groups explained 
why they were uncertain most often (5- to 12- year olds n = 10, 13- to 15- year olds n = 
28, 16- to 17- year olds n = 26). 
Lawyer Role  
A Repeated-Measures Analysis of Variance (RM-ANOVA) was conducted to 
investigate age differences (between-subjects factor: 12 years old and under, 13 to 15 
years, 16 to 17 years) in the proportions of uncertain responses elicited by prosecutors and 
defense lawyers (within-subjects repeated-measures) in each context (within-subjects 
repeated-measures: non-substantive, substantive). There was a main effect for context, 
F(1, 53) = 37.75, p < .001, p2 = .42. Children were proportionally more likely to respond 
with uncertainty in the substantive contexts (M = .15, SD = .01) than in the non-
substantive contexts (M = .07, SD = .01). There were no other significant effects.   
Question Type  
For the remaining analyses, only the 3,416 substantive questions and responses 
were analysed. A RM-ANOVA was conducted to investigate whether there were any 
effects of question type (within-subjects repeated-measures: invitations, directives, option-
posing, and suggestive questions), lawyer role (within-subjects repeated-measures: 
prosecutors and defense lawyers), and children’s age (between-subjects factor: 12 years 
old and under, 13 to 15 years, 16 to 17 years). Mauchly’s test of sphericity was violated, 
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thus Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied (ε = .71 and .73). The results revealed a 
main effect for question type, F(2.13, 113.04) = 11.53, p < .001, p2 = .18. 
Proportionally, uncertain responses were more likely to be elicited by directive questions 
(M =.21, SD = .02) than invitations (M = .13, SD = .02). Directive questions were also 
more likely to elicit uncertain responses than option-posing (M = .09, SD = .01) and 
suggestive questions (M = .16, SD = .02). Option-posing questions were less likely to 
elicit uncertain responses than suggestive questions. The RM-ANOVA also revealed an 
interaction between question type and lawyer role, F(2.19, 115.96) = 7.95, p < .001, p2 = 
.13. Prosecutors were more likely than defense lawyers to elicit uncertain responses when 
prompting children with invitations, whereas defense lawyers were more likely than 
prosecutors to elicit uncertain responses when prompting children with directives. There 
were no differences between lawyer role and the frequency of uncertain response elicited 
in response to option-posing prompts and suggestive prompts (see Table 2). Third, an 
interaction between question type and children’s age, F(4.27, 113.04) = 2.34, p = .05, p2 
= .08, emerged. Post-hoc simple effects analyses revealed that 13- to 15-year-old children 
were less likely than 16- to 17-year-olds to respond with uncertainty when answering 
invitations, option-posing, and suggestive prompts. When responding to invitations, 
children aged 13 to 15 years were also less likely to respond with uncertainty than children 
aged 12 years and under. Children aged 12 years and under responded with uncertainty 
significantly less than 16 to 17 year olds in response to directive questions, and 
significantly more than 13 to 15 year olds in response to suggestive questions (see Table 
3). There were no other significant differences.  
Question Centrality 
A RM-ANOVA was conducted to investigate effects of the centrality of question 
content (within-subjects repeated-measures: central, peripheral), lawyer role (within-
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subjects repeated-measures: prosecutors and defense lawyers), and children’s age 
(between-subjects factor: 12 years old and under, 13 to 15 years, 16 to 17 years). There 
were no significant main effects or interactions.  
Question Content 
A separate RM-ANOVA was conducted to investigate effects of question content 
(within-subjects repeated-measures: suspect, victim, witness, contextual, disclosure, prior 
formal questioning), lawyer role (within-subjects repeated-measures: prosecutors and 
defense lawyers), and children’s age (between-subjects factor: 12 years old and under, 13 
to 15 years, 16 to 17 years). Mauchly’s test of sphericity was violated, thus Greenhouse-
Geisser corrections were applied (ε = .67). There was a main effect for question content, 
F(3.32, 176.15) = 8.13, p < .001, p2 = .13. Children answered with uncertainty less often 
in response to questions about disclosure than to questions about any other content (see 
Table 4). There was also an interaction between lawyer role and children’s age, F(2, 53) = 
3.34, p = .04, ηp2 = .11. Prosecutors elicited significantly less uncertainty when prompting 
children aged 13 to 15 than children of any other age (see Table 5). There were no other 
main or interaction effects. 
Reluctance  
To investigate whether uncertainty was related to reluctance, the relationship 
among indications of uncertainty, children’s productivity, and expressions of overt 
emotion or confusion was examined. A bivariate correlation, controlling for transcript 
length, revealed no significant relationship between the average number of new details 
elicited per child and the proportion of all responses which expressed uncertainty, r(56) = 
.19, p = .17.  
However, partial correlations, controlling for transcript length, revealed a 
significant relationship between uncertain response frequency and the number of overt 
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expressions of resistance, r(53) = .62, p < .001, and confusion, r(53) = .34, p = .006. There 
was no significant relationship between the numbers of uncertain responses and of overt 
expressions of distress, r(53) = .20, p = .15.  
Discussion 
Many aspects of courtroom testimony are difficult for child witnesses. Children are 
often asked to recount complicated events that may have happened years ago in response 
to complex questions posed by opposing lawyers. Witnesses also experience immense 
pressure while under oath in a high-stakes environment. Because children’s testimony is 
often the most important piece of evidence in sexual abuse cases, the reliability of their 
accounts is of paramount importance and it is thus critical for child witnesses to indicate 
their uncertainty when appropriate in the courtroom. The present study was the first to 
investigate children's expressions of uncertainty when questioned by prosecutors and 
defense lawyers in court.  
Ground Rules 
The don’t know/remember ground rule was administered to 38% of the children in 
the present study and was sometimes reiterated when questioning resumed after a break.  
However, lawyers never practiced the use of the ground rule with the children, and so, as 
in Earhart et al.’s (2014) study, the presentation of the don’t know/remember ground rule 
was not associated with a significant increase in the frequency with which children 
expressed uncertainty. Further, children rarely explained why they were uncertain, perhaps 
because they were not prompted to do so. Since practice using the don’t know/remember 
ground rule prior to substantive questioning increases children’s propensity to express 
uncertainty when appropriate in experimental settings (Cordón, Saetermoe, & Goodman, 
2005; Endres, Poggenpohl, & Erben, 1999; Gee et al., 1999; Mulder & Vrij, 1996; Nesbitt 
& Markham, 1999; Saywitz & Moan-Hardie, 1994; Waterman & Blades, 2011; see 
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Brubacher, Poole, & Dickinson, 2015, for a review), more research is needed to 
investigate how preparatory procedures to help witnesses indicate uncertainty can be made 
more effective in the field. Moreover, in cases of adolescents and teenagers, the use of 
ground rules may be enhanced if there is a reassurance that normalizing the issue that lack 
of memory or knowledge may well be commonplace when one is asked about past events. 
This might help set adolescents and teenagers who fear appearing incompetent by saying 
“I don’t know” at greater ease and also alert the jury to the challenge of memory retrieval 
prior to substantive questioning. 
Overall Rate of Uncertainty 
Uncertain responses constituted a substantial minority of all responses (15%). 
Because many courtroom questions put to children were focused, complex, and about 
events often experienced long ago – it may be surprising that children expressed 
uncertainty as little as they did. Further, children expressed more uncertainty in response 
to substantive than to non-substantive prompts, and, contrary to prediction, overall there 
was no difference in the propensity to express uncertainty in response to prosecutors and 
defense lawyers. The greater-than-expected extent to which children expressed uncertainty 
in the courtroom may be explained by the context.   
Children testifying in court find themselves in a formal, high-pressure, high-stakes 
environment; the final stage of the investigative procedure in which they are under oath to 
tell the truth and a verdict with soon be reached. Furthermore, it is likely that child 
witnesses are brought to court because they are cooperative and have previously disclosed 
abuse. It thus follows that children might express uncertainty more in court (i.e., 15%) 
than in forensic interviews (between 6%, Earhart et al., 2014, and 12%, Hershkowitz et al., 
2015) because questions in court are more likely to be option-posing or suggestive 
(Andrews et al., 2015), and to be linguistically complex or include legal jargon (e.g., 
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Hanna et al., 2012). Furthermore, contrary to research examining child forensic interviews 
(Hershkowitz et al., 2015), more expressions of uncertainty were elicited by substantive 
than non-substantive questions, perhaps because the children were under greater pressure 
to respond accurately about issues of substance in court.  
It is unclear why, overall, children did not express more uncertainty in response to 
prosecutors than to defense lawyers, and further research is needed to elucidate this 
finding. However, it is possible that children are aware that defense lawyers are aiming to 
challenge the veracity of their testimony and/or may have been advised to express 
uncertainty when appropriate, particularly in response to defense questions. This, along 
with the high rates of closed-ended and suggestive questions asked by both prosecutors 
and defense lawyers (Andrews et al., 2015), and pressure to tell the truth, may partly 
explain the absence of differences related to the lawyers’ roles.  
Question Type 
We expected that the tendency to express uncertainty would vary depending on the 
question type. In line with our predictions, directives (e.g., “Where did you go?”) elicited 
more uncertain responses than other question types (e.g., “Did you go to the park or to 
school?”). These findings support experimental research suggesting that it is easier to 
guess in response to forced-choice/option-posing questions (which offer a possible 
response) than to recall-based questions (Gee et al., 1999; Waterman et al., 2000, 2004). 
More nuanced linguistic research is needed to understand why children responded to 
prosecution invitations with more uncertainty than defense invitations and to defense 
directive questions with more uncertainty than prosecutors’ directive questions.  
Since the extant literature was inconsistent, we made no predictions regarding age 
and children’s propensity to express uncertainty. However, age effects did emerge in the 
current study. Interestingly, overall, children aged 13 to 15 years old expressed less 
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uncertainty than older and younger children, particularly when answering invitations and 
suggestive questions. It may be the case that adolescents are particularly defensive when 
responding to suggestive questions, and so are more likely than their counterparts to 
respond to suggestive questions, even when they do not know the answer. Further, it might 
be the case that adolescents are more concerned than younger children about being 
perceived by jurors as credible witnesses (by appearing confident and mature), but may 
not understand the importance of expressing uncertainty when necessary. Such a tendency, 
combined with the lawyers’ likely tendency to overestimate the children’s cognitive and 
linguistic abilities (Hanna et al., 2012), may have increased the tendencies of these youths 
not  to indicate uncertainty when they should. Such findings highlight the need for more 
research to substantiate these speculations, as well as more research on older children in 
both experimental and field settings, where most researchers have focused on 3- to 13-
year-olds (Earhart et al., 2014; Waterman et al., 2004).  
Lastly, it is notable that children of all ages were equally likely not to express 
uncertainty in response to recognition-based and other types of questions. Although the 
current field study was unable to consider the accuracy of responses, a plethora of research 
suggests that recognition-based closed-ended questions elicit less reliable and accurate 
responses from children than more recall-based open-ended questions do (see Lamb et al., 
2008, 2015). This finding therefore raises serious concerns as to whether enough is being 
done to provide children with the opportunity to give their best evidence in court.  
Question Centrality and Content 
 It was expected that peripheral details would be harder for children to remember 
(e.g., Peterson & Whalen, 2001), and that children would thus express more uncertainty 
when answering these questions. Contrary to prediction, children were no more likely to 
express uncertainty in response to questions prompting peripheral information than 
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questions prompting central information. Perhaps when answering peripheral questions 
about emotionally salient and significant events in court, children do not find such details 
harder to remember than central details. However, it may also be the case that children felt 
pressure to respond to questions about peripheral content, perhaps because of the types of 
questions being asked or the broader questioning context, and so children expressed less 
uncertainty than was otherwise appropriate.  
As predicted, children were more likely to express uncertainty when questioned by 
defense lawyers than by prosecutors. In particular, though contrary to prediction, children 
were more likely to express uncertainty in response to defense lawyers’ questions about 
central content, perhaps because the defense lawyers sought to discredit the witnesses’ 
accounts by challenging key aspects of their testimony. It was also interesting that 
uncertain responding occurred much less when children were asked about disclosure than 
about any other content. This may be because children’s disclosure processes were 
particularly emotionally salient and the children were thus more certain about what 
happened. More research is needed to elucidate why these patterns of responding might 
occur.  
Reluctance Measures 
 As in other research (Earhart et al., 2014), there was no significant relationship 
between the rates at which children expressed uncertainty and their productivity, 
suggesting that uncertainty was not related to children’s reluctance. This finding is further 
supported by the lack of relationship between uncertainty rates and overt expressions of 
distress. However, the present study found that the rates at which children expressed 
uncertainty were positively associated with overt expressions of resistance and confusion. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that there is likely a relationship between 
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expressions of uncertainty and children’s reluctance, but that this relationship is much 
more nuanced than has previously been assumed.  
Since only a subset of reluctance measures were associated with uncertainty, 
uncertainty expressed in court may only sometimes reflect witness discomfort rather than 
a genuine lack of knowledge – and thus should not necessarily be deemed to reflect 
“reluctance”. This ambiguity calls for further examination of the circumstances in which 
uncertainty might reflect lack of knowledge or reluctance (e. g,, via laboratory research). 
Erroneously attributing uncertainty to reluctance may encourage questioners to push for 
answers and increase the likelihood that children will both provide inaccurate responses 
and feel discomfort. Similarly, the ability to identify uncertain responses that reflect 
reluctance may allow questioners to offer appropriate support and avoid persistent 
questioning that may foster inaccurate responding and frustration. 
Conclusions and Implications 
There is currently very limited guidance on how lawyers should question children 
in court. The guidance that does exist is neither well embraced nor well informed (Spencer 
& Lamb, 2012). In the United Kingdom, it is now widely accepted that gathering evidence 
from young and vulnerable witnesses requires special care, and that subjecting them to 
traditional adversarial forms of examination and cross-examination is no longer acceptable 
(Evidence and Procedure Review Report [Section 2.1], Scottish Court Service, March, 
2015; Spencer & Lamb, 2012). Evidence-based “Toolkits” (see Advocacy Training 
Council (ATC), 2011) have been introduced to provide continuing education and thus 
improve practice in England and Wales. Such toolkits should include empirically based 
recommendations to ensure that children understand the questions they are asked in court 
and feel comfortable expressing uncertainty. 
In particular, the findings of the current study found that most children were not 
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told on the record that they could express uncertainty when they did not know the answer 
to the questions asked, and it is not clear whether such instruction would have affected 
their willingness to respond in this way. Importantly, most expressions of uncertainty 
seemed to be offered when the children were unable to answer easily (i.e., recall-based 
prompts rather than recognition-based prompts), underlining the risks associated with the 
use of option-posing questions that make it easy for children to respond even when unsure 
of the correct answer. Furthermore, 13- to 15-year-olds were less likely overall than 
younger or older children to express uncertainty, perhaps because they were especially 
motivated to appear competent. It is therefore recommended that children and adolescents 
of all ages should be told the don’t know/remember ground rule on record prior to 
substantive questioning. Lawyers should practice the use of the don’t know/remember 
ground rule to check children’s understanding, and the ground rule should be reiterated 
throughout proceedings.  
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Table 1 
 
Coding Definitions and Examples 
 
Code Definition Example 
Elicitation 
type 
Spontaneous The child spontaneously responded with 
uncertainty.  
Lawyer: “What did he touch you with?” 
Child: “I can’t remember” 
 
Lawyer: “How did that feel?” 
Child: “Not sure” 
Lawyer elicitation The question contains reference to an 
expression of uncertainty, usually at the 
beginning or end of the question.  
Lawyer: “Do you remember what he touched 
you with?” 
Child: “No” 
 
Lawyer: “How did that feel? Do you know?” 
Child: “Not sure” 
In-answer Either spontaneous or lawyer elicited, but 
as well as expressing uncertainty, the child 
provides some substantive information. 
Lawyer: “Do you remember what he touched 
you with?” 
 
Child: “He touched my penis but I’m not sure 
what with.” 
 
Question 
type 
Invitation Open-ended, input-free utterances used to 
elicit free-recall responses from children. 
Such questions, statements, imperatives, or 
contextual cues do not restrict the child’s 
focus except in a general sense. Invitations 
can also follow-up on information just 
mentioned, or cue for additional free-recall 
elaboration about details previously 
mentioned.  
 
“Tell me everything that happened from the 
beginning to the end.”  
 
“Then what happened?” 
 
“Earlier you mentioned 
[person/object/action]. Tell me more about 
that.” 
 
“Tell me everything that happened 
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before/after you went to the park.” [when “I 
went to the park” was previously mentioned 
by the child] 
 
Directive Open-ended questions that refocus the 
child on aspects or details of the allegation 
that they have previously mentioned, 
mostly using WH- utterances to request 
further information.  
“Where were you when that happened?” 
 
“Who did that to you?” [when “that” was 
previously mentioned by the child] 
 
Option-posing Closed-ended questions that refocus the 
child’s attention on details of the allegation 
that they have not previously mentioned, 
although without implying an expected 
response. They can be formulated as 
“yes/no” or “choice” questions.  
“Did you see his penis?” 
 
“Was he wearing underwear?” 
 
“Did she do that one time or more than one 
time?”  
 
“Was this Thursday or Saturday evening?” 
 
Suggestive Statements or questions formulated in a 
way that communicates the expected 
response. They may introduce information 
not mentioned by the child but assumed by 
the lawyer or query the truthfulness of the 
child’s response.  
 
“He forced you to do that, didn’t he?” 
 
“Your dad told me that B. touched your 
private part. Did B. touch your private part?” 
 
Child: “He touched me.”  
Lawyer: “Did he touch your pee-pee over or 
under your clothes?” [when the child had not 
previously mentioned genital touching]  
 
“Did that really happen?”  
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Centrality Central Questions that are plot-relevant, such as 
the identification of main characters, the 
location and time of the incident, abusive 
actions. Changing any such central detail 
will change the plot of the incident 
described. 
“Who touched you?” 
 
“How did he take your clothes off?” 
 
“Were you positioned on the bed when he did 
this?” 
 
Peripheral Questions that are related to the incident, 
yet are not plot-relevant. Changing such 
details will not change the plot of the 
incident described. Examples include 
descriptions of people, descriptions of 
places, descriptions of time, emotions, 
thoughts.   
“How were you feeling when he did that?” 
 
“Can you describe how your bedroom was 
laid out at the time?” 
 
“Alan did this. Okay. Does Alan have a 
beard?” 
 
Content Suspect Focusing on the lawyer utterance, the 
specific content or information sought by 
the question is coded as suspect if it 
includes details regarding the suspect, 
suspect’s actions, suspect’s body parts, 
suspect’s verbal statements, suspect’s 
emotions or thoughts, or suspect’s sensory 
perceptions. As with all content codes, the 
information provided in response by the 
child may or may not be the information 
sought.  
“Who did that to you?” 
 
“Tell me about the man holding your arms.” 
 
“Tell me what you mean by his ‘wee-wee.’” 
 
“What did he say when he touched you?” 
Victim The specific content or information sought 
by the question is coded as victim if it 
includes details regarding the victim, 
victim’s actions, victim’s body parts, 
victim’s verbal statements, victim’s 
“You ran out of the room?” 
 
“Where did he touch you?” 
 
“Did you yell?” 
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emotions or thoughts, or victim’s sensory 
perceptions. 
“Tell me how you were feeling.” 
 
“Did you see anything?” 
 
Witness The specific content or information sought 
by the question is coded as witness if it 
includes details regarding the witness, 
witness’s actions, witness’s body parts, 
witness’s verbal statements, witness’s 
emotions or thoughts, or witness’s sensory 
perceptions. 
“Who was in the same room?” 
 
“Your brother was watching, wasn’t he?” 
 
“Tell me about what your brother said to the 
man.”   
 
“What did your brother see?” 
 
Contextual The specific content or information sought 
by the question is coded as contextual if it 
includes details regarding locations, time, 
and objects.  
“Where did the man sit?” 
 
“Tell me about the shelter where K. took 
you.” 
 
“What time of year was it?” 
 
“Did that happen one time or more than one 
time?” 
 
“Where did the Vaseline come from?” 
 
Disclosure The specific content or information sought 
by the question is coded as disclosure if it 
includes details regarding who the child 
disclosed to, the content of what was said 
during disclosure, when/where the 
disclosure occurred, the circumstances 
with which the disclosure occurred, the 
“Who did you tell?” 
 
“Did your mum get angry after you told?” 
 
“How did you feel when you told?” 
 
“What did you tell your mum?” 
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disclosure recipient’s reactions, and 
subsequent actions.  
Prior formal questioning The specific content or information sought 
by the question is coded as prior formal 
questioning if it includes details regarding 
what the child said to police officers/social 
workers/medical professionals at the scene, 
off-records, and during forensic interviews, 
as well as what the child said earlier in 
testimony.  
“Is that the same as what you said in your 
interview?” 
 
“Why is what is written in the interview 
transcript different from what you’re saying 
in court today?” 
 
“Officer D. told me that as you were leaving 
the room you turned to him and said you were 
making it up. Is that true?” 
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Table 2 
 
Proportions of Uncertain Responses by Question Type and Lawyer Role 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Question Type 
 Invitation Directive Option-posing Suggestive 
Lawyer Role M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Prosecutor .19 .03 .17 .01 .09 .01 .16 .02 
Defense .08 .03 .26 .03 .10 .01 .17 .02 
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Table 3 
 
Proportions of Uncertain Responses by Question Type and Children’s Age 
 
 Question Type 
 Invitation Directive Option-posing Suggestive 
Children’s Age M SD M SD M SD M SD 
12 and under .19 .05 .18 .03 .09 .02 .20 .03 
13 to 15 .05 .04 .21 .03 .07 .01 .12 .02 
16 to 17 .17 .05 .25 .03 .13 .02 .17 .03 
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Table 4 
 
Proportions of Uncertain Responses by Question Content 
	
Question Content N   Average n (SD) M SD 
 
Suspect 
 
56 
 
    
   67.64 (45.19) 
 
.16 
 
.02 
Victim 56    89.68 (85.07) .14 .02 
Witness 56    63.89 (40.86) .11 .01 
Contextual  56  123.41 (87.71) .14 .01 
Disclosure 50    13.34 (13.47) .06 .02 
Prior formal questioning 53    30.68 (32.56) .16 .02 
 
  
 	 222 
Table 5 
 
Proportions of Uncertain Responses by Lawyer Role and Children’s Age 
 
 Lawyer Role 
 Prosecution Defense 
Children’s Age M SD M SD 
12 and under .14 .02 .13 .03 
13 to 15 .07 .02 .14 .03 
16 to 17 .14 .02 .15 .03 
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Discussion 
The studies described in this dissertation yielded a number of important findings 
relating to the nature of the questions posed to children in court, underlining the validity of 
oft-expressed concerns (summarized earlier) about the ways in which children’s testimony 
is presented and challenged. Below, the key findings from the studies conducted to 
investigate four parameters of questioning and an in-depth analysis of children’s 
propensity to express uncertainty are summarized in turn. The implications of these 
findings are then discussed. 
Question Types [Chapter 1] 
The types of questions used to elicit accounts of children’s experiences affect both 
the quantity and quality of the information they provide (see Lamb, La Rooy, Malloy, & 
Katz, 2011; Lamb, Malloy, Hershkowitz, & La Rooy, 2015; Saywitz, Lyon, & Goodman, 
2011, for reviews). On the one hand, when questioned with open-ended free-recall 
prompts (e.g., “Tell me what happened.”), children provide accounts that may be brief but 
are more likely to be accurate, whereas the probability that responses will be erroneous 
increases considerably when children are questioned using closed-ended recognition 
prompts (e.g., “Did he touch you with his fingers?”), due to the false recognition of details 
and response biases (e.g., Jones & Pipe, 2002; Lamb, Orbach, Hershkowitz, Horowitz, & 
Abbott, 2007). Younger children are more likely than older children and adults to provide 
erroneous details in response to closed-ended questions (e.g., Waterman, Blades, & 
Spencer, 2001, 2004; see Melnyk, Crossman, & Scullin, 2007, for a review). Suggestive 
prompts are most problematic because children, especially young children, may change 
details in their accounts and thus respond inconsistently, either by incorporating suggested 
information or acquiescing to perceived interviewer coercion (e.g., Bruck & Ceci, 1999; 
Bruck, Ceci, & Principe, 2006; Eisen, Qin, Goodman, & Davis, 2002; Lamb & Fauchier, 
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2001; London & Kulkofsky, 2010; Orbach & Lamb, 2001).  
Because the quantity and quality of the information obtained from children is 
affected by the form of the questions posed, it was important to analyze the types of 
questions lawyers asked in court and how children of different ages (discussed here and 
below using three age groups that accord with the Sexual Offences Act (2003): 12 years 
and under, 13 to 15 years, 16 to 17 years) responded to those questions. 
We found that prosecutors were significantly more likely than defense lawyers to 
use invitations, directives, and option-posing prompts, whereas defense lawyers were 
significantly more likely than prosecutors to use suggestive prompts. The present findings 
also made clear that the difficulties children face with respect to being able to respond 
productively and consistently in court are not solely attributable to cross-examination by 
defense lawyers. Prosecutors, too, used more closed-ended than open-ended prompts, were 
most likely to use option-posing prompts, and virtually never asked invitations. The same 
was true of judges, too, although the majority of the questions they asked were non-
substantive.  
In response, children gave less appropriate answers and were less informative 
when answering defense lawyers than prosecutors. There were few age differences in 
children’s tendencies to answer appropriately, but the youngest children provided the least 
information in response to prosecutors’ questions. Furthermore, the youngest children 
were least informative in response to prosecutors’ suggestions and more productive in 
response to defense lawyers’ suggestions, perhaps because the younger children did not 
understand why they were being asked suggestive questions by the prosecutors.  
We further found that both prosecutors and defense lawyers elicited a substantial 
amount of information inconsistent with the children’s other responses. Although self-
contradictions were proportionally rare, all children contradicted themselves at least once, 
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with defense lawyers eliciting more self-contradictions than prosecutors. Prosecutors 
elicited more self-contradictions from the oldest children than from children in the middle 
age group, whereas defense lawyers elicited fewest contradictions from the youngest 
children, but there were no age differences in acquiescence to suggestion. In response to 
suggestive questions, more self-contradictions were elicited from children aged 13 to 15 
years than from the youngest and oldest children. These findings highlight children’s 
ability to resist some suggestions by both prosecutors and defense lawyers, but also make 
clear that suggestive questions can have diverse effects on children depending on their age 
and the identity of the questioner.  
 Suggestive questioning places pressure on children to reconsider and change their 
previous responses; both experimental (e.g., Jack & Zajac, 2014; Fogliati & Bussey, 2014; 
Zajac & Hayne, 2003) and field (Zajac, Gross, & Hayne, 2003) research has shown that 
children are most likely to change their answers when questioned using closed-ended 
suggestive prompts. In the present research, we found that suggestive questions were more 
likely to elicit self-contradictions than closed-ended option-posing prompts, open-ended 
directives, and invitations, while option-posing questions were more likely to elicit self-
contradictions than invitations. The present findings are further concerning because 
children acquiesced to suggestive questions almost 70% of the time, and acquiesced more 
in response to defense lawyers’ suggestions than to prosecutors’.  
Further, it is widely acknowledged that tagged questions are highly suggestive and 
persuasive (see Plotnikoff & Wolfson, 2007; Spencer & Lamb, 2012), and, given their 
complexity (Walker, Kenniston, & Inada, 2013), there have been calls for judges to 
restrict the use of tag questions, particularly when directed to the youngest children 
(Judicial College [fairness in courts and tribunals], 2010; R v Barker, 2010). However, 6% 
of all prosecutors’ and 25% of all defense lawyers’ suggestive questions in the present 
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study were tagged. Children were less responsive and more acquiescent in response to 
tagged questions than untagged questions, and lawyers did not alter their use of tagged 
questions depending on the children’s ages. Such findings raise serious concerns about the 
extent to which suggestive questions, particularly tagged questions, are being avoided or 
proscribed in court.  
Overall, the current findings suggest that the majority of lawyers’ prompts, 
particularly defense lawyers’ prompts are ‘risky’ question types (closed-ended and 
suggestive). Such prompts had detrimental effects on children’s responsiveness, 
productivity, and consistency, and lawyers did not alter the nature of their questioning 
with children’s ages. However, question type is not the only parameter that may influence 
the way children are afforded to give evidence in court, as was shown in a close 
examination of the language used by the lawyers when questioning children.  
Linguistic Complexity [Chapter 2] 
One major concern has been that lawyers ask many linguistically complex 
questions, and that children may not possess the linguistic capacity and psychological 
competence necessary to effectively comprehend and respond to courtroom questioning 
(Hanna, Davies, Henderson, Crothers, & Rotherham, 2010; Zajac, O’Neill, & Hayne, 
2012). Indeed, children seldom request clarification of grammatically complex and/or 
nonsensical questions (Carter, Bottoms, & Levine, 1996; Zajac et al., 2003), perhaps 
because they have difficultly detecting whether or not they have understood the requests. 
Such questioning techniques violate guidelines, based on an extensive body of 
experimental and field research, outlining the best ways to elicit testimony (see Rush, 
Quas, & McAuliff, 2012; Spencer & Lamb, 2012) and raise serious questions about the 
extent to which courts ensure both that guilty suspects are convicted and that innocent 
suspects are not wrongly convicted. 
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Operationalizing linguistic complexity is a complex issue in itself. By definition, 
the complexity of questions is enhanced whenever any lexical, syntactic, semantic, or 
pragmatic aspect of the question increases processing time (Walker et al., 2013). Since 
adding length and additional structural components to questions is likely to greatly 
increase processing time, the present research focused on the structural complexity of 
lawyers’ questions and the effects of complexity on children’s responses. The linguistic 
complexity of lawyers’ questions was assessed using 8 quantitative measures of each 
utterance’s components (number of questions, phrases, clauses, sentences, false starts, 
average word count, word length, and sentence length). These 8 measures were compiled 
to form a composite measure of complexity that was used in the analyses.  
We found that defense lawyers tended to ask more complex questions of children 
in the courtroom than prosecutors did, but there was considerable variability. Many of the 
lawyers’ questions were quite simple in structure, whereas others were more complex. The 
average utterance contained one question, formed by 14 relatively short words within one 
sentence, with few false starts. However, the average number of phrases per utterance was 
4, and the average number of clauses per utterance was 2.5, suggesting that many 
utterances contained multiple clauses. Such questions are notoriously difficult for children, 
particularly those aged 12 years and under, to monitor and answer accurately (see Walker, 
1993; Walker et al., 2013). Furthermore, some utterances contained 8 questions, some 
involved as many as 10 sentences, some included up to 184 words, and some contained 
words that averaged as many as 15 letters in length! Such questions would likely be 
extremely difficult for adults to monitor and answer, let alone children responding in 
extremely stressful and upsetting circumstances and after long delays between the event(s) 
in question and the courtroom testimony.  
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These issues are further exacerbated by both the prosecutors’ and defense lawyers’ 
manifest insensitivity to the children’s ages. Lawyers did not alter the structural 
complexity of the questions they posed depending on the children’s ages, suggesting 
insensitivity to children’s developmental capacities and limitations. Put another way, both 
prosecutors and defense lawyers used similarly complex questions to address 5- to 12-
year-olds and 16- to 17-year-olds. Studies conducted in New Zealand (Davies & Seymour, 
1998; Zajac et al., 2003) and California (Evans, Lee, & Lyon, 2009) similarly showed 
lawyers’ inattention to children’s ages, implying that this problem is not unique to 
Scotland, but may be a common characteristic of adversarial legal systems. 
Open-ended directive questions were less linguistically complex than closed-ended 
option-posing questions, open-ended invitations, and suggestive questions. Suggestive 
utterances were the most linguistically complex questions, particularly when asked by 
defense lawyers. Tagged questions were the most linguistically complex form of 
suggestive questions. Not only do tag questions pose risks to the veracity of children’s 
responses because of their suggestiveness (Spencer & Lamb, 2012; Walker et al., 2013), 
but such risks are exacerbated due to the high degree of linguistic competence they 
demand (Walker et al., 2013). The current findings thus support recent calls for courts to 
restrict the use of the suggestive questions (Carloway, 2013; Lord Chief Justice’s Criminal 
Practice Directions, 2013; Spencer & Lamb, 2012). 
As the linguistic complexity of the questions increased, so too did the likelihood 
that children would be unresponsive, express uncertainty, or (non-significantly) contradict 
themselves. Our findings are consistent with those of studies showing that increased 
complexity reduces the accuracy and informativeness of children’s reports (Cashmore & 
DeHaas, 1992; Zajac et al., 2003; Zajac & Cannan, 2009). Increases in such responding 
may have deleterious effects on the evaluation of children’s testimony (Bruer & Pozzulo, 
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2014; Goodman, Golding, & Haith, 1984; Myers, Redlich, Goodman, Prizmich, & 
Imwinkelried, 1999; Semmler & Brewer, 2002), and the consequences may be serious. In 
the present study, children’s responses were largely influenced only by the linguistic 
complexity of questions, regardless of who asked them and how the questions were 
formulated, suggesting that linguistic complexity is a powerful determinant of children’s 
responses.  
We found no age differences in the children’s responses, suggesting that young 
witnesses of all ages are remarkably responsive and consistent in the face of challenging 
courtroom questioning. However, since the accuracy of children’s responses cannot be 
assessed in field research, it is possible that the children simply acquiesced to the large 
number of suggestions and option-posing questions asked of them in court (Chapter 1; 
Andrews, Lamb, & Lyon, 2015a). Indeed, because option-posing and suggestive questions 
are more likely to be linguistically complex, it is possible that many children were 
responsive to questions they did not fully understand, and thus our results underestimated 
the deleterious effects of question complexity on children’s responses.  
In sum, although defense lawyers tended to ask more complex questions of 
children in the courtroom than prosecutors did, the present study revealed considerable 
variability. Many of the lawyers’ questions were quite simple in structure, whereas others 
were more complex. Importantly, both prosecutors and defense lawyers asked similarly 
complex questions of children regardless of their age. Suggestive questions were the most 
complex. Variations in the complexity of questions had an impact on the quality of 
children’s responses. Children were less likely to respond, more likely to express 
uncertainty, and non-significantly more likely to contradict themselves when questions 
were more complex. These findings highlight the additional risks associated with asking 
some types of questions in structurally complex ways and highlight the need for further 
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innovations (e.g., the use of intermediaries) to facilitate the questioning of vulnerable 
witnesses in Scottish criminal courts. The detrimental effects of risky question types and 
linguistically complex questions is likely to be further exacerbated when such questions 
are repeated, as examined in the next Chapter.  
Question Repetition [Chapter 3] 
Repeated questions provide interviewees with opportunities to change their initially 
correct or incorrect responses. Since triers of fact often place emphasis on report 
consistency when assessing the credibility of oral testimony (Bruer & Pozzulo, 2014; 
Myers et al., 1999; Semmler & Brewer, 2002), the adverse effects that inappropriate 
question repetition may have on children’s testimony merited close examination. We 
found that all children were prompted with repeated questions in Scottish courts. Defense 
lawyers repeated more questions (39.6% of all the questions they asked) than prosecutors 
(30.6%) and they repeated questions using more suggestive question types (52% of their 
repeated questions) than prosecutors (18%) did. Younger children were asked more 
repeated questions than older children, but the effects of question repetition were no more 
detrimental, in terms of consistency, for younger children than for older children.  
Repeated questions most often elicited repetition and elaboration, which may have 
enhanced the informativeness of the children’s testimony (Andrews & Lamb, 2014; 
Andrews et al., 2015b; La Rooy & Lamb, 2011). Repeated questions also elicited self-
contradictions on occasion. Although we were unable to assess the accuracy of children’s 
responses and the rate of self-contradiction was low, the risks of confusion and inaccuracy 
they foster may be substantial and the consequences may be serious. Furthermore, 
although self-contradictions were infrequent overall, Andrews et al. (2015b) showed in a 
previous study of Californian cross-examinations that the rate increased dramatically as 
repetition frequency increased. This is of particular concern because nearly 70% of the 
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repeated questions in the present study were repeated more than once. Because in the 
present study each repeated question was repeated an average of 2.5 times, most repeated 
questions were closed-ended or suggestive, and in 50 separate instances questions were 
repeated 10 or more times, it is worrying that no Scottish lawyers or judges ever raised 
asked-and-answered objections. Such failures to object may have been motivated by the 
lawyers’ expectations of the judges’ responses, since Andrews et al. (2015b) found that 
when Californian lawyers objected, their objections tended to be overruled. Nevertheless, 
there is no obvious reason why judges repeatedly failed to intervene.  
Suggestive repeated questions had greater effects on children’s consistency when 
posed by defense lawyers than by prosecutors, whereas non-suggestive repeated questions 
resulted in more repetitions and elaborations when posed by prosecutors than by defense 
lawyers. These findings suggest that question repetition is a technique that is frequently 
utilized to undermine witness consistency during cross-examination, although children of 
all ages were somewhat resistant to the implicit coercion. As noted above, however, the 
risks may be substantial, particularly when questions are repeated multiple times. As in 
Andrews et al.’s (2015b) study, questions repeated immediately after preceding prompts 
elicited more elaborations and repetitions from children than when questions were 
repeated after delays. By contrast, self-contradictions were more likely when there were 
delays between initial prompts and repeated prompts than when questions were repeated 
immediately. 
Of course, questions may sometimes need to be repeated to make the requests clear, 
to clarify details previously mentioned by the children (e.g., ambiguous or unclear 
responses), or to encourage children who are anxious or reluctant (Andrews & Lamb, 
2014; La Rooy & Lamb, 2011), and their repetition may lead children to change 
previously incorrect answers, but the sheer amount of question repetition found in the 
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present study is alarming and findings suggest that lawyers frequently ask children ‘risky’ 
repeated questions. Lawyers and judges should be made aware of the potential harm 
associated with unnecessary question repetition and of how these effects may be reduced 
(i.e., ensure questions are repeated immediately after the initial prompts, that reasons for 
repetition are explicitly explained to children, and repeated suggestive questions are 
avoided). Training should encourage lawyers to utilize the asked-and-answered objection 
and judges to sustain objections when warranted so that children’s developmental 
capabilities are respected.  
Question Content [Chapter 4] 
Research investigating the ways in which children are directly and cross-examined 
by lawyers in court has overwhelmingly focused on the types of questions asked and the 
effects thereof on children’s responses. Whilst more recent research has begun to assess 
the combined effects of question type, linguistic complexity, and question repetition on 
children’s responses, very few field studies have comprehensively considered how the 
content of questions, including whether the questions prompt central or peripheral 
information in relation to the allegations under investigation, affects children’s responses. 
Indeed, the contents of the questions prosecutors and defense lawyers ask are likely to 
differ due to their opposing motivations. This study investigated the centrality of the 
information sought by lawyers, the topical focus of the questions asked, and the effects of 
these factors on witnesses’ responses.  
Although lawyers’ questions were more likely to focus on central (e.g., 
identification of main characters, the location and time of the incident(s), and abusive (or 
target) actions) rather than peripheral details (e.g., descriptions of people, places, temporal 
parameters, emotions, and thoughts), 40% of all questions were focused on peripheral 
details. Defense lawyers (47%) asked more questions about peripheral details than 
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prosecutors (36%) did, but because children respond more accurately to questions about 
central than about peripheral details (Almerigogna, Ost, Akehurst, & Fluck, 2008; Candel, 
Merckelbach, Jelicic, Limpens, & Widdershoven, 2004; Peterson & Bell, 1996; Poole & 
White, 1991; Saywitz, Goodman, Nicholas, & Moan, 1991; Tucker, Mertin, & Luszcz, 
1990; Wright & Stroud, 1998), it is surprising that prosecutors asked so many of these 
risky questions. Although questions focused on peripheral details can elicit forensically 
important information, such details are unlikely to be as important as central details in 
determining whether abuse occurred (Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1987).  
With regard to question topic, lawyers devoted a large proportion of their questions 
to exploring with children aspects of the location, time, and witnesses, with questions 
prompting information about location and witnesses more likely to focus on peripheral 
than central details. It is also significant that topics such as those asking about body parts 
and sensory perceptions were discussed much less than other details, given that the 
lawyers were exploring allegations of sexual abuse. That said, it was clear that there were 
lawyer role differences in the topics of the questions asked, broadly in line with their 
motivations. Prosecutors asked children more about the suspect, victim (perhaps to bolster 
character/credibility), suspect actions, time, body parts, and suspect verbal statements than 
defense lawyers, whereas the latter were more likely than prosecutors to ask children 
about victim actions (perhaps to draw attention to the actions that victims did or did not 
take), witness actions, witness verbal statements, and disclosure processes.  
Children were more likely to respond and to do so more productively when asked 
about central rather than peripheral details.  Questions about dynamic actions, such as 
victim actions, were more productive than questions about static content, such as body 
parts. These patterns are likely to further vary depending on question type, such that more 
open-ended questions elicit more productive responses from children than closed-ended 
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questions (see Ahern, Andrews, Stolzenberg, & Lyon, 2015; Andrews et al., 2015c). 
However, it is noteworthy that questions focused on five topics (victim, body parts, 
witness verbal statement, prior formal questioning, sensory perceptions) elicited relatively 
few substantive details. Low productivity in response to questions about victims, body 
parts, and sensory perceptions may reflect resistance or embarrassment on the part of the 
children, whereas low productivity in response to questions about witness prior statements 
and prior formal questioning may reflect particular difficulty recalling details about that 
topic, perhaps because those details are less salient than details about, for example, 
actions. Some of this speculation, which must be further investigated, is supported by the 
finding that children were least responsive to questions about witness verbal statements 
and sensory perceptions.  
Although prosecutors elicited more productive and responsive answers in response 
to questions about central rather than peripheral details, there was no difference in 
children’s productivity when responding to defense lawyers’ questions probing central as 
opposed to peripheral information, and children were more responsive to defense lawyers’ 
questions about peripheral details. Defense lawyers elicited more responsive answers than 
prosecutors when asking children about witness actions, witness verbal statements, 
disclosure processes, and thoughts and emotions. This may be because witnesses strongly 
resisted the credibility challenges put to them during cross-examination (see Szojka, 
Andrews, Lamb, Stolzenberg, & Lyon, 2017).  
Children contradicted themselves more in response to defense lawyers’ than 
prosecutors’ questions (see also Chapter 1), but they did so in response to questions 
focused on both central and peripheral details, and there was no difference between 
lawyers in the rates at which children’s expressed uncertainty when answering questions 
focused on central and peripheral details. Whilst question centrality may play an important 
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role in influencing children’s productivity, responsiveness, and expressions of uncertainty, 
children’s self-contradictions were less influenced by the substance of the questions, but 
more affected, as in previous research, by question type (Chapter 1), structural complexity 
(Chapter 2), and question repetition (Chapter 3).  
Importantly, there were no differences associated with child age. In particular, this 
suggests that the lawyers were as likely to ask questions about peripheral details, despite 
evidence that young children find peripheral questions much more difficult to answer 
accurately than older children (Brady, Poole, Warren, & Jones, 1999; Roebers & 
Schneider, 2000). This finding suggests that prosecutors and defense lawyers focus both 
young and old children on aspects of their narrative that they are likely to struggle with: 
most notably, prompting temporal information (e.g., Droit-Volet & Izaute, 2005; 
Wandrey, Lyon, Quas, & Friedman, 2012; Zelanti & Droit-Volet, 2011). Overall, the 
centrality of the information sought and question topic are important parameters to 
consider when evaluating children’s responses to different types of questions. 
Children’s Propensity to Express Uncertainty [Chapter 5] 
One study closely examined children’s propensity to express uncertainty. In 
criminal court, the reliability and completeness of children’s accounts, especially of sexual 
abuse, is critical because witness testimony is often the primary source of evidence. It is 
thus important to examine the conditions under which children express uncertainty in 
court, since allowing children to express uncertainty increases the likelihood that the 
information elicited from them is truthful and accurate (Koriat, Goldsmith, Schneider, & 
Nakash-Dura, 2001; Roebers & Schneider, 2005). Furthermore, courtroom questioning 
can be unusual and difficult for children, who are accustomed to being tested by 
knowledgeable adults (Lyon, 2010), and often feel pressured to answer adults’ questions 
(Earhart, La Rooy, Brubacher, & Lamb, 2014). Lawyers may also question children using 
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complicated prompts about events that occurred long ago (Andrews et al., 2015a; Hanna et 
al., 2012; Spencer & Lamb, 2012), making it critical to prepare children for their unique 
roles as witnesses by instructing them not to guess and to express uncertainty when they 
do not know the answers to questions (i.e., the “don’t know” ground rule). Comparing 
children’s propensity to express uncertainty in response to prosecutors and defense 
lawyers may be particularly important because lawyers are motivated to undermine the 
opponents’ witnesses and to question alleged victims of child sex abuse accordingly, by 
asking easier or more difficult questions, respectively (Andrews et al., 2015a). 
Remarkably, however, very little field research has been conducted on children’s 
uncertain responses, and there has been no prior research on children’s uncertain 
responses in criminal court proceedings.  
 Thirty-eight percent of the children studied were instructed to express uncertainty 
when they do not know the answers to questions but this was not associated with a 
significant increase in the frequency with which children expressed uncertainty. Further, 
children rarely explained why they were uncertain, perhaps because they were not 
prompted to do so.  
However uncertain responses constituted a substantial minority of all responses (15%). 
Because many courtroom questions put to children were focused, complex, and about 
events often experienced long ago, it may be surprising that children expressed uncertainty 
as little as they did. Further, there was no difference in the propensity of children to 
express uncertainty in response to prosecutors and defense lawyers. It is possible that the 
children were aware that the defense lawyers were aiming to challenge the veracity of 
their testimony and/or may have been advised to express uncertainty when appropriate, 
particularly in response to defense questions. This, along with the high rates of closed-
ended and suggestive questions asked by both prosecutors and defense lawyers (see 
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above) and pressure to tell the truth may partly explain the absence of differences related 
to the lawyers’ roles.  
Directive questions (e.g., “Where did you go?”) elicited more uncertain responses 
than other question types (e.g., “Did you go to the park or to school?”). These findings are 
consistent with the results of experimental research suggesting that it is easier to guess in 
response to forced-choice/option-posing questions (which offer a possible response) than 
to recall-based questions (Gee, Gregory, & Pipe, 1999; Waterman et al., 2000, 2004).  
Children aged 13 to 15 years old expressed less uncertainty than older and younger 
children, particularly when answering invitations and suggestive questions. Perhaps such 
adolescents are more concerned than younger children about being perceived by jurors as 
credible witnesses (by appearing confident and mature), but may not understand the 
importance of expressing uncertainty when necessary. Such a tendency, combined with 
the lawyers’ likely tendency to overestimate the children’s cognitive and linguistic 
abilities (Hanna et al., 2012), may have increased the tendencies of these youths not to 
indicate uncertainty when they should.  
Children of all ages were equally likely not to express uncertainty in response to 
recognition-based and other types of questions. Although the current field study was 
unable to consider the accuracy of responses, a plethora of research suggests that 
recognition-based closed-ended questions elicit less reliable and accurate responses from 
children than more recall-based open-ended questions do (see Lamb et al., 2008, 2015). 
This finding therefore raises serious concerns as to whether enough is being done to 
provide children with the opportunity to give their best evidence in court. In cases of 
adolescents and teenagers, the willingness to express uncertainty may be enhanced if it is 
also acknowledged that lack of memory or knowledge is common when one is asked about 
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past events. The present findings highlight concerns surrounding preparatory procedures 
to help witnesses, especially adolescents, indicate uncertainty when testifying. 
 When considering question content, children were no more likely to express 
uncertainty in response to questions seeking peripheral information than questions about 
central information. Perhaps when answering peripheral questions about emotionally 
salient and significant events in court, children do not find such details harder to 
remember than central details. However, it may also be the case that children felt pressure 
to respond to questions about peripheral content, perhaps because of the types of questions 
being asked or the broader questioning context, and so children expressed less uncertainty 
than was otherwise appropriate. Children were more likely to express uncertainty in 
response to defense lawyers’ questions about central content, perhaps because the defense 
lawyers sought to discredit the witnesses’ accounts by challenging key aspects of their 
testimony. It was also interesting that uncertain responding occurred much less when 
children were asked about disclosure than about any other content. This may be because 
children’s disclosure processes were particularly emotionally salient and the children were 
thus more certain about what happened.  
Forensic contexts often involve children being questioned about personally 
significant and emotionally salient events. As a result, children may express uncertainty, 
not because they genuinely do not know or remember the answer, but because they are 
reluctant to respond to the question, either because they find the subject matter difficult to 
talk about, or because they want to omit details (see Earhart et al., 2014; Hershkowitz, 
Lamb, Katz, & Malloy, 2015). However, the current study found no significant 
relationship between the rates at which children expressed uncertainty and their 
productivity, suggesting that uncertainty was not related to children’s reluctance. This 
finding is further supported by the lack of relationship between uncertainty rates and overt 
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expressions of distress whereas the rates at which children expressed uncertainty were 
positively associated with overt expressions of resistance and confusion. Thus, uncertainty 
expressed in court may only sometimes reflect witness discomfort rather than a genuine 
lack of knowledge – and thus should not be deemed to reflect “reluctance”. Erroneously 
attributing uncertainty to reluctance may encourage questioners to push for answers and 
increase the likelihood that children will both provide inaccurate responses and feel 
discomfort. Similarly, the ability to identify uncertain responses that reflect reluctance 
may allow questioners to offer appropriate support and avoid persistent questioning that 
may foster inaccurate responding and frustration.  
Overall, this study showed that most children were not told on the record that they 
could express uncertainty when they did not know the answer to the questions asked, and 
it is not clear whether such instructions would have affected their willingness to actually 
do so. Importantly, most expressions of uncertainty seemed to be offered when the 
children were unable to answer easily (i.e., recall-based prompts rather than recognition-
based prompts), underlining the risks associated with the use of option-posing questions 
that make it easy for children to respond even when unsure of the correct answer. 
Furthermore, 13- to 15-year-olds were less likely than younger or older children to express 
uncertainty, perhaps because they were especially motivated to appear competent. It is 
therefore recommended that children and adolescents of all ages should be told to express 
uncertainty when appropriate prior to substantive questioning. Lawyers should practice the 
use of the don’t know/remember ground rule to check children’s understanding, and the 
ground rule should be reiterated throughout proceedings. 
Summary  
In sum, a large proportion of the questions posed to children by lawyers involved 
the use of suggestive questions that implied expected responses or introduced undisclosed 
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information. Questions were overly complex linguistically, heavily repetitious, and 
focused to a large extent on peripheral elements of the allegations. In response, children 
acquiesced to suggestions the majority of the time and expressed low rates of uncertainty 
given the nature of the questioning. Overall, both prosecutors and defense lawyers were 
insensitive to the developmental capacities of children of different ages; 5-years-olds were 
questioned in a similar manner to 17-year-olds. Taken together, it is clear that the nature 
of lawyers’ questions posed to children in court can undermine the quality of the evidence 
obtained, regardless of the role of the lawyer or the children’s ages.  
Implications 
Taken together, the findings obtained in this dissertation largely substantiate 
concerns about the inappropriateness of the ways in which children are questioned in court 
(e.g., Spencer & Lamb, 2012). Indeed, the suggestive and closed-ended questions that 
dominated cross-examinations in particular resulted in reduced responsiveness, less 
productivity, more compliance, and more self-contradictions from children than did open-
ended questions. On the whole, children were not given the opportunity to freely recall 
their evidence during direct-examinations, nor were they given the opportunity to fully 
respond to the challenges put to them during cross-examination. In adversarial 
jurisdictions, lawyers aim to undermine the opponents’ witnesses, and it was clear that 
they questioned child witnesses accordingly. Further, lawyers may challenge witness 
credibility and persuade children to change details in their accounts, often by exploiting 
their developmental limitations (Andrews et al., 2015a; Szojka et al., 2017; Zajac et al., 
2003). However, in the interests of fairness and justice, both prosecutors and defense 
lawyers need to consider the problems associated with these questioning practices. 
It is difficult for experts and laypersons alike to assess veracity (see Vrij, 2008). 
This problem is confounded when lawyers do not use the types of open-ended questions 
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that are likely to elicit accurate information (see Lamb et al., 2011). By asking misleading 
questions and inducing self-contradictions, whether intended or not, lawyers are hindering 
fact-finders’ abilities to reliably assess child witnesses’ credibility. Indeed, experimental 
research shows that children are just as likely to change initially correct answers during 
cross-examination as they are to change initially incorrect answers, suggesting that cross-
examination does not expose dishonest child witnesses effectively (Zajac & Hayne, 2003). 
Because triers-of-fact must determine guilt or innocence based on the evidence presented, 
it behooves us to provide them with the most reliable evidence possible (Henderson & 
Andrews, in press). Veracity can be assessed more accurately when children provide 
narrative accounts in the course of examinations adhering to the best-practice guidelines 
(see Earhart, La Rooy, & Lamb, 2016; Henderson & Andrews, in press; Hershkowitz, 
Fisher, Lamb, & Horowitz, 2007). Is it thus in the public interest for jurors to make 
decisions based on what amounts to manufactured and contaminated evidence (Cossins, 
2012)? For a trial to be fair, evidence needs to be elicited in accordance with research-
informed best-practice guidelines.   
One could argue that the cross-examination of witnesses is essential to protect the 
accused’s right to a fair trial (e.g., Article 6 (3d), of the European Convention on Human 
Rights; Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution), and that restricting the nature of the 
questioning reduces the extent to which the evidence can be challenged. Of course, the 
right for defendants to challenge evidence put against them should be protected. However, 
courts must also allow witnesses to give their best evidence (Home Office, 2011, section 
5.8), and the current findings suggest that this duty is not being fulfilled.  
One could also argue that much has changed in the education, attitudes, and 
practices of Scottish judges and advocates since 2009 as evidenced, for example, by the 
launch of the High Court of Justiciary Practice Note on Taking Evidence by a 
 	 242 
Commissioner (2017), rendering the current results (based on trials conducted between 
2009 and 2014) of limited relevance to today’s questioning practices, especially if 
Commissioners are more widely involved in the taking of children’s evidence. Whilst 
there may be wider recognition of the need to consider children’s developmental 
capacities and limitations during forensic questioning since 2009, and there have been 
procedural changes developed to help address theses issues, however, it is important to 
recognize that education and changes in attitudes and procedure do not necessarily yield 
changes in the nature of questioning within an adversarial culture. Our findings are 
relevant to current practices in two ways.  
First, the lawyers studied here questioned children in much the same way as 
lawyers in Californian cases tried 16 to 20 years ago (Andrews et al., 2015a). In fact, if 
anything, whilst prosecutors in Scotland and California questioned children using similar 
proportions of question types, defense lawyers in Scotland asked more suggestive 
questions than Californian defense attorneys. Although direct comparisons between two 
different jurisdictions and samples is far from ideal, these similarities nevertheless raise 
concerns about the extent to which the nature of questioning changes when those asking 
the questions are acting in accordance with their clients’ instructions.  
Second, we were able to test whether taking evidence on commission affects the 
nature of lawyers’ questioning. Eight children in the present sample gave evidence on 
commission. Although this sample was too small to allow sophisticated statistical 
comparisons with children who did not give evidence on commission, we were able to 
compare the two groups descriptively on many measures (see Table 2). The key difference 
between the groups was that that, although cases taken on commission involved younger 
children, their cross-examinations were longer. There was no evidence that the use of 
Commissioners resulted in less suggestive, linguistically complex, or repetitive 
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questioning. This finding is noteworthy because, as Lady Dorrian (2017) made clear when 
launching the High Court of Justiciary Practice Note on Taking Evidence by a 
Commissioner (2017), “…a successful Commission depends not only on the practical 
arrangements, but also on the nature of the questioning”. Our findings underline the need 
for legal practitioners to have additional support when it comes to questioning young and 
vulnerable witnesses. 
The nature of questioning can be improved through practitioner training at all 
levels. However, in order for training to be effective, three points should be considered 
(see Lamb, 2016; Stewart, Katz, & La Rooy, 2011). First, the delivery and content of the 
training should be based on methods that have been the subject of scientific study and 
proven to work. Second, training in best-practice questioning should be supported with 
information about the research base supporting the approach. Finally, training programs 
should be continuous and ongoing so that the quality of questioning is maintained at the 
highest standards possible (Lamb, Sternberg, Orbach, Esplin, & Mitchell, 2002; Lamb, 
Sternberg, Orbach, Hershkowitz, Horowitz, & Esplin, 2002). Of course, such training is 
likely to be both time consuming and costly.  
This realization has led several practitioners to create and advocate for the use of 
alternative self-administered training resources. For example, evidence-based “Toolkits” 
(see Advocacy Training Council (ATC), 2011) have been introduced to provide 
continuing education and thus improve practice in England and Wales. These Toolkits 
were endorsed in the Lord Chief Justice’s Criminal Practice Directions (2013), and more 
recently acknowledged by Lady Dorrian (2017) with the launch of the High Court of 
Justiciary Practice Note on Taking Evidence by a Commissioner. Although such materials 
are useful resources, there is no evidence that self-administered training without external 
review has the desired effects. Indeed, the effectiveness of “Toolkits” and other similar 
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resources for improving the nature of lawyers’ questioning has never been systematically 
assessed.  It is not yet clear whether the ways in which vulnerable witnesses are 
questioned in court can be ameliorated by training alone, if at all.  
One alternative is exemplified by the increasingly accepted and widespread use of 
registered intermediaries in England and Wales (see Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2009; 
Spencer & Lamb, 2012). Intermediaries are neutral specialists (often speech and language 
therapists) who facilitate the communication between particularly vulnerable witnesses 
and forensic practitioners during testimony. Proponents of the intermediary system believe 
that their involvement offers a range of benefits -- facilitating communication, helping 
witnesses cope with the stress of court, assisting in bringing offenders to justice, and 
identifying prosecutable cases (thus saving court time and money). By ensuring effective 
communication with vulnerable witnesses, the most reliable evidence possible should be 
presented to triers of fact (Henderson & Andrews, 2017).  
In many parts of the United Kingdom, Ground Rules Hearings (GRHs) are now 
required in all cases involving serious sexual allegations in which questions to be put to 
witnesses can be reviewed by all the practitioners involved. GRHs may be the critical 
forum in which intermediaries can be most effective (Rafferty, 2016). Indeed, practitioner 
surveys (e.g., Plotnikoff & Woolfson, 2009) and preliminary results from experimental 
analogue studies (e.g., Henry, Crane, Wilcock, & Jones, 2017) suggest that intermediaries 
indeed help children give better (i.e., more productive, less experienced distress) evidence. 
However, the effectiveness of this special measure has never been objectively and 
systematically evaluated in the field. There is cause for concern because extremely 
suggestive and unnecessary questions are often put to very young witnesses even after the 
intermediary and judge have reviewed the questions in a Ground Rules Hearing (personal 
observations). Intermediaries may also fail to distinguish between making witnesses feel 
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comfortable through context-appropriate rapport-building, and distracting witnesses 
through high-stimulation play, which can compromise proceedings. Further, many 
intermediaries still advocate the use of props, such as toys and diagrams, during forensic 
questioning, even though carefully conducted experimental research has shown them to do 
more harm than good to the quality of children’s evidence (Bruck, Kelley, & Poole, 2016). 
In sum, there remains considerable variability in the levels of expertise and the actual 
behavior of intermediaries (Henderson, 2012), and training is variable (Plotnikoff & 
Woolfson, 2007), yet the potential benefits associated with the involvement of well-
trained intermediaries are unmistakable.  
Finally, the Barnahus (children’s house) model has been identified as a long-term 
goal for Scotland (see Dorrian, 2017). Informed by the Children’s Advocacy Centers in 
the USA, Barnahus was introduced in Iceland in 1998, and has since resulting in a trebling 
of the number of perpetrators charged, a doubling of the number of convictions, and better 
therapeutic outcomes for children and their families (Children’s Commissioner, 2016). 
Each Barnahus is an unmarked residential property, designed to be a non-threatening, 
child-friendly, and familiar setting. Within the Barnahus, alleged victims are forensically 
interviewed by experts, undergo medical examinations, and are provided with ongoing 
therapeutic support. Critically, the interviews conducted there also serve as the children’s 
entire testimony. Only forensic interviewers question the children although defense 
lawyers have an opportunity to suggest questions for the interviewers to ask. This 
approach minimizes the trauma experienced by alleged victims and improves the quality 
of the evidence in accordance with best-practice guidelines (Children’s Commissioner, 
2016). Variations of the Barnahus model are currently being prepared for piloting in 
England and Wales.   
 	 246 
Legal practitioners and researchers need to develop practices and public policies 
together. Systematic, quantitative, objective psychological research can be a critical tool in 
that context. Improving the questioning of all witnesses, not only children and other 
vulnerable witnesses, should make it easier for the criminal justice system to ascertain the 
truth and reach fair decisions.  
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Table 1 
 
Scottish and Californian Sample Question Type Comparison 
 
 Scotland California 
Question type Prosecution Defense Prosecution Defense 
Invitation .03 .01 .03 .00 
Directive .28 .09 .29 .13 
Option-posing .54 .37 .52 .46 
Suggestive  .15 .54 .16 .42 
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Table 2 
 
Descriptive Comparison between Evidence Taken on Commission and Evidence Not 
Taken on Commission  
 
 Commission (n = 8) Not Commission (n = 48) 
Mean age (years) 11.6 14.4 
Gender 50% boys 25% boys 
Relationship to perpetrator Comparable – most biological father/step-father 
Alleged offence Comparable – most involved penetration  
Outcome Comparable – most resulted in convictions 
Average length of direct-
examination (in # 
questions) 
305 308 
Average length of cross-
examination (in # 
questions) 
260 192 
 Prosecution Defense Prosecution Defense 
Average proportion of 
open-ended questions 
(invitations and directives)  
 
.15 
 
.08 
 
.17 
 
.04 
Average proportion of 
option-posing questions  
.38 .42 .50 .35 
Average proportion of 
suggestive questions 
.47 .50 .33 .61 
Average proportion of 
suggestive tag questions  
.01 .14 .06 .21 
Average linguistic 
complexity  
      2.28       2.64        3.26       2.73 
Average # of repeated 
questions  
78 63 77 65 
Note. No statistical differences were significant between those who were questioned by 
commission and those who were not. For some comparisons the lack of statistical 
difference is likely due to the large standard deviations (i.e., variation) within the small 
commission sample.  
 
 
 
